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"FAMILY JEWELS"

Created: 5/16/1973

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

7 POUTING ANO RFCORD SHEET

(Ofoo

COMMENTS

on column ciio aath

APPBOVRD FOB BF.TiFA.1F, DATE;7

-flis oar

CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

"Family Jewels

purpose of this memorandum is to forward for your personal review summaries of activities conducted either by or under the sponsorship of the Office of Security in the past which in ny opinionwith the provisions of the National Security Act

These activities cover the period from9 to date and represent asecord as is available in our files. Those activities which took place prior to the date of my appointment as Director of Security4 have been developedertain extent through the recollection of the senior people in this Office who were involved or who had knowledge of the activities at the tine they occurred.

I have gone back to9elieve that the activities occurring since that time stilliable "flap potential" in that many of the people involved, both Agency and non-Agency are still alive and through their knowledge of the activitya possible potential threat or embarrassment to the Agency. ould be glad to provide clarification or an explanation of any of these activities if desired. You have ray assurance that unless otherwise stated each of these activities was approved by higher authority--the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Executive Director-Comptroller, or the Deputy Director for Support.

Attachments

eiirrnr ua'i for this period.

Various Surveillance and Supporthese are briefly summarized and range from the surveillance of newsmen to the provision of specialized support of local police officials in the Metropolitan area. elieve that each one is self-explanatory and, therefore, no further comment is needed here.

Equipment Support to Local Policettachedist provided me by the Director of Logistics (he will simply report these items in his report) which we have provided local police in the Metropolitan D. C. area over the past four or five years on indefinite loan. During the period when the Agency's installations in this area appeared toarget of dissident elements

EYEb OilLY

a conscious decision was made by the agency to utilize the services of local police to repel invaders in case of riot or dissension as opposed to utilization of our gsa guards, who are not trained in this type of activity. this equipment has been issued over the years to local police, principally fairfax and arlington county police departments. o not believe that this is totally illegal under the provisions of the national security actmitm sure that it would beas such in light of the recent congressional fuss over our police training activities.

7. audio countermeasures support to the united states secret service

s. test of specialized equipment in miami immediately prior to the political convention there

star

secset

subject:

roselli

r. richard m. bissell approached colonel sheffield edwards to determine if the office of security had assets that *ay assistensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. the mission target was fidel castro.

because of its extreme sensitivity,mall group was made privy to the project. the dci was briefed and gave his approval. colonel j. c. king, chief, wh division, was briefed, but all details were deliberately concealed from any of the jmwave officials. certain tsd and communications personnel participated

in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of the purpose of tho mission.

robert A.leared source of the office of security, was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an entree into the gangster elements as the first step toward accomplishing the desired goal.

mr. maheu advised that he had met one johnny roselli on several occasions while visiting Las vegas. he only knew him casually through clients, but was given to understand that heigh-ranking member of the "syndicate" and controlled all of the ice-making machines on the strip. maheu reasoned that, if roselli was inember of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the cuban gambling interests.

was asked to approach roselli,ersonal relations executive handlingforeign accounts, and tell him that he hadretainedlient who represented severalbusiness firms which were suffering heavyin cubaesult of castro's action. theythat castro's removal was the answer to their

problem and were willing torice0 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made clear to Roselli that the United States Government was not, and should not, become aware of this operation.

pitch was made to Rosellit the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New YorkJames O'Connell, Office of Security, wasthis meeting and was identified to Roselli asof Maheu. O'Connell actively served asuntil2 at which time tie phased out due

to an overseas assignment. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved, hut through Maheu's persuasion, he agreed to introduce himriend, Sam Gold, who knew the "Cuban crowd." Roselli made it clear he did not want any money for his part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals were ever paid out of Agency funds.

the week ofeptember, Maheuto San who was staying at theMiami Beach. It was several weeks afterwith Sam and Joe, who was identified to hir.courier operating between Havana and Miami, thatphotographs of both of these individuals insupplemental "Parade." They were identifiedSalvatoro Giancana" and Santos Trafficant,were on the list of the Attorney General's tenmen. The former was described as theof the Cosa Nostra and successor to Althe latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of Cubancalled this office immediately upon ascertaining

this information.

discussing the possible methodsthis mission, Sam suggested that thoyto firearms but, if he could be furnishedof potent pill, that could be placed in Castro'sdrink, it woulduch more effectiveindicated that herospective nominee inof Juanuban official who had beenpayments from the gambling interests, who stillto Castro, and wasinancial bind.

EYjjif ONLY

SHEET

was requested to produce six pillslethal content.

Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona, one of the principal officers in the Cuban Exile Junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress pi the Junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own

l l 'rerequisite to the deal, that J?orexpenses and requestedworth of communications equipment.

Dr. Verona's potential was never fully exploited, as the project was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode. Verona was advised that the offer was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved.

Of significant interest was an incident whichequest levied by San upon Maheu.

;re

At the height of the project negotiations, Sam expressed concern about his girlfriend, Phyllis McCuire, who he learned was getting much attention from Dan Rowan while both wei. bookedas Vegas night club. San asked Maheu toug in Rowan's room tothe extent of his intimacy with Miss McGuire. The technician involved in thewas discovered in the process, arrested, and taken to the Sheriff's office for questioning He called Maheu and informed hin that he had been detained by the police. This call was made in tho presence of the Sheriff's personnel.

Subsequently, the Department of Justice announced its intention to prosecute Maheu along

SEGSr

tmim

with the technician. ho DirectorSecurity briefed the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, on the circumstances leading up to Maheu's involvement in the wiretap. At our request, prosecution was dropped.

Inr. William Harvey took over as Case Officer, and it is not known by this office whether Rosolli was used operationally from that point on.

It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Roselli had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the United States. Our records do not reflect the date of conviction, but it is believed to have been sometime during

oselli, along with four other individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friars Club0igged gin rummy game.

Mr. Harvey reported to the Office of Security of his contacts with Roselli during November and7 and It was his belief that Johnny would not seek out the Agency for assistance in theproceedings unless he actually faced deportation. Roselli expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

Onaheu called James O'Connell, Roselli's first Case Officer, to advise that Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan, hadallhomas Haddin, Roselli's lawyer, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, and his client now faces deportation. Haddin indicated that, if someone did not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he wouldomplete expose of his activities with the Agency.

r. Helms was briefed

on the latest development in this case, and it was decided that the Agency would not in any way assist Roselli. Maheu was so advised of the Agency's position, and he was in

all.

21. Subsequently, Roselli or someone on his

complete agreement with our stand. He further adv that he was not concerned about any publicityffected him personally should Roselli decide to t

behalf furnished Jack Anderson details of the operation.

Attached are two Anderson columns dealing with thi matter.

22. The last known residence ofederal Penitentiary in Seattle, Washington.

Attachments

la!ilOii Tlffi 37

6 Aitemvts to Kill Castro Laid io CIA

Juvk AitdfrsOit ? valley inv.id- laie drains! President >si- tnmplete wiihl

er< Winded on the is'-iod.ch hn'rto-

Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

*i - * 'r ft*va.

awr roi imm.admitted wUrii he iMd -

.*foodPflll ind nOM

ooutt to fun CHOT.Fwfi CM ay. 3tew:ll tod mu

*ard All :old. sixt:on iiin t Mwy.nl art now

nclooul this period. floielU sorted'fi*ir client, cll.at ourmltsfon for.nder ihe rtireflM,ald all his;of Ris.

ie* .vjl of hi* Jarar; iBJS! mi

nd ri.Wd hieio Jin.)

The FBIMind ol Dt-paiincBi hai failed lo en-the asmiinaiion plot ^a*iuloftrirt to romp KMfllirpitto-i. Butbr th*

ia the"" . auernp'ed 1. Hart-r: Tro

oawto fun Cixr? Tr.tr-t Cub ni :j

He '1 xfrl1 John Sow! fl^ur. arM

ray. co-|Innate With a

atppver in La!(

the Chica-0'oB (h* i* Jamri

RomIU s addled Mjwidpwddie v. hith

ttrt.Can roV lift Vl>iV hv'ih^

C-ajt hySThiJi^rtSi inrd.r. ofoVrt

Coail Guard cuitm andSaM Ciancani tokMand Dr.-

and

contact. Tht renndeMlall th.t luhtriiH tho

n. ,hrim?o mil SowliL The FBIuailcr.io.-ldi. no UN lalow.ver, the Chi- dluovtred thai hit Cntcaroj r" liic xvaCubanno -ireel WnAha, bm In

that his nan. was roallyrtnanilipoo Sawo and thai he hadi^0^ *CJlafi

pan in Ui. aMat.ination slot.

rMCaitro ;oaVih* Havana ;amblin;

He*

I ipso

cam io' ibis country frwiipu* ttsiaary hasa rt.ld. Hea

f* |ri,

H# -as alto coavktrlhim l*

Hi* fl!* r Kxi^eimri refwrt lhai Cfaauea had EpL-tawttt, ai ran of liierark-.TfMwryo rcqiti" t ll!1, s-bllnf intereitn in- on trearmsai

RokIIi mad. micniihl ii -to Cubsaisins inpo^eriKais. Ore. a Cuban patrol (hip .turned IU ;uni on hiti oart of Os'caeal ^sat.oi. in ih*

.irJW.trtflA Vitomw nr Mf!

4 of iho

*sn CakaIr thot. ir*

|bmihos?tadows. fnmiw a

ftCfli in .flrllrr roiimns. vehaa nowrm. fll#*.

tort haw Hie CIAnd O'Coaata;

project mockingbird

projectelephone intercept activity, was conducted between3 andnd targatcd two washington-ba*ed newsmen who. at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this agency and others, including top secret and special intelligence.

telephone intcrcopt connections were installed at the newmcn's offico and at each of their homes,otal of 3. the connections were established with the assistanceelephone company official who respondedersonal request by the director of security, col. sheffield edwards. col. edwards' authority for the activity was mr. john a. mccone, director of central intelligence. the latter conducted the activity in coordination with the attorney general (mr. roberthe secretary of defense (mr. robertnd the director of the defense intelligence agency (cen, joseph carroll). in addition to office of security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: tbe deputy director of central intelligence (general marshall s.he inspector general (lyman kirkpatrick) and the general counsel. (mr. lawrence houston).

the intercept activity was particularly productive in identifyingof the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. for example, it was determined that during the period they received data fromewsmen, f whom were identified; enatorsembers of congress, all identified; ongressional staff members, of whomere identified;overnment employees,taff member of the white house, members of the vice president's office, an assistant attorney general, and other well-placed individuals. umber of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but ths short span of the activity precluded positive identification. it was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified ond official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

since the termination of project mockingbird, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two office of security professionals.

subject:

ivanovich nosenko

contention and he was confined at to convince him to "confess."

this office together with the office of general counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the agency's position inefector under these conditions forong period of time. strong representations were made to the director (mr. helms) by this office, the office of general counsel, and the legislative liaison counsel, and onhe responsibility for nosenko's further handling was transferred to the office of security under the direction of the deputy director of central intelligence, then admiral rufus taylor.

nosenko was movedomfortable safchouse in the washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his security case officer, mr. bruce solie, for moreear. it soon became apparent that nosenko was bona fide and he was noved to lore comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the federal bureau of investigation and this office since that time. he has proven to be the most

valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution

| He currentlyiving under an alias; ivorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and stalesegret my three years ofave no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

SURVEILLANCES

pan national with whom

During the0 February, urveillance was conducteda foraer staff employee, and

fa LUbai

xiVVfilVe information that_ employees information files, and that studio operated by City, Virginia.

become professionally and erao-Surveillanco was predicated upon

1 had been seeking from in intormation Processing Division employees werehotographic

addition to

phyTTCai

one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio

Fairfax surveillance, was

aade, and an attempt to enter the apartnent of was aborted becauseoor lock problem.

Pursuantequest from the CI Staff,the DCI, surveillances wore conducted

and her associates at various times from May to '

longource ot the informationlot

Nil Division and

aa given/ informationlot to assassinate or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. included coverage of the activities of Miss King during two visits to the United States, technicalof debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mailof several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverageommune in Detroit.

C. CELOTEX I

At the direction of theurveillance wasof Michael Getler of the Washington Post during

thectober,1 andn addition to physicalan observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could beof the building housing his office. Thewas designed to determine Getler's sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appearedumber of his columns.

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance wasof Jack Anderson and at various times his "legritt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, fromebruary to In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post wasin the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.

At the direction of theurveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti fromarch to The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articlesAgency operations.

II. POLICE SUPPORT

A. n several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department wasommunications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consistedadio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from the Washington Field Office equipped with radio receivers andand manned by two WFO Agents, as wellepresentative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency

S fiilLY

B. During the period8everal items of positive audio equipment consistingof clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department, New York City Police Department, and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

this office hasailprogram of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but alsoopening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters ofsecurity interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is nowormant stateecision as to whethor the operation will be continued or abolished.

For several years the Office of Security hassupport to Anatoleussian defectorto the CI Staff.

C. REDFACE I

Inhis officeurreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring,ormer defector working under contract for tho Agency. This involvedontact and

sonic alarm system,ault, nndafe within the vault. the purpose of thowas to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.

d. bureau of narcotics and dangerous drucjs

inhe director approved athe director, bureau of narcotics and to provide covert recruitment andsupport to bndd. this has beenthe mediumroprietary of the officeknown asoperating us'

Support

includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. it has been divided into three phases:i operation to placein bndd field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other bndd employees;

| and li)

recruitment ot an individual used as an Agent by bndd but actually employed by bndd, although this fact is known only to the director and chief inspector, bndd. in this caso, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from cia on abasis.

f. me rri mac

from7 to november

office of security proprietary, recruiter ana nanaifed several agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring

dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that she was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such informationeriodic report distributed toparts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.

SECRET

infra

SIM

tTj-ray

MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO LOCAL POLICE

V: :'

Helmet and Liners

and Groin Protector

Protective

Grenade

Flashing Red Light

Tear Gas

istol

with Shoulder Strap

Gun

NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits,and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.

SONLY

SUBJt-CT:

Countermeasures Support to the United States Secret Service

Onnd at the specific request of tho United States Secret Service, this Officetwo audio counterineasurcs technicians to the United States Secret Service in connection with the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois. This was not an official detail although both men were provided with temporary credentials identifying them as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.

One detailed the same two men to the United States Secret Service to cover the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida. On both occasions, the team members were debriefed upon their return and it is clear that their activities were confined exclusively to sweeping the candidates and potential candidates quarters.

T LY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Howard Osborn

Director of Security

Identification of Activities with

Embarrassment Potential for the Agency

1. In respondingay by menorandum to the DDO's request for the identification of any incident which might conceivably have an embarrassment potential for theited the equipment test which is mentioned in the attached memo. The test in question was related to the development of

TTTTTJ LUUI'bU UJUlllig

niuiaus were in and outfour hotels in Miami,equipment. Thisbefore the politicaland at leastthe hotels was within athe convention hall.

Chief, Division/I)

2. Although this completely innocent--althoughto misconstrual--activity may already have been drawn to your attention by your .own staffs-it has occurred to us that we should ensure you aro aware of it, given the involve mentecurity officer,

Att:

ayy

Miami,ug 71

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT :

Rquipment Tost, Miami, Florida,

Tbe following details concerning

penta for Subject tests were provided by

elephone conversation with

the

now retired, formerly .iusigned to

?est ot then

for the1 Field Security

uxTOT

tor CBa test were nanaied on pc'haif of "

ecurity Officer

the-Miami

isitora byconjunction wit

, r.

aascn

duties.

JVas in daily contactrrr the course of his oficiffr"ii

reluctant" to callat home

arrangements at this point, and suggested

JSucurity Officer by this time night have been transferred back to Headquarters and be availableirect query.

over an open telephone line to inquire about the specifics of the1-that t

Security indeed i;

The writer called Officer, whoe race-cnar

stationed at Headquarters,urrent assignment to a

1located in r

connections:

available via-tlie following tele-

The above details were provided by telephone tof

Chief,0 hours this darJe^

Distribution:

File

V-fi

MEMORANDUM FOP: Executive ROSELLI. John

This memorandum is 'or your information only.

Reference is made to our recent conversation regarding the Agency's participation in political assassinations. Attached heretoemorandum dated0 which wasto Mr. HolmB setting forth the circumstances of the Subject's activities on behalf of the Agency. Initially Roselli was unwitting

of Government interest, but as time went on, he suspected that the U. S. Government was involved and specifically the CIA.

Roselli is presentlyrison sentenceederal penitentiary in Seattle, Washington and awaits deportation upon completion of his current sentence.

This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation In the plot should we not Intervene on his behalf. The DCI decided lo ignore his threats andalculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalfJack Anderson details of the incident. Attached hereto are two of Anderson's articles dealing with Roselli. Anderson is also Editor of the Washington Bureau of the Washington Post, Sunday supplemental "Parade."

Individuals who were aware of this project were: Messrs. Dulles, Bissell, Colonel J. C. King, Colonel Sheffield Edwardu,

William Harvey, and James P. O'Connell. Also included were Robert A. Maheu and his attorneys Edward P. Morgan and Edward Bennett William*.

6. On1 arrangements were made with Immigration and Ndturalization Service Commissionerrell to flag any action that may be taken by his organization regarding deportation proceedings against Roselli. On2 James F. Green, Associate Commissioner for IfcNS. advised that they were deferring any deportation action for another year and would again call it to our attention upon expiration of Ihe dc ferral.

Atts

is rce mi

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fxecutive ROSELLI, John

ei.'iorandum is for your information only.

Reference is mado to our recent conversation regarding the Agency's participation In political assassinations. Attached heretoemorandum0 which wasto Mr.etting forth the circumstances of the Subject's activities on behalf of the Agency. Initially Roselli was unwitting

of Government interest, but as time went on, he suspected that the U. S. Government was Involved and specifically the CIA.

Roselli is presentlyrison sentenceederal penitentiary in Seattle, Washington and awaits deportation upon completion of his current sentence.

This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose Ms participation In tho plot should we not Interveoe on bis behalf. The DCI decided to Ignore his threats andalculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalfJack Anderson details of the Incident. Attached hereto are two of Anderson's articles dealing with Roselli. Anderson Is also Editor of the Washington Bureau of the Washington Post, Sunday supplemental "Parade, "

Individuals who were aware of this project were: Messrs. Dulles, Blssell, Colonel J. C. King, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,

turf

William Harvey, *nd Jbk.cb P. O'Connell. Alio Included were Robert A. Maheu ond hia attorneys Edward P. Morjtn and Edvard Bennett Wllllrrr.s.

6. On1 arrangementsdc with Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Raymond Farrell to flag any action that may be taken by bisi.tlon regarding deportation proceedings eg&Inst Roselli. Onames F.soclate Commissioner for IbNS, edviced tliat thoy were deferring any deportation action for anolSer year and would bgaln call It lo our attention upon cxplrctlon of the deferral.

nowara ji^jsdorn Director of Security

Atts

cv m

MlM FORi Director of Central ROSFLLI, Johnny

1. This memorandum is for information only.

Inr, Richard M. Finncll approached Colonel Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assistensitive miction requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

Because of its extreme tensitivlty,mall group was made privy to the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WHvision, was briefed, hut all details were deliberately concealed from any of the JMWAVF. officials. Certain TST and Commo personnelin the Initial planning stages, but were not witting of the purpose of tho mission.

Robert A. Maheu was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an rntrce into the gangster elements as tho first step towardthe desired goal.

Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through clients, but was given to understand that heigh-ranking member of the "syndicate" and controlled all of the ice-making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Poselli was Inember of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.

Maheu was .inked to approach Roselli, who knew Maheuersonal relations executivenicstie and foreign accounts, and tail him that he had recently been retainedlient who represented several international business firmsng heavy financial losses in Cubaesult of Castro's action. They were convinced that Castro's removal was the answer to their problem and were willing torice ofor its successful accomplithment. It was to be made clear to Roselli that the U. S. Government was not, and should not, become aware of this operation.

Tha pitch was made to Roselli on0 at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City. His initial reaction was to avoid getting Involved but, through Mahcu's persuasion, he agreed to Introduce himriend, Sam Gold, who knew the "Cuban crowd." Roselli made it clear he did not want any money for hia part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals was ever paid out of Agency funds.

During the week ofeptember, Maheu was introduced to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami reach. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was identified to himourier operating between Havana and Miami, that he saw photographs of both of these individuals In the Sunday supplemental "Parade." They were identified as Momo Palvatore Giancana and Santos Trafflcant, respectively. Both were on the list of tho Attorney General's ten most-wanted men. The former was described as the Chicago chieftain of the Cosa Nostra and successor to Al Cap one, and the latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations. Maheu called this office immediately uponthis information.

In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but, if he could be furnished some type of potent pill, that could be placed In Castro's food or drink, it woulduch more effective operation. Sam indicated that herospective nominee in the person of Juanuban official who had been receivingpayments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Castro, and wasinancial bind.

was requested lo produce six pills of liltjh

delivered the pills to Crta. After severalreported attempts, Crta apparently- got cold feet and askedthe assigimient. He suggested another candidate whoattempts without success.

Joe then indicated that It. Anthony Verona, one of the principal officers In theilc Junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own rctourccs.

He asked,rerequisite to the deal, that he beor organizational expenses and0 worth of communications equipment.

Verona's potential was never fully exploited,project was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigswas advised that the offer was withdrawn, and theretrieved,

significant interest was an incident whichrequest levied by Sam upon Maheu.

At the height of the project negotiations, Sam expressed concern about his girlfriend, Phyllis McGuire, who he learned was getting much attention from Dan Rowan while both were bookedas Vegas night club. Sam asked Maheu toug In Rowan's room tothe extent of his intimacy with Miss McGuire. The technician involved in the assignment was discovered in the process, arrested, and taken to the Sheriff's office for questioning. He called Maheu and Informed him that he had been detained by the police. This call was made In the presence of the Sheriff's personnel.

Subsequently, the Department of JusticeIts intention to prosecute Maheu along with tho technician. he Director of

Security briefed tho Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, on the circumotanccs leading up to Mahru's Involvement in tlie wiretap. At ourprosecution was dropped.

Inr, William Karvey tool; over as Case Officer, nnd It is not known by this Office whether Roselli was used operationally from that point on.

oselli. along with four other individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friars Club0igged gin gummy game.

Mr. Karvey reported lo the Office of Security of his contacts with Roselli during November and7 and It was his belief that Johnny would not seek out the Agency for assistance in the deportation proceedings unless he actually faced deportation. RoselU expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

Onaheu called James O'Connell, Roselli's first Case Officer, to advise thatattorney, Ed Morgan, hadallhomas Waddin, Roselli's lawyer, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, and his client now faces deportation. Waddin indicated that, if someone did not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he would make

a complete expose of his activities with the Agency.

ou were briefed on thein this case, and it was decided that thenot In any way assist Roselli. Maheu was so advisedAgency's position, and he was in complete agreementstand. He further advised that he was not concerned about

THE WASHINGTON POST ffe-Ay. ,.

"i. it.

Attempts to Kill Castro laid to CM.

Jack Aiultirton

Lucked ta the darkest re-

ceil lheal Intelll-jenre Agency f* (he slory of

tlxniton ailCiiipls agalr.slidel

POTa

people have known thesecret They haveIo (alk. Vel lYom

vrboic credentials are beyond question.

Welo John McCone. who headed iho CIA al the time of tha assassinationHe acknoa-Icdced the Idea had been discussed InsideCIA but Insisted It had"rejectede viiO'QUJiy denied lhat Ihe CIA

paledlot on Castro's life. Asked whether Ihe at-lempU could hive been made wila hU knowledge, he re-.plied: "It could have

We have completeaowever. ia our sources.

The plot lo knock offenan as pan ol the Bay of

laf before the moiloy lovae^iata agalnsl Preiidenl Ken-en landed on tfce Island Theirjnrdy.

Castro to lead Ihem.

After the fsrtt attempt [failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. Tbe Inst learn rcporlediy nude itooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This hafr pened around the las! of Feb ruary or flrai of March, IW3.

Nine months later.Kennedy was ^unnrd down in Dallas by Lee Haiveyanatic whohad agitated forin New Orleans and hada mysterious Uip to tho Cuban Embassy in Mexico Cily.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there Isby the Warren Com* mission'sCM-

arrival was espectedchj To tri upio assaisi-offgeneral uprising, which {notion, the CIA enlisted Pofv the CommunistsnmenU for the CIA out ol hit Washington public relation! office. He later moved to Lu Vegas to bead up billionaire Howard Hushes' Nevada operation*.

Maheu recruiteduined ly handsome gambler with contacts In both ihe American and- theThe dapper, hawk-fared Roseili. formerlylo irovie aciress June Laneower In Ibe movie industry until hiswith racketeer Willie Bioffillionlabor shakedown. The CIA asslfned two of Its most 'trusted operatives, William 'Harvey and James (Bul Jim) O'Connell. to Ihe hush-hushn Von. Using phony names. Ihey nrcanpanledli on nips lo Miami lo line

lcCame aware . up the assassination teams,

u^l lsloryhe:

*eciet tryslslittering Miami Beach aotelt arid midnight powertt-at ['on the l >o>

. :. ..

under him.

For the first Jry.| furnished Boieti with poison capsules to s'lp Intoll' Caiim's food The pAmnupposed lo lake thrie days lo art. By thehrow off all traces of the po.von. so he would appear loe victimatural If niysterious

Roselli arransiduban, related lo one otroa chefs, to plant the deadly peileU in the diciaior's food. Onosellivcred the capsules to hisat Miami Beach's clamor* -

A couple of weeks later, jut! abom the right lime for the plot to have been sWlMeport out of Havana sail Castro was Ul. But he ti covered before the Bay* '. Invasion on|

Tour/ *

maie on Castro's

THE XTASHINCTON POST

i r. r

'jf^ it

'i*ry-Go-tlOumd

I Castro Stalker

(iglltO AfCUl

Las

year-old inmate with aailment.

Confidential FBI Iilcshim asns Mafia fi:-urc" who valchcd over "ihc concealed inicresls in lis Vegas casino* of ihc Chicago

Ilosclli has admitted lo friends that houm run. ncr florin- iheOpera'Ion:t Coast, he Ira ncil how in evade Coastutlers andpalrols.

His name later became linked withst names in Ihe Chic.ico ami Las Ar.ce-lesie alsocontacts in ihc Cuban underworld before Ca.siro took over Ihc Havana fniUullui; ea-si noi.

i.?iIi wai rcciuncri for the

He had the rich! back-groundush-hushthat ihc CIA wasin imi. as pan of the

wa' SO flalteifd over helng asked to perform aminion for Ihe US. gov-eminent thai he paid all hii expenses out of his own pocket and mked his neck lo land theeams on Ihe Cuban Wait.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cu-^znw willing lo make anon Castro's life. Once, he called onacket boss Sam Ciancana io lineontact. The confidential files report thai Glancana had "gambling interest and aain the shrimp businessowever, the Chi-racotook no direct part in llie assassication plot.

iiosclli madeashes to Cuba wiih his hired assassins In twin powerboats.uban patrol ship lurncd its Runs on hisboat,ole in the

escaped lino ibt> Miadows.

In earlier rolinv.ns, wc rr. ported how tlie CIA furni;hed

aj;;ro'sto plant inlenipied lo iniillralcenough to can

.*.he sprin? oful ihis period, Roseili worked jthi under Ine directf two secici ClAm Harvey and James'COnr.cIl.

Kofcilt's Hcvard

The FBI which got wind of tho assassination plot, has tried lo pump Boselli forn. But he was swornepce hy the ClA. and uo

io this moment, he hasn't bro- murders of Ren ken it.

Meanwhile, the Jtisllce Dc-par'.ment. as pan Ofs:tued ciime, tried lo nail Poselli. The TBI discovered lhai his Chicago hmh records hid been forBcd. thai his name was really Fi-lippa Saeco and lhat he had come to this country from Italyhild. He wasfor failina lo register as an alien.

He was also onvicled; card rrae* 1

n uto:

I Of Roiclh's iw* ClAr-ridi>Harveyxini"Cii--iU-ndianar-nllso-e. r-

unclassified tcow' :ntial

AND RECORD

SUftJfCI,l)

Howard J-irector of SecutityJ 1 |Hqs.

tecmtor :

|Ofi(' dnlgnaiAn. iaam ntinte. cnxl

IMIKAli

la .fco- -hen Orai ascreii calunn otter rah

Attn: I-

ISrr-

-ik^S.

gjoMT CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

ME'tOnANUfM FOR TIE RECORD

SU3JECT: Recent Activities of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff

Division, Washington

1. Early in the evening ofelephone call from!-

utv:

2. It seems that] just spent an hour in

conversation at his home mxn

in the Washington Metropolitan Police ueparUieUl Wlio naa reported to hira on his interview that afternoonar. Martinr. Ibrowitz, prosecutors of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff.

|had been subpoenaed for his appearance and ho indicated

that the two prosecutors were principally concerned

to I

with two matters:

type of training had the Agencyof the Washington Metropolitan how long were the courses?often were thoy given?

support did the Agency provide toMetropolitan Police Departmentoccurring in the9 and

'*that ho had beenong list of

names and asked If any of them had been involved either withgiven the Washington Metropolitan Polico Department orto the Washington Metropolitan Police Department duringWgggbjg only three naraes on the

list. They were: |

who informed the that he, in turn, nMall tram

The three individuals namedin fact participate in both the training and support during the demonstrations. They aro only three anong others ofsupport group who were involved in these activities. Of extrtne sensitivity is the fact that these saae individuals were engaged in other highly sensitive activities which could cause the Agency severe erabarrassrxnt if they were surfaced today in the current "Watergate climate.11

I briefed the Director personally on this development and he Indicated that if the training and demonstrations surfaced that he would sijnply acrowvledge that this had occurred but as heU-rs of Cc:.we n thisctivity in the future. Ho agreed with ny suggestion that'we have tho Legislative Counsel brief CongTessrian Nedil and Senator Stennls on this since they have already been briefed on all activities of this nature undertaken by the Agency in the past. riefed Mr. John Warner, Acting General Counsel, and agreed with nln that we would make no offort to brief members ofand if they are subpoenaed. Mr. Warner or ineribers of his Staff will then caution then to only answer questions asked and not volunteer arM-Hfflfl Iflfa^w nopy of this raerorandua , lof tho Inspector General's Staff at the suggestionthe Inspector General,lso briefed on this development.

Howard J. Osborn Director of Security

^cc: IG Staff Attn:i

1 ONLY

IJi

ROUTING AND HiCCSO SHSET

J. Osborn -fjyjO Director of Security

Executive Secretary.

Management

D/Security

Hdqs.

INumi.irohornwhom. af<><

MEMORANDUM FOK: fcTxeculive Secretary,

. CIA Management Committee

Project TWO-FOLD

This memorandum setsecommendation for your approval in paragraph 5.

For the past several years, this office lias beenthe Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) byassessing, and recruiting personnel to form an internal security unit whose primary mission is the detection of corruption within the BNDD. Subsequent to the recruitment and training stage, the individuals selected are turned over to the Chief Inspector of BNDD for operational guidance and handling in their variousassignments.

Recently, this Agency has ex-tended this activity by supporting BNDD in the covert acquisition of individuals who are hired as Staff Agents utilized under nonofficial cover and directed against tlie principal international drug traffickers. Theseare true employees of the BNDD and, although alldetails relative to their employment are handled within the Agency, they are unaware of any Agency involvement.

It is felt at this timeeaffirmation of our support to BNDD in Project TWO-FOLD is necessary and desirahle.

Therefore, it is recommended that approval be granted for the continuation of Project TWO-FOLD as originally approved by the Director of Central Intelligence on

SUBJECT: ProjectLD

DISAPPROVED:

Di stribulion:

eturn to OS

DCI concurrence, terminatectivity and continuenly as the activity pertains to foreignto collect narcotics intolligonce abroad. Copy furnished IG.

ROUTING AND RfiLOkD

sifc^ET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

on (he background of Ihe Cuban is fairlyit is inconclusive. He is known to haveember oforganisations In this country. There* are also reports lhat

his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are oilier episodes in his lifo tlml suggest intelligence Involvement on his part wllh some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

Office of Security has had atecondthis case. His reporting has tended lo confirm reporting byinformant.

Office of Security has been running this operationtwo years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of itsnature. CI Staff has been kepi informed. The FBI.informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to takefor it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internala result, the Offico olSccurity has been inhi biled in the actions

it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand. Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear ofthe operation.

would appear to me that the Office of Security hasthis case long enough. Apparently unable through positiveresolve doubts about Iheas followed^the course ofwaiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant'action himselfgive us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge

of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

2 -

0OOG0

r'snorandun to: The Inspector

Subject: Office of Securityffice of Security Support to S'JDD

1, In Dscembarobert Ingersoll, head of the Dureauar-cotics and Dangerous Druts, asked >ir. Helms if the Agency could give him some assistance In shoring up the internal integrity ofDD, According to Tngersoll, the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics had bsen heavily infiltrated by dishonest and corrupte believed to have tics with the narcotics smuggling industry. Ingersoll wanted us to holp him recruit some thoroughlyple who could bo ussd, not only as social agents in his various offices around the country, but also to servo as informants on the other BNDD employees in these offices.

co,.secret

routing and record sheet

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director forervices

Press Allegations re Use of Agency

Polygraph

This memorandum is for your information only andade to you by telephone earlier today.

Onn article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of William Beecher. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotesresidential advisory memorandum tho White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmamentew days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorizedof classified information and directed a. sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the dir.ect^onEgil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants' to Mr. John Ehrlichraan, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency-were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on1 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arras Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect

in the Department of Defense.

informed Hr. Krogh that from time tomatters involving the national security the Agencyto Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director ofolygraph operatorolygraph rtacMneuse in polygraphing State Department employeesrecipients of allegations concerning their loyalty.

I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that thewas their total responsibility. urther informed him that this was the only way we could undertake tohis request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.

that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr.inquired as to whether the arrangements had beenGentile indicated they had and suggested that theoperator be used to examine the Defense Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered thisidea and that he would instruct Defensemake their nan available to Mr. Gentile for a

four individuals wergp

paginations resulted in Clearing the lour men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on opy of my covering memorandum is attached.

7. Mr. Murreytaff writer for The Washington Post, in an articleT, statedtate Department spokesman had acknowledgedews briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegationetter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. centered around the Agency, butay or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Mr. Harder apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Mr. Marder plans toress conference to be held. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operatorachine detailed to tho Department for this purpose. o not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Mr. Marderuspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employeo was the source.

ADMINISMTiiiyiSiim ONLY

Attachment

J:cic/rttaxy Cvrarintaai of 8taio

AM.OCM 7CS: Mr- Marvin Goullo

Social Technical

AttachaJ an>

iatazviawoa

otterisvolv-as? be mmd* to tali Afoacjr'a lavolvosuitaction**

you vriliin riports=ot cUiiuii-J to year jadgntaatval cflileattoa.

oooba

'iTiiV.Sl.iiV

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Items In John Clarke Memorandum

to the Director of Central tnlelligenco,3

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not

previously been reported. The first:

Use of CIA

facilities toQ

FBI and

of technical equipments by NS>A

use

manic.

some

2. ollow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised lhat involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA

"Jl

1 There was also

help given in

Further, other

on said he thought the only proble

in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with ssistance. wj Mr. Clark

here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. Heonly source of additional information on this subjectthe DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: se of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia. "

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department0 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be

Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

nly

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Per your instructions

I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment shouldatter of record.

Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:

-- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/O.

and

accumulation of Government capital

Use of CIA funds and facilities tostate for FBI and provision ofbyuse against

Use of CIA funds to help State Department

trip to SEA.

Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. Jy

m. Clarke

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Items in John Clarke Memorandum

to the Director o( Central Intelligence,3

use

1. Two items In the attached memorandum had not previously been reportod. Tha first: se of CIA funds and facilities to. real estate for FBI andof technical equipments by NSA against a

2. ollow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds approprlatedfor CIA being given to the FBI In cashiers checks for the purpose of

There was also

Further, other

Agency help given to |

CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some i assistance, was working on

| Mr. Clarke said he thought the onlywas in the use of funds, not In the operation. Heonly source of additional Information on this subjectthe DDO/C1 Staff.

3. The secondse of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said tho total amount of money requested by State Departmentut that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds In those Instances where some operational activity was Involved or could be

Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Age: cy

CUKIflHI U'dt

O.MT

ON *Uflftl

of2 Key Building

I MS

[HwtWto

id ttt mioi!ode im>

Director for

Manage men l <%s |Hea*dquarters

ofHeadquar

13.

13,

1 *

CONFIDENTIAL Jga0% UNCLASSIFIED

AY m

FOR VIA FROM SUBJECT

of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Management and Cervices

Director of Finance

Special Other Government Agency Activities

1,White, Executive Director-

he Agency has reimbursable and non-reinbursable agreements with the Khite House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies,ased on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

Projecteimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agentsomestic Agency Security proprietary.

6. Payment to Whiteeimbursement to White House as approved by Executive Director-Comptrollerepresenting cost of postage, stationery and addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received by the White Houseesult of the President's speech on Cambodia in

FOR VIA

ROM

SUSJuCT

of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Mnnapeaont and Services

Director of rinonca

:Spsci.il Othery Activ&ias

!7hicov Executive

ho Agency has reimbursable andecxents with the White Couse, Department of Justice, defense Agencies,ased onranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agcncios.

Projecteinbursenent fron Bureau of Narcotics ana Janjerous Drags for training ofagentsomesticSecurity proprietary.

6, Payment to Whiteeimbursementhite House as approved "by Executive "Director-Comptroller8 representing cost of postago, stationery and addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received by tho White House-esult of the President's speech on Cambodia in

homas B. Vale

Thomas B. Yalo Director of Finance

FOR

VIA

FROM

of Central Intelligence

Dej'uty Director for Manageraent and Services

Director of Finance

Special Other Government Agency Activities

White, Executive Director-

ho Agency has reimbursable and non-re imbursabToagreoBicnts with the White House, Department of Justice. Defense Agcncifes,ased oniaoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4; Projecteimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and TTangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agentsomestic Agency Security proprietary.

s. r

6. PaymentiteeinbursenoiiChite House as approvedDirector-Comptroller8 representing cost of postage, stationery and addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received by the White Houseesult of the President's speech on Cambodia in

(Glgood)- Vale

Thomas B. Yale Director of Finance

UNCLASSIFIED

coriFi' -aiAL

Director of2 Key Building

are pertinent documents and papers relating tof tbe Director of Finance's memo to the DCIubject: "Special Other Government Agency Activities"

UNCLASSIFIED

Hr.phono conversationr. John Brown atno:

Guess we're bock together again! Cot nore problems?

Yes, don't knowch Watts told you.

I didn't talk to Watts. Think he called Colonel White.

Let ine explain background. esult of the Cambodia speech, we're getting relatively inundated with correspondence and noraally all of thia is sent to the uepartawnt of State for answering. What we're doinge're continuing to send_all cons correspondence Ao.State. However, the President made determination he'd like to unswer support over his signature here and we asked the Department of State to support us on this effort. They'reosition where they con provide only United support at this tins. They're conndtted for SIQ.OOO which would probably handle in the area of0 responses.

How many responses altogether counting proa and cons?

The cons arearge group that they're handling themselves also.

Are they going to be handling pros toe?

s for pres. They're doing cons. On pros they can pick upe estimate it will be00 and it looks like at present time we've gotesponses in and it could go upwards pf^lgO.OQO or greaterA Looks like we'llinimum ofooaSTy fn area^ additional. Tnis covers cost of printing, postage and addressing.

X: Just printing, postage and addressing? Not any overtime for any salaries or anything like that?

B: . No, the posting of the things we'll do ourselvesy hand. No problem. We're talking about physical costs of jobost of stamps, cost of envelopes and cards, and cost of having then addressed by outside firm. We'll handle putting stamp on, inserting, and sealing and nailing. Only talking about cost associated with three aspects of the operation.

M: Postage, addressing and printing.

B: Yes,sked NSft to Bee if they could arrangedepending on how volume goesrobably.

M: These are Just pros? State is handling all cons themselves? (continued)

ooos4

B: Yes, this is just portion of pros we're talking about. Ky understanding tict in touch with you to work out Ktchanics of how we would litndle the billing to cake sure it's straight and we do it properly so It fits In with your accounting system.

Ml This is only portion of pros. State doing soiae too?_

They're picking up quite ft loadesult ofThfs. One hellot of respor.se coining in on this.

M: Bound to be. Tell you, John, let me giveall back later todayay. Have toook aboutould fit this stuff in. Are you going to be in this afternoon?

B: I'll be around. If I'm not in ay office I'll get back to you as soonone back.

M: I'll giveall then.

B: Can't be real definiteot sure how we're going to peak out. Hot sure what backlog is. I'll chock into that so when we talk thisan be little mora definite. Probably run into thathink.

Ml Okay, I'll get back in touch with you. B: Okay, thank you. Warren.

End of Conversation

Mr.hone conversation with Col. WhiletO on

K: alked with John Brown today and it seems like as you mentionedesult of odia. Inquiries going into White House. The State Department is doing all the work on the cons there are pros and cons. The State Department is going to answer all the cons and the President has determined that he wants to answer personally all the pros. However, the State has agreed to pick up some of those too in the amount. That will cover0 of the answers. Thoy ustimota there's going to benswers that will have to be put out by the White House. Estimate it's going to cost0hink it sight go. dditional which the White house will have to pay for. The charges are only going to be for printing, postage and addressing by an outside rirm. No salaries for overtime or anything like that. They're going to lick the stomps in the White House, paste the stamps on and insert the message into the envelopes. John Brown said ho had requested NSC to see if they could Arrange, presumably withuess, forepending on volume. He was talking as more or less foregone conclusion we would do it. ade no cosoaitaent. Told hie I'd look into it.

W: How would we do this?

M: We would do it by asking them to pay amount und then send0

to us with bill for the postage, bill for the addressing of the envelopes and bill for tho printing accompanying this and we would Just send check back. They would send shortwith it certifying these are the charges.

W: hink we want to know what we spend our money foron't think we want the public records to-Bhou that we paid for it.

M: What we can do, SirI can ask them to send0 withthat these are the charges for classified services per our conversation, and if you're willing to take that we can certainly do it that way.

W: Mill this be an outside firm? Couldn't we Just pay the firm? What would be better? I'm not sure.

M: hort memo Just saying0 is for charges previously sgrced to between this Agency and themselves ond that's all and then we send them check for that. Otherwise, there's always chance that an outside firm might realize it was us paying for it.

W: uess It's the best way to do it. I'd like to have in our recordsnobody else has access toexactly what it was forall about itj their records, which are audited by the General Accounting Office, as little as possible.

'ClJ^

Mr. Kagnusson wid Col. Whiteage 2)

an talk to then and arrange thathe Just- sends unclaral

K: Go ahead and do it. I'll have to sign off onuppose. You go ahead and arrange It in way that will give us full record. As far as any records of their's oreould prefer to have minimum.

M: an wTite memo and John Brown can refer to this and our phono converna-tionemo accompanyingY).

W: Okay, go ahead and do it. Put limit on it. When they talked totheyOO.

M: Keecause they're Just pouring in. Might run.

W; ut in no case will it- something like that. Okay.

M: All right, Sir.

W: Thank you. Warren.

End of Conversation

Kr. Kagnusson'* phone conversation with Nr. John 3rovn atnO:

M: Think we can go ahead and do this, .'lave to ho careful as to way thie is documentedhat's the only thing, would like to suggestrite memo for the recordind of co-sign itagreeing to Mwnfe and so forth and the way ve do this. Keao would have in it what it'a for and ttien you would send0 for this, referencing this tc.to and our conversation.

B: You're thinking in terms of reimbursing us again? Wouldn't it be better for us to have direct charge to you?

M: No, because of public record. In order to have all the things in our hands. It wouldn't look good for us to pay the bllla direct for this sort of thing.

8: It would not?

M: So, if you people pay the bills

B: (interrupting) Even toarge postage fco? Bulk of expense will be postage.

M: But we have to document what it's forf you people can just pay it, then we'll give you money for it.

B: What would our memo say?

M: Say attached0 referencing memo dated such and such. B: What does the memo saythat we're making reference to? M: I'll writo that up and bring over to you. B: What, basically, are we going to say it's about?

M: ith Unitnd would be Tor printing of these things and so on.

B: Just wondering if you have diroct billing it seems to me that serves purpose of memorandum.

M: The direct billing from, let's say, the printer, the addressograph cenpany or something like that, to us might raise questions outsidehink powers that be don't want to have fact that we're paying for this sort of thing anyplace where it can be dug up. Easiest and cleanest way to do this is you people go ahead and pay and we'll reimburse you immediately.

B: Do we have to have this memo?

M: I'd keep in my safe here.

B: Wouldn't it be adequate to send io80?

M: Don't forget, you people keep copies of lCSO'sou have to by law. 0 would have to cite what billing is for because of that, then that would open up Lo CAO or at>mebydy else as to who's paying for this sort of thing.

B: We have to cite what it's for?

M: Let's say it's "XYZ Printing Company" and you pay bill. This looks like you're paying it. You send0 which says nothing and we give you money for this. We ourselves have to have on our records what we're paying for for our own auditors which doesn't get outside of our Agency.

B: It's for your internal auditors? It would not get outside? Okay, that sounds all right.

M: I'll draw the memo up and bring it over there and you can see it.

B: That sounds good. Warren.

M: Would next Monday be all right with that memo? B: Yes, we'll go ahead and order. M: You can get going and so on.

B: Don't know what final cost is going to be. Hate to restrict ourselvei We figure total cost is going to be. Gotlready that are just pro. hat haven't been analyzed yet.hey estimate possibly upwards00 could pertain to Cambodia. Of the backlog0 could be of .type that will be answered in this mailing. Our best estimate would be it may run over.

H: I've got instructions, John, to indicate in memo that it's forut not to. If and when it, we'll start over again and I'll inquire further as to whether we can cover the otherokay?

B: Okay.

M: Open to negotiation if it runs higher.

B: y run higher- 0 letters come out being pro, will, take usr somewhere in that vicinity.

m: then i'd have to go hack wid inquire to sec if powers that be will cover the other ps.rt. hink it's best to wait 'til that happens.

good enough.

time monday?

don't you give us call here monday? my secretary will line it up.

you. warren.

End of Conversation

8 jus is70

M-LVCHAND'JX FOB THE RECORD

Reimbursement to the White Kouao for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

Reference is Bade to the telephone conversation between Hr. John Brown, Staff Secretary, White House, and the undersigned concerning the accounting and the reimbursement procedure for White House expenditures in connection with the printing, postage and addressing of replies to certain mall addressed to the President.

It was estimated and agreed that these expenditures would amount toOO, but not, and the request for reimbursement to this Agency would be based upon receiptemorandum categorising the expenses and certifying to their validity. The memorandum will alsotandardl and copies of the vendors' invoices where applicable.

Upon receipt of the above memorandum. Standardl and copies of vendors'. S. Government Treasury check will ba drawn and forwarded to the White House.

^^WAKHKN D. HWWUSHflR Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning Office of Finance

O*AKDIJM3 RECORD

SUBJECT: Reir/oursemeirt to the White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

he undersignedeLephor.eMr. Johndvising that the mailing hodthan anticipated (increasedieces) and thatrequirement for subject purpose had increasedo

apologetically advised Kr. Brown that since ourthat prior approval was limitedould haveand confirm with my superiors that the increase toacceptable,as sure it was.

3- In the absence of Col. White (onr. Bush immediately contacted Mr. Clarke, I" ho waa not in his office. OnAugust, Mr. Clarke telephonicaDjr-approved the increased level and Mr. Brown was duly informed.

Chief,

THE WHITE HOUSE

Dear Mr- Kagnusson:

Pursuant to your telephone call to Mr. John Brown regarding the breakdown of costs in connection with tiv? mailing of the Acknowledgement Cards concerning The President's Speech on Tbe Situation in Southeast Asia, the following costs wore incurred:

Computer Marketing Industries,

Acknowledgement

Total

Sincerely yours,

Carson M. Howell Administrative Officer

Mr. Warren D. Magnusson

Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning

Office of Finance

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C.

ifi.iv-jiU:i

2. It leiy

nnd jortlfiod ar,reilsMliiy ofc offis'J

rcT.uty Director for Liftnd Officii of finance

AttoataMnto lif-TO frora Mr. Koucll dtd0

1 (oris ana 2)

in.:

Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeti:

Reimbursement to tiie White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

Memorandum for the Record, datedame subject

hereto is accounting submitted from the Whitemailing expenses.

is requested that the original voucher beand certified as to the availability of funds and returnedoffice for payment.

D. MAGNUSSON Deputy Director for Liaison an Office of Finance

Memo from Mr. Howell

dtd01 (orig and 2)

redits

o* m

Aro duUiuriscd lo effect tlio willidrnwiils nnd credit! indicated below.

iiiiuiivi

D. C.

the printing ofCords, Envelopes, and lo Keypunchudr and place on Magnetic tape and the preparation of heat transfer labels and affixi to envelopes, in connection with the acknowledging of mail concerning the Preside speech on the Situation in Southeast Asia.

For uie of blillnr.

For um of office bitted;

I certify funds aro avallable.

fax hop.

FICATE OF OFFICEvniy llul Hie koM HaOi herein wo correct and proper for BMBBSOS frniaQJCAgErwrMlotifr) ilirMgiinlwl

br cluck No.

No.

u. kroihiino o'cicc; tmi-eaiji

t isa as follows:

3. Allhis ti'-'iii-iclim ir. Vein- n tliie office for eocvrit/s rvjiIImIo to tho Af.aey cu'litorn.

U. Floasflheck to thin optica foro ftpproivlAt; official.

vatj:H, d. rAfeT/tf

Dar/aty Directorr.d,r^

W.r. John Or own Stud Seentary The Whit* House Officen. D. C.

Dc.tr Mlf. Brown:

t,-Enclosed is U. S. Treasury Chock No.

lit the amount

hich represents relmbarserocnt or Bureau Svhcc'ulc opy enclosed./This schedule was forwarded to this

No.

Office by Mr. Carson M. Howell, Administrative Officer, on

Yours very truly.

Enclosures

D. MaOuSSOH Iroctorainon and Planning Office of Finance

" -f

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December0

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUMMAGNUSON

We have finally received the cost breakdown for acknowledging the mail in connection with the President's speech on the situation in Southeast Asia. By copy of thism requesting our administrative office to forward that portion of the bill applicable to you.

If there are any problems in handling this, please let me know. Thank you.

JOHN R. BROWN III

cc: Carson Howell

t<EW)RAWDUM FOR: Director of Planning, FrograciTiiiig and Budgeting

to the White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

for the Record, dated 2'tame Subject

70 MemoPB, transmitting

1st accounting, datedept Copy of1 Memo from the White House

datedeptemo for the Record dated 2't Aug 70

JD'I.H'.-II

WITHDRAWALS AKD CReD.TS

O. AV.

Ar.hatna

Tho White nmiH Or.too

'ashing

Tlbc Sin

xuoiio.ooi

Tot.i

DtlaJU of chargei or rcfcrcoce to attached mpporting document!

Tor the printing of Acknowledf/iir.9nt Ceres, Snvolppes and Postsco fornd to Keypunch nair.es, place on magnetic tape, prepare and af ,'ix to onvol- ooa host transfer labels, ondrintout, in connection with the, of aail concerning the President's Second speech on the Situationit See attached list for breakdown of couCs.

uw of onV* billed:

funds oro 1

uieof billing office:

Certificate of office billed

Ilhai Ihcatin vt correct and pro par lor pariccnt from ll* appropriate adetonated.

byNo.

No..

OUMr,ml UMcon Dlvittoo

:lo The Whlto IvOuas

I. It iace'u Uulu, uVS.e drawn payable to the Treasurer of the United SCntoa,

his dtobur*er.uiit ir- ci.ci'^cc.blo ae folic, vo:

All documentationie tran;4ictlca iahia office for security rcasoo -nilaiiaVlo to tha

Plcace forwardcl.eckMs office for'jciul.

irector for Liaison ;

It. KB

John R. Drown in

Sl.'Jf Secretary

Tho White House Office

Washington, n.Q0 Dear Mr. Drown:

Enclosed is U. S Treasury Check No.

n the

(.ncloicd.

amount.hicheimbursement of bureau Schedule No.

Enclosures

OF i

very truly.

Director for Liaison und PIOffice of Finance

MHMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Special Report

This hiOH.orandum is in response toequest to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

Details to the Unite House and Government Agencies -Background": For" many "years the Central Intelligencedetailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Ke have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employeeseimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but wc do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.

I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall0 couriers, telephoneaborer assigned to the groundsraphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By Octoberore funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present timehe National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSCeimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State to

wniiai.

Huntockpicker:

Thisecord of ExternalBranch's actionequest fron Howard Huntockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency.

Sometime in the springrank O'Malley ofa call from Howard Hunt who asked Frank if he hador resigneo who was accomplished at pickingO'Malley sentesume on Thomas Amato Mr. O'Malley did not document his EEABshow the date of this exchange, but

also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and

All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security2 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

Sent retired"

McCord:

employee who retired in SeptembeVas External Employment Assistance Branch in his after retirement. One of the leads given to James McCord's security business. EEAB sent

-as to

i contract Client of tho searchob

a re Mime

but

not hired.

mid-summer Chicago. (Heead provided by

iEAB,

but until this telephone call he had

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from. area.) He said he had been visitedpecial

told

Agent of the TBI who found amongaper's

After the Agent loft lof OP and ^

that his resume hadAgent wanted to knowany connection with

; me resume got to McCord.

' of

us were

telephoned EEAB, notified immediately.

Harry b. nsneT

Director of Personnel

FOR

of Central Intelligence

Director for Management and Services

Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

memorandum contains information for tho Director of Central Intelligence.

This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Servicesay that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all natters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at theof another Agency component. We haverief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by-this Office will have to boby inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:

eHs only

slot

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

tho DD/O, wc will not honor any requisition forequipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

a. Inolonel L. K. White, theDirector-Comptroller, called me to attendin his office, also attended by Mr. WilliamWhite explained that the Technical(TSD) had been requested to providethe FBIensitive project designated [ White did: HOTthe purpose ol m* assistance being provided bydid instruct rae to assist TSD on purely Since the Office of Logistics has nothe mission or purpose ofquestions concerning the subject sh(Uldto TSD. Other procurement actionsthe FBI are reported below. Specific mention isof| hocause of the dollar magnitude, ap-

proximatelyand the complex technicalthat has been involved in the undertaking.

Procurement Division, OL, currently hasin hand from TSD which would involvesales to the FBI. One such requisitions for two Westinghouse The second requisition in the amount offor two wide-angle surveillance probes manufacturedand Lorab. No action is being taken on eitherrequirements pending further instructionsbe sought from the Deputy Director forServices.

the years, this Agency has oftenGovernment agenciesontractual or Upon the submission of an officiallysupportedransfer of funds, theeither enter into "accommodation procurements"requesting agency or support the requesting agencyissuance of materiel from stock. Such actionsaccomplished under the Economy Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, ora service for, another Government agency when such

- EYES ONLYEGRH-

SUBJBCT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the OfficeLogistics

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. ypical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement,ave had our records researched for theears andeflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during1 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. irected the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Moffet Naval Air Station in California to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished thera by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. Onhe senior Security Officer assigned to this Officeetter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contentsemorandum1 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from thehich is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies ofroducts to Rand asunder USIB regulations. Thealso states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security toook written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book wasby Mr. Murphyrookings Institution Federal

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office ofties

Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's WhatSources of Information for Federaltull treatise on the existence of sources ofthat may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printingopies was mndo inue toecond printingopies was made in The title page of the book gives attribution to Mr. Murphy, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. opy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

Sometimeepresentative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Securityonsulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honoredthe Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general andpurposes, and it would be an abuse of ourfacilities.

5he Director ofpprove his leasing up to olevenfor use in connectionpecialwhich would lastonths. of Security informed me, in hishat "This support activityundertaken at the specific instruction of thehas his personal approval." The request was approved.

o date, the Office of Securityfrom thisonsiderable amountwhich we understand was to be given or loanedto local Police Departments. In certain casesthis materiel was issued from Agency stocks and,cases, direct procurement of the materiel wasfunds furnished by the Office of Security. Aof such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

-Egg

-All

[VIS Cill.Y

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by tbe Office of

Logistics

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic Nationalnd the Republican National The apartment was usedeeting place |

in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logist ics

assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant operating component on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

John F. Blake Director of Logistics

2,y

cc: DD/MgS

receiving

o o

requosting office

of request

item

cost

or agency

analyzer

radio beacon

analyzer

liouse

communications

agency

analyzers

force

analyzers

sets

recorders

cameras

video

image, burn-resistance, equivalent

television

eyes only

requesting office

tsd

date of request

transmitters, radio

actuators, recorder

tube, image, burn-resistance equivalent

tube,

transmitters

module, plug-in

power

telephone analyzers

telephone analyzors

cable, special-purpose electrical

. depart-llnit cost ment or agency

fbi fbi fbi fbi

treasury treasury

.42 white house

communications agency

0 o

tsd

ink, special formula

transmitter, radio beacon

lot

1 lot

728

and

naturalization

service

immigration and

naturalization

service

u.s. forestry

MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICSECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO LOCAL POLICE

Gas Mask

Steol Helmet and

Vest and Groin

Vest, Flak

Vest,

Emergency Flashing Red

Tear

Baton 6

'Chemical Baton

Baton

'Mustang 3S

with Shoulder

Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.

FOR THROUGHT

of Central Intelligence

Deputy Directornaf,estont and Services

Sensitive Activities IVrforred byffice of Logistics

rieivoranduw contains Information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

This awDorandua is submitted pursuant to advice fiven by the Deputy Director for J'anagoF.ent and Servicesay that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognisance or otherwise known to then, the naturo of which could possibly need explanation or justification when vlcvod within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Ceatral Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all natters herein reported, except two, the actions undertakan were at theof another Agency component. Wo haverief description of each action involved and thon hfive included tho name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be detor-oined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:

"SESONLY SECRH^

SU3JLCT: Sensitive Activities rcrforned by the Office of Logistics

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition forequipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.

4. Kithin the area of contractual responsibilities, the following itons are pertinent:

a. Inolonol L. K. White, theDirector-Comptroller, called me to attendin his office, also attended by Mr. WilliamWhite explained that the Technical(TSD) had been requested toensitive projectdesignated | [Colonel Whitethe purpose ot tne assistance being provided bydid instruct me to assist TSD on purely Sinco tho Office of Logistics has nothe mission or purpose of Project ^sub-

stantive questions concerning the subject shouldto TSD. Other procurement actionsthe FBI are reported below. Specific mention isofof the dollar magnitude, ap-

proxinatelyillion, and the complex technicalthat has been involved in tho undertaking.

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in bond from TSD which would involvesales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amounts for two Wostinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amounts for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lonb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

c. Over tho years, this Agency has often supported other Government agenciesontractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supportodransfer of funds, the Agency would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support tho requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, ora service for, another Government agency when such

-RES; ONLY SECREL

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

action would bo more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. ypical oxanple of this proceduro is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement,ave had our records researched for thoears andeflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during1 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. irected the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Moffat Naval Air Station in California to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On the senior Security Officer assigned to this Officeettor to the Kand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is suxaarizod the contentsemorandum1 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from thehich is In our possession.

This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to coase distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies ofroducts to Rand asunder USIB regulations. Thoalso states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from tho CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. Tho Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security toook written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book wasby Mr. Murphyrookings Institution Foderal

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Ferforned by the Office of Logistics

Executive Fellowship. Tho .book is entitled "Where's Whatources of Information for Federaltull treatise on the existence of sources ofthat may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printingopies was made inue toecond printingopies was made in The title page, of the book gives attribution to Mr, Murphy, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. opy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

She Director ofpprove his leasing up to elevenfor use in connectionpecialwhich would lastonths. of Security informed me, in hishat "This support activityundertaken at the specific instruction of thehas his personal approval." The request was approved.

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

in liaison with TnemoeTSb secret, service anu renuwrmg

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office ofcs

assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WII Division is the cognizant operating conpenent on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and nemory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

jonn f.

Director of Logistics

2 Atts

cc: DD/MQS

SECI

EYBr ONLY

office

date of request

item

quantity unit cost

r agency

o o

tsd

tsd tsd

analyzer transmitters, radio beacon telephone analyzer

telephone analyzers telephone analyzers telephone analyzers camera sets camera sets actuators, recorders tessina cameras camera, video

tube, image, burn-resistance, equivalent

tubes,

cameras, television

EYES^Ntr

house

communications

agency

force

O O

Transmitters,

Actuators,

Tube,

Module,

Power Supply -

Telephone

Cable, Special-Purpose

ft.

Ink, Speciallot

Transmitter, Radio Beacon

.42

728

cncy

BNDD

FBI

FBI FBI FBI FBI

Treasury Treasury

White Housens Agency

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Immigration and

Naturalization

Service

U.S. Forestry

MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO LOCAL POLICE

Gas Mask

Steel Helmet and

Vest and Groin

Vest, Flak

Vest,

Emergency Flashing Red

Tear

Baton 6

Baton

with Shoulder Strap

NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.

Hq.

USS3Wseciet confidential Jlt unclassified

ojcsT

AY TO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Deputy Director for Management and Services

Activities which might be considered sensitive

issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which might be considered sensitive issues.

Most Sensitive Projccts

for

Identification T

SANCA

Ober CI Staff

OS"

URD

A specialinitiated by DCI

Machine index to security files

Information storage Stof drug related data (ORD's project OFTEN)

Type of data being collected.

Type of data in index.

Type of data in files.

Projects

file of drug data.

of data in file.

b6 7*

Projects Project Organization, Telephone

of Project

Statistical analysis of psychological data.

OJCS Reason for Listing

Source of data. are involved with project.

Unknown, butatter for Concern

Nature of data. of systemwith FBI.

OS"

on radioused for support ofystem to identify unauthorized transmitters.

oflicense numbers.

File of Agency applicants who were not hired.

of data.

Nature of data.

Sensitivity Unknown, butalter for ConcernOfficer

& for

Identification

Association with the named

organization.

JOHN D. LAMS Director of Joint Computer Support

1 cut

Jscad

orHqrs.

Dire ctorgf Coriaunications

nciivio KMHM

ten S

INviWi ho- -he*

in -horn. iieii

is in ti response to your request

13.

14.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

top se s

ET IDENTIAL

document description .

oc|

number:

of nnnimfnt: 5

document received:

NI1URFR fSl-

of pages: lwo documentof attachments: one

ommtnlconcutnuw*

riply

fUrum

Oijpitch

Fill

' olunlt

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary. Special Programs Divisionffice of Communications, Operational Contacts with. Government Agencies

1. Prior9 the OC COMINT intercept unit,hich was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miaai Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DP of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the DDO's

2. In lateSA, through Division D/ DDO, requested that the Special Prograas Divisionearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,

tne circuits could be tltisraetoniy intar-

cepTaiT On ISormal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. Onll coverage vas terminated byecause of possible legal complications.

S. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBIumber of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have bean made by theDO. Support has been provided in the fora of

DOWN uponjie*

SECRET OTAL OF ATTACHMENT

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years.bejuuendered to

sensitive FBIsupport

has been and is presenmy oewg given to FBI projects i I

These projects are described in the attached-

sealed envelope.

luxDO and

4. An operational test of an

system wasI

OC-SPD personnel in the early

. part of the summer

A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DFotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the root. eam member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

opeciai Frogtams Division, OC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Organizational Dealings with Activities Inside the United States

This MFR records organizational dealings with activities inside the United States known to this office.

In1 _ Ircqucsted secure communl-cationshe Miami Area with local offices of BNDD and Customs.

phe communications link was never installed

Iff! fiwDepartment Division, and at

S, Poring the Democratic and Republican conventions,

1supported requirements levied by the Secret service concerning name traces and other intelligencerelating to subversive influences which might affect

those conventions.f" some technical advice and

procedural assistance Inseful means ofbetween the two correspondents. WHD should be able toetailed resume of activities supported in this matter.

Thomas E. 0'DonneII Chief, Americas Staff, OC

OFFICIAL KOUTJXG SLIP

William E. Colby

HON

Hill:

Tho attached memorandum identifies the funds referred to in Chuck Briggs' notes ofnd

FOLDCTU'tN TO St'MOER

from i

General

May 7

'#'Sincc these notes, .ireoally separate sensitive subject, 'pis "pull them from this fileEC " (KotePS).

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Mr. Colby's Request fo Inspector General to

Determine Subject Referred lo by Two Notesemo to

PB Memo to

Subject: Watergateirector Indirect Involvement

itndvji will check, ON TOP ANO BOTTOM

CONFIDENTIAL 1

ROUTING SLIP

AND ADDRESS

HEP If

PFCU

O RETURN TO SCNOCA

AHO fHOMt NO.

May 73

CONFIDENTIAL |

memorandum "

3 "TTJaTET

will.to* awojiottom

JVrou:r

OFFICIAL ROITINC SLIP

ptIHM itm

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COHCWKWI

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SIGNIIUU

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FCfiE IO RETTtinM TO Sf

THOM: umi essr.i

Charles A. PB

) CONmiKNTJU. |

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

irect or Indirect Involvement

memorandum responds to the Director's requestreport of any involvementy capacityanuaryMessrs. Hunt, .McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

then ORD) rDhink, would

McCord contact was indirect and occurredthests Director, Office of pposed plans for Technical Division, Office(under Mr. McCord) toeparate computerhv-Place Monitoring System.the computer individual wo mugdetails.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his request, first through OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on bchall of the Cabinet Coir.miltcc on Iniernalional Narcotics Control. phone discussions are noted in the ail-.ched. The Ajjcncy

focal pointsI understand

las forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of

memoranda from Messrs.Colby arc attached

also.

5. taff meeting yesterday to pass the requestPPB employees. One officer who wasuneral will not be available until tomorrow.

6 /s/ Charles A. Brl035

" E' ,

A. Briggs

of Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting

As stated

Attachment3

Fobfrom Jin Taylor,Bud* Krogh and his deputy,

Waller Minnick, of IhcCouncil who plan foreign travel In connection wiih Iheir narcotics interests. Jim was alerting us to their intention to sttk us for funds for the travel.

Febfrom Taylor: ripsndividuals-

E>:Dir said OKTehran

all inostK. Minnick ready toplugged in.

visit.

Febattached memo from Egil Krogh,

follow-on memos from.

to Bill Colby andnd Colby

Jfor OMB to Europe.

ayohn Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/ Minnick attendanceatin American (Stationonference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd, White House, was laying on awith himself. Shepherd and Mark Alger.

Jun 72

on Krogh/Minnlckgetting CA- activities, Including large-scnlenarcoticssmall-scale PP.

Jul 72

Motes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film,

wii send.*

Aug 72

re Colby letter (attached). Saidready; need money this FM (No record inas to who was traveling when, but haveof its being to Mexicoby

Nov 72

.dated? Ltextco."

MEMORANDUM FOR HILL COLBY

SUBJECT: BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control was created Septembery the President to centralize his attack on thedrag traffic.

The Committee does noteparate budget.

Salary and administrative support for its small, full-time staff has been provided by the Executive Office of the President. Other expenses are being.charged to the constituent agencies and departments.

The Bureau of Customs, BNDD, and AID/Office of Public Safety have provided support to date.

The CIA should be prepared to defray not more than fifteen thousand dollars in overseas travel expenses for Cabinetduring the remainder of

Walter C.ick, the Committee's Staff Coordinator, ran be contacted for further details.

Thank you for your assistance.

Egil Krogh, Jr. Executive Director Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control

CC: John Ehrlichman

Assistant to the President for Domestic

Chief. General Government Programs Division ujla KcpreJentative, CCINC Working Group

3 Budgetary Support for the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCTNC)

to ExDlrDP/NARCOCJdtdame subject

hie is la rosponse to the referenced memo regarding uso of CIA funds to cover travel expenses for ;Us White Houso Cabinet Committee Staff for Fiscal

You are authorized to obligated upor tbetho White House Cabinet Committee Staff for Obligation should be recorded against theand travel orders issued against year own appropriate

the extoat tbal you are unable to absorb thisyour present allotment, we will have to arrangeLiter ia Ihe year lo cover [Ml Mlbatfgttad tfeMB.

W. E. Colby Executive Director-Comptroller

-R

PPB Subj (BMS

eading

HEHORAMDUN FOR: Executive Director Controller

SUBJECT

Deputy Director for Plans

Fiscal3 Budgetary Support for the Cabinet Coralttee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC)

' * ou^ invitation, Hr. Walter C. Minnick, Staff

iS scheduled fco attend and particioate

onsponsored byfigf Division

ux5; it1"with procedures adopted' for travel -of Uhlte House Cabinet Committee Staff int is requested that funds to cover the cost of Hr. MInnlck's rip be released. Attached herewithopyormal request fron Mr. Egil Krogh2 to Mr! fshfiquestlng travel funds, for the balance of ^ninnn t' s"orsial request for .hite House Cabinet

il1 foward this requestyour oifice as soon as It

u/uiii'/flAHCOC

achaent:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management andContacts with individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central Intelligenceoubt that die In formation contained herein is of such significance to warrant Uis interest and because it lias been on record with the Agency since However, if you feel tliat die information is of such interest that it should be forwarded to thehall put it in tlie proper format to do so.

My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was th roughformer Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In |called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get tn touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Huntormer employee,ontact Hunt and ask himad only met Hunt once aboutears beforegreed to relay the message.

I called Howard Hunt at his home and told himnot have his

home phone and requested he call Mr. Hunt thanked me for

relaying the message and said that he wouldThis seemed of

little consequence to me in1 but in2

of the

Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of theAt that time Ithe telephone call from

inttachedopyemorandum for the

Record prepareda result of our conversation.

3. In the summerook my family to Disney World intook that occasion to drop in tome in

a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

With Howard Hunt. On X92 after my return fromeported this conversation to the Director of Security and madeemorandum for die Record. Tills memorandum was sent to Mr. Colbyopy of ihe memorandum is attached.

4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment wiih the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once ino not 'mow norad any coninct with ony individuals named or knowledge of related

A as

"Charles W. Kane Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Management and Services

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Conversation wilh

on leave visiting Disney World ia Florida, in tolives in Winte.rbaven, Florida.

etired from the Agency about five years ago on disability cueerious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for aboutears prior to his retirement.

a privateme that heinterviewed three or four times by the FBI in connectionMcCord-Hunt affair. sked him why he had beenhe told me that in1 he had been contacted bywho suggested that he consider an assignment asfor the Republican Party. | |visitedo discuss the proposed position with Howardapparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. [

esume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity.

3. Accordingduring the meeting with Mr. Hunt

they discussed some of the requirements of the job. Ateed forositiveounteraudioa needood security system both before and duringConvention.that he sincerely believed that

the Republican Party didecurity officerood security' programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though itery lucrative offer. Apparently, money wasroblem.

4. When| eclined, he indicated that Mr. Huntany other recommendations he might have. According totold Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still inbut he did furnish the namemight be

possibly ready to retire from the Agency:

e that he assumed that the Bureau

obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions and that he had written up0 page statement concerning his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord,said that he realty did not know McCord that well and declined any knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability:

hat he had not been in touch

Hunt since the early oart2 and knew nothinc nf

with Mr. Hunt since the early part2 and knew nothing of the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained thefrom the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as originally reported.

7. All of the above information was volunteered

eally did not get involved in any discussion oo the matter other than to conimcntated to sec the Agency's name connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place0 orinute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held, Jt is being reported for the record and for information of the Director of Security.

^Charles W. Kane

.MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane

week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBIthe Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this nature wore followed up by the FBI with an interview of the subjects.

I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on the "Watergate" case and the Actingf the FBI inquiry. Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that

the Bureau does not wish to interviewA-

the same fashion as

office of the DI)/PS will

was previously interviewed. /

I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty onalled Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion At that time Hunt was

the Chief ofmeeting was occasioned

I Mr. Kane stated further lhal around

OFFICUL ROLTINC SUP

Ar.

DDMfrS,

IEHV

it oi*i

OLD HTIIt TO RETURN TO SEN OEM

AND HO.

May 73

cirsni

ia. rfllmrt

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Director for Management and Services

in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the.DDP Systems Group^priort1 was involved in providing data processing support for the following Sensitive projects:

a.Staff' Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing dataS. citizen's believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.

taiijand Office of Medical Services prog-am. for recording data on foreign. physicians

c.ystems Croup sponsored program of common concern listing travel. citizens lo and from Communist countries.

In the same capacity my staffriefed police officers from New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

emberave been aware of five programs with possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDSfiT/ORD's contract with the

VTP Health and Behavior Prediction

ay stem."

b.RD's Project OFTEN which involved the collection of data on dangerous drugs.elieve Mr. Helms terminated this'program last Fall.

'i ii I'^'VTrrr

CVf-'g ONLY

6 iw w3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of CentralDirector for Management and Services

and Like Matters

personal involvement, direct or indirect to mymy part or my staff, with the Watergate or Pentagon papersYoung on security regulations or with classified releasesas aware, many years hack when in the DDI. thatpapers were released to RAND from the One staffa member of Ihe

IC Staff, didAND contact which he is elaborating on separately.

are some sensitive activities or projects ofam aware, which are mighty close to the borderline ofterms of Agency mission, including:

CI Staff (Ober) project

Office of Security narcotics cover project

CI Staff funding-channel project with the FBI

JEYESONL?

ooigs

in OCt can recall

i. One of my staffe briefing officer for Ihe At t

the briefing officer for the Attorney Licneral, nothing in his dealing with Mr. Mitchell which would have any relevance to the current issues. ouple other staff officers are reporting separately on some Sensitive activities in which they were involved prior to coming to this staff.

of Planning, Programming, and Budge

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT:

from, . Roosevelt

IHIIIAU

hio iKow horn wSsm n m* otimia(iM toil,

CQHE10EIITIAJ. S. UNCUSSIFIEDg

UNITED STATC3 INTELLIGENCE BOARD

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COliNTERMEASUKES COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Support Furnished to Elements of the Government

Outside of the Intelligence Community

The Interagency Audio Surveillance Countermeasures Training Center (ITC) was established at the instigation of this Committee and opened in8 under the executive management of CIA. The need forchool had been recognized by the National Security Council's Technical Subcommittee as far back2 and was re-emphasized by the Security Committee of the USIB in their4 report titled "Damage Assessment of the Technical Surveillance Penetration of the US Embassy, Moscow."

Membership on the TSCC has been confined to agencies and departments who are represented on the USIB. From time to lime other elements of the Government have indicated their concern over the audio surveillance threat and asked for membership on the Committee. In all cases they have been turned down with the suggestion that they take advantage of the TSCC's product either through liaison with the security organizations of the Committee's members or by nominating students to attend the ITC. Duringhe following students were trained at the ITC:

Central Intelligence Agency

Intelligence Agency

of the Air Force

of the Army

of Justice (BNDD)

of the Navy

of State

Department of

Internal Revenue

National Security

United States Secret

White House Communications

117

The ITC has furnished training only to employees of the agencies and departments of the Federal Government. State and local police departments have not been detailed to the ITC.

Cornelius V. S. Roosevelt Chairman

Date of retirement: 0

Systca: CIA Retirement and Disability System

Grade nnd salary at time of retirement: GS-IS,

Creditiiblc civilian service used in computing annuity:

8uneEconomic Cooperation Administration

98 to9 tate9 toIA

At0 per month

At present 1 per month (which includes cost-of-living

increases since date of retirement)

the time of retirement Mr. Hunt did not elect survivorshipmeant that upon his death, his wife wmld not draw a By letter1 be raised the question of changing

his election but was' informed by the Ceneral Counsel1 that this could not be done. By latter2 Mr. Hunt asked Mr. Houston to raise with the Director the possibility of being recalled to dutyhort period of tine, after which he could retire again and elect survivorship benefits. By letter of2 Mr. Houston advised Mr. Hunt that to call him back to duty solely for the purpose of permitting hira to change survivorship benefits would be in violation of the spirit of the CIA Retirement Act.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector Central

BU1--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

Youth, No.Foreign Dissem.

This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America) which was sent only to the President, Wall Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secrciary ofhe other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in9 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. till more abbreviated edition waa sent to the Attorney General in

Klack Radicalism in the Caribbean,, Socret/No Foreign Disaem

Hlack Radicalism in theook, No. Orif7/'rO,'Secret"/No Foreign llljfloin.

House note that these are our

I"II*"

Dtputj IHrvvtur forTnU'lUgcncc

(

WIH. CM. M TOPAWO BOTTOM

OFFICIAL ROUTING SUP

and AODRri

lim

ums to riturn to scnocr

from: nam*. amd no.

Sl: y-rtalent

1. CUs. o the Cabineth"ivc

KccsuTe oT its< = osture of thein tho prableH

uck-fit dtesideuce sou Idll inicioriety, particularly In the universityd bi-cautc pursuant lo Wr. nosto>i's instructions, the author included in histudyuc'?nt radicals ia tho United States, thereby k'.ho Agency'u charter. , have Shtiiti*.ed th*>lorto theof the Prtsidout'sj.thii the Intelligence COMUnity by eiiisir.at'ing nlto-(C'thvTapter vhirh ditfcus&es Student?e-toer-otic Societyec1 by htrlsios from th? Prospvcte section alltiUS.

3. Oytsit'e the Coaaunltytblnesiciiouiu to lurtner cfii'u for tho purple ofven tho cost cleukI reference to tie lioc.sticsuipouc Ir.ier frochance referencehe original paper bsdictior- onstudent?. Tbo nineteen country chr,pt"rs vblch fore. Pari.cand within theE'at" th* controls nppropriato io their clans Ll lest lon ere observed. To do tho rditini; cod reprinting re ulred would take tcveral daysst.

tlie tesdenicjjiorlfi or to tb^

Forive- tisct release of the bosicvould hart* tbr Agency. Tho country chapters could not be released without first being rtvrlttee to slimirmte all claseiflod inforaatlon. Once this mas done.

I'-.cyCuuXlcatcivfdy tvallttl* Inu is ro lack of evert literature ea. (ur*ejjt ciif^-itt; virtually'.Vr

-:tol* title cn his curroat ,f (OvtruMnt.ccltti,l t'clfare, tieve tipons^red rctcr.rch cn tha robjfet. rc pv/piiiid lo puMtnh thc-lr lflUSlAj*. ily, iiift publicn.

6 /Wy

mo 1

,ka

Ill3

KE-'ORAA'DUM. FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Research Project on Robert VeSco

2 Hessrs. Ereckinridge and

In the courseurvey, were briefed on

Atlantic/Pacific Division of th* Office of Economic Reports.

project citeduery from the Director, apparently "at theof Secretaryo the effect, -What do ve know abouthe man then running ICS. Two of OER's analysts were assigned to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Service,ay going over the files of tho Securities and Exchange Couknission. There apparently was 3ome contact also with EUR Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current Intelligence.

information above ia based on rough notes andsketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoine butthe ourrenl publicity about Veaco and the probability ofinto the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Breckinridge

Director of Central Intelligence

Please handle in this channel due to classification of attachment.

warning

This document contains classified information ofTectlng the national security of the United Stales within the meaning of ihc espionage laws. US Code... The law prohibits lis transmission or the revelation of Its conlcnU In any manner to an unauthorized person, as welt as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or (or the benefit of any foreign government to the .detriment of the United Slates.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained In accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONSwhich may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Director for Intelligence

Possibly Outside CIA's Legislative Charter

memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's legislative charter.

All Office and Staff chiefs In the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of theirave received responses from nil of them, and none reported any activities related to cither the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities:

White, Richard Lehman,alked

to Hunt in0 regarding his preparationecommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award.

Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments.

f crs ring the

wiin

Harry Eisenbeiss and had frequent contactsummer2 in connection

with Executivend the implementing nsc directive. This involved visits by Young to cia to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of angroup dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.

In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. Their responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but thereew which could be viewed as borderline.

DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly.

dcs, for six months in2 andas acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.

NPIC and COMIREX review satellite Imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.

-2-

cia internakuse only

NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil disturbances.

OCI,7repared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement ond world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.

FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for anothero the FBI to translate Arabic in Washington.

FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports covered by copyright. These are circulated within the Government and stamped "Official Usehis has gone on for three decades without problems.

FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda, and Ramsey Clarke.

' aUWRRU W. FOXJl.'HJR

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

73 f^

nul'M FOB: Deputy Director forDomestic Activity

To tha beat of my knowledge, DCS haa not engaged in any activity outside tho CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions thai we perform underi) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to theagencies, however, are perhsps borderline or could be construed as Illegal if nls-intarproted. For example:

Collect Information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of OS dissident groups, but onlyassive manner and only when tho source has refused to pass tho Information directly to the FBI.

Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again onlyassive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to DVDO or the FBI.

SZCnET/SSiiSiTPT

EYES oTJM'

FOR

VIA

FROM

SUBJECT

of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Intelligence Director of Current Intelligence Activity Related to Domestic Events

provided current intelligence briefings

to John Mitchell as Attorney General, with the approval of the DCI, thia practice began in the pte-inaugural period in New York and continued until Mr. Mitchell's resignation as Attorney General. The OCI officer assigned to this dutyaily appointment with Mr. Mitchell in his office at Justice.

briefings provided were strictly onandegitimate service for CIAto an official advisor to the President whoamong other bodies, theommittee. It musthowever, that our man's daily visitsand speculated on elsewhere in Justice. comes in the potential press treatment: in Continuous Contact with Mitchell.*

Director of Current intelligence

MEMORANDUMof Central Intelligence

Director for Intelligence

of Current Intelligence

Related to Domestic Events

began following Caribbean blackearnest The emphasis of our analysis wasnationalismolitical force inhreat to the security of the CaribbeanDDI memoranda were produced on the subject: in the Caribbean" ndin theLook"ingle paragraph was devoted to ties with the

US black power movement; the discussion primarily concorned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

rcher Bush of OCI was askeda memorandum with special attention to linksblack radicalism in the Caribbean and advocatespower in the US. The record is not clearrequest originated, but it came throughthe DCI. The paper was to be treated asand was to include material provided byOperations group of the CI Staff. The CIwas voluminous but did not provideof important links between militant blacksUS and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of

the conclusions of the paper. Tho memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI.

3. For several months in the first half8 the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescripton Stokely Carmichael's travels abroaderiod whan he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only,opy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

U IUHOH

Director of Current Intelligence

EYES

for

via

prom

SUBJECT

of central intelligence deputy director for intelligence director of current intelligence activity related to domestic events

1. in late spring8 walt rostow, then special assistant to the president for national security affairs, tasked the dci withurvey of worldwide student dissidence. confronted by tumult at campuses like columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at berlin's free university and elsewhere, rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostile to the interests of the us and its allies; or likely to come under inimical sway to the detriment of us interests

d/oci, and for his or

2. the paper was prepared by f oci

the assistance of the ca and ci staffs. the ddi,

t with rostow to elicit theoncerns and to agree on the sources to be examined/the research methods to be followed,

etc.

3. written during the summerhe most sensitive version of restless youth comprised two sections. the firsthilosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. this section drew heavily on overt literature and fbi reporting on studentsemocratic society and affiliated groups. ense, the survey of dissent emergedage-typescript study of sds and its foreign ties the same author had done for mr. rostow at the dci's request tn (we no longeropy.l

eyes GR&L

EYES ON

Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolized the field of student action here andecond section comprisedountryranging from Argentina tostood by itselfeview of foreign student dlssidence.

Because SDSomestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay ondissent went only to nine readers. opy may be in the Johnson Library.

Following the paper's favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostov, the DCI briefed the NSC on student dissent. Tha sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in

Tha less sensitive text was disseminated in8 and thon updated and issued again in9 and

Kicnara gunman Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET EYES ONJjY

warning

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws. US Code.,. The law prohibit* IU transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; Its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONSwhich may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages lo be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director ot Central Intelligence.

FOR: Director of Central

Director for

of Current

Related to

Events

7 OCI participated in tha preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with tha foreign connections of OS organizations and activistsin the anti-war movement. The main purpose of these reports, prepared at tha request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed betweenCommunist elements or foreign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts betweenactivists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.

In7 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject andigh levelsurvey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Holms asked tha CI Staff to collectinformation was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which was directed toemorandum from the DCI to the President.

A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever information was on hand rolevant to this subject. Although agent reports on Communist frontoverseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of USthat was quitesensitive intercepts produced by NSA, which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

draft memorandum was jointly preparedand CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI. Hetypescript memo, dated topersonally. The White House copy is nowfiles of President Johnson's papers at the library

in Austin.

Director of Current Intelligence

follow-up memoranda were preparedto the White Houso onecember According to our best recollection,finished intelligence reports onof the peace movement were produced.

7 May3

MEMORANDUM FOR: In Domestic Affair*)

memorandum responds toisting of anyin domestic affairs. o notCRS is doing anythingeasonable

man could construe as improper.

does, of course, have severalacquire still pictures, movies, vidootapM

3. CRS files do not generally bear. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political lifeoreign

fdge.

w j * -w > . - -. . *

ersons so oualifv.

cu&an ti.

prooaoxy include

no way to separate them; we have files. defectors to Cuba.)

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

CIA Library has severalfiles intended to aid the librariansthe kinds of questions that theywill gotontinuing basis. fileollection ofappointed federal officials: who holdswhen and what is his background? ollection of foldersariety

of organizationsew people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files.-. ewap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: oreign, underground, scholarly.

am not aware of any other kindin domestic activities that isto development of techniques orlegitimate training of CRS personnel.

H. L. hloEBbKlSS Director, Central Reference Service

enhancement techniques on TV pu pose was to try to identify

s possession. The request Security.

InPIC lerformed tapesackow. 'Hie serial murbers of CIA docu tents in Aiid rson was levM on NPIC through he Office o

z- The Poppy Project

PI to assist an interagency addition the Center has provided the Bureau of Narcotics and studyrivate coxpany.

NPIC has provided the ervices of effort to dptect poppy cul ivation. ne contractualangerous Drugsilt spectral crdp

3. Reviews of NASA Collec ed Iragery

of satellite imagery fron ranes of photography notenco potential of the imagery. andEflTS photography and pre-LAB iuagery.

NPIC has and continues to conduct NASA programs toensitive" to the public and to ascor: ain the intelligence This service has been provided for GBfl paratlons are underway for review of

.SlY

eaceful Uses of Satel! tte Imagery

lias been requested to provide coverage for special purposes, Exsnpl'

a nicnber of looks at domestic includ-:

threat) Floods

Damage on the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico in Detroit

, If1'

Activities

has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.

FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several

FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly.for the FBIhort-term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI Staff. He said tbe project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBISheck with the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordingsare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

its responsibility for monitoring press agencyfor Intelligence information, FBIS publishes andmaterial which fallsgray" area of copyright protection,privacy of international communications. Press services controlled

by national governments and transmitted by. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC'smonitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without The legality of this haa been affirmed by decisions of the

Office of General Counsel, i

-2-

SECRET SENSIltor

A. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts oftan involves statements or speeches made. citizens using those radio facilities. Example* aro statements made or allegedly made by American POW's Id Hanoi, by Jane Fonda Id Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justica, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasiontranscripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice aa part of that Departnent's considerationossible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors Involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses, (In one casen FBIS staff employee waa directed to appear aa an expert witness In the court-martialarina enlisted man charged with aiding the enemyroadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all thia with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is Incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

t L

sv:*cn

Office of tsrvlco

2U: .ii'

T 2

,Ji.ti***

ix.

13.

14.

tOHHIIiMUL UHOAJKiriCP

U -on: oty Director Tor CpovAticns

Support for Dm la tha

United Slates

1. As you twoCIco providesportariety of covert activities. I

1 Spocifio use is not

always available to this office and should properly come from the requesting office who can provide the details. . alias documentation use in the United States is approved by the Office of Security and normally has the concurrence of Central Cover Staff or FI and.CI Staffs. Requests received by this office froc* outside the Clandestine Service are approved by an appropriate office of tho DDO.

2. eview of this office's document support files for the2 to date indicates that tho following number. alias document requests wore fulfilled for probable use in the United States. The statistics below are broken down by roquester:

-sb-

Attn:

OTS/EXO

JUS If:

"7?

M.oK88" COHriDCHTIAL KPgfe uncussifieo

XtEMOR.^rjTJMOTH TIIjv RECORD

filca

1. 1elieve) the DeputyBe^onauMit-of State, (Mr.Robertguy gfredaaie.onCThethertthat.office might-borrow aof.tke'-Passport Office,

Franceeeting she had scheduled with rep/ras*fttatives*oreign government.

2. onveyed this request to the thenand subsequently held several uiycussiont

wdfch representatives of our bffice. It was decided to loan tfaeJpasaportmall commercial recorder (Norelco Cassette Recorder, Modelhich we had in stock.

representative of our Training Branch nd Ldeliwerad the -recorder to Miss Kaigh

the recorder's capabilities

instructed her in its use. She did not seem too pleased at the recording quality; however, the recorder was left with her.

4. On-thissked Mr. Johnson to check on-the. status of .the recorder. He said it was. never used in any way. herefore retrieved it from the Passport Office and delivered it to Training Branch

MEMORANDUM FOR: ' Mr. Colby /

Carl Duckett brought this up and said he is very uncomfortable with what Sid Gottlieb is reporting and thinks the Director would be ill advised to say he is acquainted with this Duckett plans to scrub it down with Gottlieb but obviously cannot do it this

DATc )

Gottlieb Chief, TSD

ls:M

1 1

^ 3

la .ton

ARMS

Carl R. Ducket* DDSfcT

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

eputy Director forechnology

Support

Agencioa

Services Division's charter) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CLA operations And other activities as may be directed by tha Deputy Director (or Operations.

Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Sorvice, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have Included training and materials, andewparticipation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, alias documentation and questioned document examination, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcoticsand counter-sabotage/terrorism.

In most instances requirements for this support are 'received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involvedrivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is

The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

E2 IMPDET CI.8

6. i>ce ofrjer>ftl Identityy iSDo Iwo broad lype ot*and lype ofi Afor denied]OO Arc*n Ii honored jftnrI4tftM> Free worldequire so.'oe extra coofd':-ation however, j

7. Unless ordered otherwise by higher AgencyU.S. documentation is issued by TSD Headquarterscoordination with the Office of Security and theStaff. TSD Regional Bases require at least. documentation requests by the COS, orrepresentative,e requesting Station. could be

U.S. Birthwitnout approval or tng-pp^ via Central Cover Staff. Backstopped major credit cards are issued by Office of Security, not TSD.

8- Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Heaoquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issuedoan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation haa been issued. TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returnedeasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

/ .

I/,

4*A

Gottlieb

Distribution:

Oddressee,Services Division

SECRET

( . r

De. ga

itriting. Cap* and ncalfije ccui-ue*

- . been furnished ioomenta of tlie rliv.ont

of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests arei th the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarter* and with the Chiuf of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign Identitiesoreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected auc*io requirement* have been .furnished overseas for CI -typs cases.

Bureau of Investigation

At tbe request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureauew audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangorom Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone device* forperations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flap* and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requesta overseas are coordinated with the COS or hi* designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards.

have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly'to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if

TnchclrnlV.ew CiiitoJ Ifotayort, ii csinmatngpurtormol locator*or: use Mors hava (icontho St)Satynent. fn Addition analyses and

of black Ijttorp^rlnst the United Scales

abroad are Allr* fox'v&rdiad to i'Sa for furtherion !aDivision. Xho Department of SUto furnishes tZMjr.^lari of foreign pas-JpQVta, foreign visas and inpast passportsriority basis.

Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has

been furnished foreign postal information and haa been

recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished

Itypewrite* analyses. Requirements are coormnatea wicn

the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office haa furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and |

We also have nd reinsert

a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving In the United States. Secret Service

passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidentialecure ID photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish InstructorsSAiD-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at j

Stationery, special memoranda, moldi of xhn Great Stall ht>va baaiithaSecretary.ly CI rector for Otvo rr.Uo.ists.

Police Rcspresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and_ Alexandria^

Curing theeries of clauo* reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, counteraatotAge and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Cen'.oral Intelligence and in turn validation waa required Cor each course from the Director of Security.

Gottlieb

L -

j" a *

aAm.-A

>rcvnlfa'ttoneiof VSD support to

U.S. Oovornmantagencioa.

step SB say

secret confidential uYeonly unclassified

FBUKRAt, HCAEAII OF INVESTIGATION

TSD hasox-king rc'clionihip withr ihe past The FiJI is tho only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD -vjcUod equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:

8Iy73

FOR: Officer

with Domestic Police Organizations

In Doc dDB provided lwsic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for thacane from DDP and chief. Office of Security.

On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office ofrovided training andto police officers of several dcriestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. Thesehad been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDBhave in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, inwo SDBattonded the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began inur liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had completeon letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide disseminationav.

xys

Y'.cM'.l

. s

I. V-^ich

Jhciigcd in tha training offotropolitno Police 2cp*itrcnt.

i.xptit" usof SubjectJit:

Familiarization and identity of American locks.

i'ethoil of ii'Knipuletion ot* loefcs.

Methods and techniques of conductingEntry Survey.

hotoof Subject taught:

Familiarization with cameras: Pentax Spotwatic, Leica, Nikon F, Robot and Polaroid.

Lens, telephoto and vide angle.

Exposure Meter,

Film, film, processing and print processing.

Document copy exercises.

Photography and night 7. TV Surveillance.

udioof Subject taught:

Microphones, wire impedances and line amplifiers. (ShureennheiserB and RCAll commercially available)

RF commercial transmitter. (Research Products, Tracercientific Research Corp.)

01'r

! L

tereo,ona,OL, all cciEac-rcially oats?siable) .

d Ji'aXl restoration.

D. pc-vaticnali end Exercise

1. This problem entailed anrati oral exercise agairs-jt three offcsties. The stvdents had toise andocati.;is using surrepti tious entry, photography and uudio surveillance.

2. All these safesites, two apartmentsone onbeen

turned back to Agency Seal Kstatc and have since then been teri.iir.ated. Formal class instruction has conducted at

II. After this first MPD gTOUp other police departments personnel trained using the identical safe sites and employingme subject Matter and cor^ercialas indicated above were taught on the following dates. The Fairfax Police Department and Arlington Police 10 Sixrom APDrom FPD.

III. 9 additional officers from tho Metropolitan Police

Department, Fairfax Police Department and Arlington Police Department received identifical training as that stated . above. In total olice officers were trained in our facilities.

lr .

DA1C

f/3

**% urn'i '* |. M-l

Jjyr..

tKw^^:

KCRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCUSSIFIEO

Survey of 0R0 for non-Foreigngo-TC Activities

ay survey hat been repeated and refined with respect to all ord services or dealings with other agencies on domestic, non-foreign natters. in addition, this report covers all our activitieswith the research and development of intelligencefar foreign use which has been tested in the united states and might have collected domestic information. again, each member of ord available today was asked either directly or through histo provide the above requested infovsation, vhethor heirectly involved or not. xe have used oil diligence to search our records available to us during this time period to ensure this is a

complete and factual list.

jra-bayredirector ofevelopment

attachments:

contacts with other

government agencies

domestic tests

CONTACTS WITH. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED * TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

ORD representsn theub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control that is concerned with research support of the narcotics control problem.

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical securityasith theii.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation andas discussed with BNDD.

BNDD)

n.viJiij

i'e proctsset'he it ip't-ftlligibilxty. Thehas was unkviowi-.

BKDD)

ldHavose of CTA-

jf*i

KjPD (cont'd]

s givenin thoo receiveTne,adar Peo->lo Bo tector du'.rtioyed fur OBO,

BNDD]

bndd]

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermcasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence conaunity regarding technical surveillance counterneasurs and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has beenunder the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, end Navy.

State Department

Two contracts for development of countermeasures techniques were funded jointly with the State Department

f theuwahah river labvratory, arc ^ported by clave,.op adio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and

LU JIULAlut.

devices. these laboratories have used sampling techniques developed for cja to measure covjs nuclear plant releases.

(mr. b. benson, abc)

at the request of aec security officer, mr. richard cowan, the walls of the office of the chairman of the aec (then mr. schlesinger)ayed. the operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the

(mr. richard cowan, aec)

law enforcement assistance agency (leaa)

reports and information about the ord-developed adhesive restraint, non-lethal incapacitation system were made available to department of justice, leaa in if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

(mr. les schubin, leaa)

technical surveillance counterraeasures and physical security information were exchanged with leaa.

:hJcs tliich Ccnldo iTseoln .Vdrtjssing Coadetic Problems

JVcasujjr

s being detailed io Treasury Dcpvrteeht

in anticipationo ustsblishnent of the newadministration. The request for hismade by l the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-

nator. tha request and cleared the

detailingr. Colly.

Customs/Treasury

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions overMexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Custops)

obacco Tax Div/IRS

About five years ago, assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared scanners. This was turned down.

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment.

ilhiohor iJuvon Uao oti ^olegy in Addressing Pcaestic

F<Jornl AvTation Agoncy (rAA)

The results of ourh vorfc in thoMetalsreported to FAA for possible

in tho detection of hijf/.'er ripens.

National Institute of Health (N'lH)

At the request of ORD, OCStaff technician to undertake toomputer program for the h'isswesser Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was done in cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH)

Arras Control and DisarmamentDA)

met frequently with ACDA personnel in order to snurture ORD's BW/CV research programs to support ACDA needs.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)

i'i'A (cont'd)

Technical'discissions relating to tiding IS scnmn.-ig equipment to detect'rcsanitary 7find fill have Leon conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA)

Federalf Investiga_tion

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

Secret Service

FETE

Customs

as or"s tan

in t

total contact with other agencies ce with domestic operations has be-in in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI) (Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

NASA and IJSDA

have an on-going program.

earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA) (Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA) (General Smart)

*jc SECRbT)

Kithjvo l Tn Ihro ol CIA-3cvodjnTV.'cst'c FjoHV -is

ig 'trsM Jfitji

field

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was made available for USCG tests to evaluate IReans for night search of life boats.

(then-Lt. James Mcintosh, USCG)

San Mateo County Sheriff's Office

ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants. Polygraph security findings were compared with the Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff)

A study was made on con-men techniques andmethods.

(Sheriff)

.DOMESTIC TESTS FOR AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1. ormal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications In foreign intelligence, wo conduct experiments and tests In the United States. Clearly, the design and development of ourequipments can be done more economically and more securely in this country. Although most of the tests of our RftD equipments are performed in closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi nents, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2. eview of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a' jrpserhe laser probe develbpeoTby OBU was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings thnt were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed.._

yscem was zes ;ed

- About

JThis system is

assigned to permit intercept of 11

"Re^"

coraings ot thesewere

carefully controlled and were destroyed several years ago.

A'l'i'AOKMK.yy 2

iwany ot these are patterned

axtord, for this reason, limited monitoring to test the operation of intercept equipment in the United States is planned. 1

Message content is

no interest and will not be recorded. testing is plannedubsequent date. To date, some domestic testing of this concept has been carried out at the contractor's plant. Nb recordings have been made of such data. Ex-

tremely brief tests. and foreign telephone systems f

beento verity initial

concepts. The Juration of testing ras Less than one-half hour.

d. .Other Sensorxamplesdevelopment tests of specialthe United_States

in an tnese cases, Tne data output ot SUCA testing has been used for engineeringand the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

rO--'

gcod .itite

os atest subjects aro WlttJiig, out rtoston naive subjects (they i'oowboi.xg Fosted). 'ihe

yjetoly hairless to the sua jeer. ?iu the test results are closely held.

f. Personality StructurePefectorswi) un^'ertooTc to" ifetevmiiTe thestructure of dofectors during the. Tho work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concernedtudy of the phenomenon of defectioneaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University.

h. Communications Link Loading Study -

unaer careiuiiy controlled conditions, some U. S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyedew weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content.

nfcltO&.WUM for: Cd^jty Director tor scion ctt mid

Technology

Survey of ord for

Intelligence activities

At. today, each division and staff chief or his representative was instructed to query all of his people and report back by this afternoon whether or not they had provided any sorvices or dealt with any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign natters. The attached list is an inventory of all items we were able to uncover. If additional information on any of these topics is desired, we can provideerbalritton report on very short notice.

scientitic aavisot

Director ofevelopment

as stated

T.'i;

ongoing pro^/itn wh irhfc,

at cstim-to program whichy bo politically sensitive.

"arcotics--cur foreign activities are well known in DDSfjT.

A negative report from tha Support Staff.

ORD's|_ Jwork was reported to the FAA about three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge

Performed intelligibility enhancement

ot" audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

- At the request of FBI, we described iMagery^wi an cement Techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

My total contact with other agencies in terns of assistanc with domestic operations has been in the field ofdiocountermeasurcs, anti-hijacking, or drugs.articipated in TSCCubcotBiitteo meetings which included technology exchanges and souemporary bpsis ostensibly for testing orlso assistedaying the office walls of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesingcr) at the request of Mr. Richard Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening (date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of tho

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service

Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs

Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA

Mr. Thomas Allen, PBI

Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF

Major John Langager,USN

Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

Continuing contortsli/toili^oncoochnical 'iturv alliance co'i.iveraeasujres.security. This is an exchange ofondonductedthe auspices ofTechnical Surveillance Cownt.orrtoa^ui'os

MrSecret Service

DIA FBI

Joint, funding of two contracts with State(TRK/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD contract (Bureau of Standards).

Other DOD and Government contacts for information collection or exchange only.

ARPA

LEAA/Dept. of justice DNA/DOD

Office Telecommunications Policy Office of Army/Provost Marshal General Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon Air Force/Office of the Inspector General Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

'uingo of technicalrelating tofe

tit'hnical discissions anting to usingosanitary land fill.

3xdd

- exchange of technical information relating to

ndd

- cia has requested the establishmentwo-acre plot of'opium poppiessda research site in washington state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium poppies.

us coast guard

- about six years ago, cia infrared equipment wasfor uscg tests to evaluate ireansnight search of life boats.

alcohol f> tobacco tax div/irs

- about five years ago assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using cia infrared scanners. this was turned down.

i W'l

X373

1. i) vya .ji'.vn pn.'slssicacrrivc proposals from Aerospace,sdar People Detector developed for ORD. Tiae: Fe.ll Action ves swpvovedRD.

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System. Reports and information vas rr-ede available to Department ofA in If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crovd and riot control.

s.Vrf Inbox.

xachaieal Security Civi-jicn md

. ujgeacads jiz&a* tio thutlie. ^iiiiiiiitj of enhancing tha subject ccawraatloa*.

2- . fcaelcinJ appeared atpausterjal wlro tapping. Vha taps vaa to ursor/idicatad that rsoatccnouicL'aca noro iatallioibieavailable ia the Laboratory. Incfnature of Eha raguautjMr. CaJklni was inferred tSftt gor*itfc approvallovola Within the Agency. If air.ilax raouastsraqtteatuggested

could be trair.ed ia tie aaa cf tha processing systera.

i as* *?

MEMORANDUM FO.lftSCORD

T:Bureau of Narcotics

rons Ol'us division.

1. On2 Kir. Charles Caskins of Ehc Bureau of

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs requestedc to improve the intangibilityan audio tp.pa that had been acquired by BNDD zgcnta.

Mrftf jjoum rax Tni: ksccb&

SPSjZCTs Ass'dtaBca to ?i'.:tcu o<

x. r. Wtrc R. WcIm ofJ*atificrecuasced thoSAWthe

* he had evolved fm

it. John Bullcrd. Regieatl Director, hftded fc. Kerne to aid BNDD in Che anieaceoent of the-conwreetionsecord icC which were Bashed by background ausic Tbe rwcltsthe proceEsing vill be used to r. gzsnd Jury investigation and possible follow-on trial. lfcytf* Bulled cid not indicate hew he had becrtsa aware of it. fcciss sir* this

7 May ly/i

MEMORANDUM FOR:Director for Science end Technology

this ico^iluj concerning miy OSA

activities which ould putAgency into .in embarrassing situation.

are no missions which we have down during the lastwithan associate the result directly lo anyembarrassing to the Agency. Thereumber ofthat indirectly have the potential for this embarrassment. Bearthat once we turn the film over to NPIC or any other agency,no control over subsequent distribution.

missions listed on the attachment aro in three categories:

a. Category A: These are missions flown in the U. S. that are very similar to the potential that you discussed with me using the example of the Santa Barbara oil disaster.

B: Itfetec lion of illicit

poppyeparate category oecause of the high sensitiviiy of this subject.

C: When we were developing LONG SHAFT,

the

effect, we weroP

to our

activity could be labeled illegal.

3. ave specifically looked to see where's were operating during the Watergate break-in discovery. Democratic National

TASK

CATEGORY A

Santa Barbara Oil Disaster

HILLTOP ( now Survey

Hurricane Base Line

Earthquake Damage

Minneapolis -Kansas City

of Interior.

ORD/NASA Earth Resources9

Environmental Science Services Administrationept. of Commerce thru COMIREX.

Office of Economic

Solf generated, NPIC processed.

OSI/AEC Division.

Potential for providing basiy for criminal Law suits. Pressure or. oil company to change operation.

Possible iua for IndaetrisU exploitation. Crop productionittrnafaa future nutrket

Industrial vx-^oitaLion. Water resource allocation.

Political leverage for disaster area funds.

Political leverage. Criminal negligence suits, jxuccr.aV'.'UCtiwn exploitation.

, urban planning; exploitsilcn.

top ODOnnT

WHOM/WHEN

IMPLXAViO.V

Virginia Dam Site Coverage

CATEGORY B

rmy Corps of Engineers.

Political iiivcrago. u atrial exploitation, civiluits.

Potentialal ObK&hCaterol.

ertoulti Spectral Sensor

DDI/CIA, NPIC, ORD. Dept. of Agriculture. 2

CIA extonsior, ofraA'icking from SEA to CONVt. Jeitcr techniques to avoid dv'.ccUor.growth.

SHAFT

COMINT collection.

Tng srrnrT

'ctwigate cues'ionis UJ In:

- ill in Ji'flco with ey.:cpt'->n' urrejults vc

- contactedt two who wore on leave--negative.

on these he could contact. Fallowing arc

people he could not roach:

said FMSAC has negative results.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science te Technology

Correspondence "Received by Chairman-Habere, House Armed Services Committee, Concerning

Sthc at .ached Letter from Chairman Hebert, "House Armed Service* Committee, together with tbe enclosure from

b forwarded for your information and such action as you deem appropriate. ave rechecked the Committee ntaff.aud have been advised tiiEtt'absolutcty no response toHebert't* lattoris expected.'

^sislETit Legislative Counsel

Aits

N0TE: Oune)) was sent to the IG for Ms Information and was notart of the

components* submissions to the IG in response to the Director's request on "Questionable Activities" and, therefore, it is believed that these documents should not be included in the Halperfn request.

rtee oh

Jaoes It. Schlesiacar' - . . ; r.

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, ,D.A

Dear -ftfe-^Sehlesioger;

io-corresponienaa fr-O"

ia forwarded for .Incarnation and whatever octioavWrtirtet regards.

feh:whv attachment

i;-d

FOR:

SUBJECT:

Director for Science End Technology

Policy Regarding Assistance to Agencies Outside the Intelligence Coronunity on Speech Processing Problems

Recent public concern over Agency affiliations with law enforcement activities has madery of offering speech processing assistance to various otheragencies. My concern here is restricted to government activities outside the intelligence community. Becausecientific community awareness of the expertise of members of OEL in speech processing problems, we are often asked by individuals in government for help on various speech problems. The requests are usually informalerson-to-person basis. While most of these contacts involve only an exchange of unclassified information, several have involved the use of laboratory resources.

Contacts General's office, Drugsos Of the above, ass sanctioned by Mr noisy tape was to to insure that thNDD employe laboratory using equipment/

come from the FBI, Attorney Bureau of Narcotics andffice, and the Treasury Department, istance to BNDD had been specifically Helms. In one recent instancee usedourt case, care wasrocessing of the tape vas doneven though it was done in an Agency the Agency's Coherent Spectrum Shaper

"UL-OIO-73

i. Providing service! of this kindas Dotyeti^niiicent work lead thereenefit to us in tr.at such contact the staff to test techniquesipuont on of speech pvobXons. Informal fntevrctions at level are fruitfulerns of liolrtos to Agency goals. Reoce we would be villingupport other departments on an ad hoc basis, appreciate your guidance ro the wisdomn "Jonestic" activities.

Against when do these agents work, on what do they "

report, and to when?

/ Got copies of the reports on "Restless Youth" and black radicalism.

ltf}C How lB cryogenic magnetometer used, on vhoo, and for

"z. Get coptee of the reports.

does dcs collect information on

What Id done with it?

in DCSurpose T

undown on for whom, and for what

ouple ofn Tofte.

^ Include the submission of JH"

Get the full story on providing alias documentation to tbeG Service.

|tjWhy did we pay the costs of the responses to letters receivedA about tbe President's speech on Cambodia?

upplying beacons to Ambassadors seensood Idee. How may MKfcBMmi are there In use and where?

I Vhy i" Logistics procuring police-type equipment for local police forces?

Whatelephone analyzer?

i^^Vhy Is Ito continue

^ More on Vesco. How did It get started? What was done? Why was It stopped?

% What were the multiple channels to CIA on tbe ICS matter?

(OS".

AD i

/cS-

;; :

t -

A(l &.

v soft

c.:',

j4- P^ Sod

iff/" si f

cU^ .

V i-#:

yT t.

The Director advised theheft White House staffer Houston and Presidential Counsellor Pat Moynihan thought well of the memorandum on "Black Radicalism In the Caribbean."

Maury briefed on hie meeting yesterday with Congressmanhord, Chairman of the House Internal Security Committee, who had asked what ve are doing to Investigate "security leaks" connected with press accounts of Lon Hoi's having sold rice to the Communisto and having engaged in on attempted deal with Hanoi. Maury briefed on his explanation of why we are doing nothing, since such reports are not exclusively confined to our information.

Maury noted that the Directoretter to Congressman Moss on telephone monitoring practices.

The Directoreptember memorandum from John Bross on Daniel Elsperg (olc). He asked tho DDS to lift his clearances and to make this fact known in security channels.

DDS reported that the Weathermen have declared this month for their fall.offensive and have mentioned the Agencyarget for bombings and kidnapping. He briefed on precautionary measures adopted and asked senior officers to vary their route to aad from work, aad to report any peculiar telephone calls or unusual events around their residence.

DDP reported that the FBI desires to check for fingerprints on all cryptogram messages mailed to high Government officials. The messages will then be passed to KSA forDP requested that Agency personnel who receive ouch meo capes pass them to him for transmittal to tho FBI.

DDI noted preea accounts of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover'sovember statement that the Black Panthers are supported by terrorist organisations. Be said that we have examined the FBI's related files and our own data And find no indication of any relationship between the fedayeen and tbe Black Panthers. He provided the Directoremorandum on this topic.

S30

Executive Director called attention to theecember memorandum on "Disclooores of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearjce of Officialhich la believed to be the result of representations by the Director and Admiral Anderson. Executive Director said that he will meet with selected Executive Committee Members next week to discuss the meooranduB's implications and to develop recommendations for action by the Director in view of the special responsibilities placed on him by the President.

Executive Director reminded Executive Committee participants about the meeting involving most of them this morning on the President's directive on disclosure of classified information.

ecember

Executive Director briefed on the results of yesterdays meeting on what the Director now needs to do in pnirsuance of the Prealdenc's directive on disclosure of classified Information. He will outline in tbe Director's briefing book actions which are to be

taken.

IU January IgTl

Bross said that be and Bronson Tweedy will have lunch today with General Bennett, Director of DIA. Tbe Director aald that be night aek Broas to ta)ceopy of bis letter and guidance on the Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements but thut he first ulshas to clarify with tho Executive Director scoe of tbe language In the guidance section.

anuary'

Maury said that heuDber of questions froa the Hill on the attached article by Jack Anderson in today's Waehlnfiton Post,ttempts to Kill Castro Leid to CIA."

- Housten related that be vill have lunch today with Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Hardlan to discuss the Director's guide-lines on tbe disclosure of classified Information.

Brbss related that Parrott met with General.Bennett to review tbe Director's letter on disclosure of classified Information and said that General Bennett will now discuss It with Deputy Secretary Packard, who say in turn review it with Secretary laird. Tbe Director asked to be advised of Secretary Packard's reactions and said that he wants to check the final guidance with Secretary Laird end with someone in tint' White House before It la issued.

alled attention to Jack Anderson's column in today's Washington Post, "Castro Stalker Worked For The CIA."

"Carver said that he will beeeting today called by Aasistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Henkin. He added thatssumes it will concern the declassification of some of the secret Pentagon papers and that, if it does, he will seek the Director'sDDCI in chai

"At the Executive Director's request, thegreed to get together with thend General Counsel toriefing paper for the Director on where we stand with respect to classified materials at Rand and efforts to safeguard them. "

"Maury reported that Congressman Mahon would like to meet with the Directoruly to discuss the Pentagon papers and various world hot spots Carver said that h< willriefing paper for the Director on the Pentagon study. "

"Carver briefly toncern over the

revelations in the Lansdale memorandum, which was surfaced as part of

the Pentagon papers.

eportedOD security team is going to Santa Monica to repossess classified Defense materials held at Rand. He suggested that.

than take parallel action, weecurity Officer to observe tha operation and inventory Agency materials in the possession of Rand. In response to the Director's question he explained that we have seven contracts with Rand; only one is classified, and it is with Rand'soffice, although some material could have been sent to Santa Monica. The Director concurred andeview to determine thelality of current proposed contracts with Rand. Houston commented that according to DOD General Counsel Buzhardt, DOD is technically under instructions to lift the security clearances of Rand contractors but has -taken no action. DDCI reported that John Ehxlichmaa had^tclephoned to

Huntecurity consultant. Later in the meeting the Director asked all Executive Committee members to review their lists of consultants towhether each is really needed. "

briefed-on his meeting yesterday with Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Henkin and noted that anyfrom the text of the secret Pentagon papers must beMonday. He added that no decision has yet been made on whetherto the public the volumesersion thereof. The Directorwe should oppose any such course of action.

MgbttM to the Director's question Carver reported that none of contained in the sncrft iWpum

in the New York Time.ueu.omplete copy of the forty-seven volume*

to the Director's question Carver reported that none of jcontaiued in the secret Pentagon papers has yetes. He added, however, that the Soviet Embassy has the forty-seven volumes I

"Carver reported that the book which General Laos dale has been writingearalf is now in the hands of the publisher, with some minor changes being mado in light of revelations resulting from theof the secret Pentagon papers. In response to tbe DD/P'a question Carver said that he might be able to arrange for us to read theDDCI in the chair)

"Tweedy noted that at White HouseFIAB committeeof Franklin Lincoln, Dr. William Baker, aid Frank Pace willa damage assessment of the publication of the secret Pentagon papers. He added that the committee will want to hear from us and spoke of plans for Houston and Carver to undertake this task* "

"Tweedy reportedelephone call from Andy Marshall and said that Marshall and Rand President Henry Rowen are brooding about the security problem in Rand. Marshallesire to talk with one of our senior security officers when he next visits Washington in order toeel for security practices in general. Executive Director advised against our getting out front in terms ofajor DOD contractor on security. The Director approved and requested that re respond to Mr. Marshall's request in low key and that the meeting be held in this building."

P:" '

ZZ1 (the day Howard Hunt came to see General Cushman)

"GaJvarwith NSC staffer David

' Youno. who is assisting John Ehriichman^^yiewing^he secret Pen-tag

"Carver highlighted his, Houston's,session with the*

"Carver highlighted his, Houston's, andwith the

PFIAB committee which isamage assessment of theof the secret Pentagon papers. (See Morning Meeting Minutes ofuly

61 .

The Director called attention to the article by Michael Getler in today's Washington Post, "CIA Patrols Into China Saidndhat Mauryetter for his signature to Senator Stennis making it clear that Senator Case was briefed on this topic and obviously leakedhat Maury brief Carl March on the background, including the fact that thesewere not terminated because of the President's projected trip toChina but because certain aspects of them were previously exposed in thehat the Director of Security (who was present at the Morning Meeting) get additional background from Maury and see White House staffer Davidhat Goodwin reply to queries by saying that we know nothing about thishat Houston and Maury utilize this incident in any material prepared for his use in opposing the Cooper bill;hat the DDCI brief Dr. Kissinger or General Haig on this matter today.

ugust

Knoche called attention to the article by Tad Szulc inew York Times, "Soviet Move to Avert War Is Seen in Pact withnd said that the material contained therein on the reason for Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to New Delhi is clearly from highly classified CS material. DP noted his concern, over this breach of security.

DCS. The Director askedstaffer David Youlg toWhite

A-DDP noted that he has reported to White House staffer David

on the results of the Deputy Director of Security's survey of those who

the classified assessment upon which Tad Siulc based hisugust article (see Morning Meeting Minutes of. **

"Maury briefed on White House staffer John Lehman's request forin determining what four volumes of tho secret PentagonGravel reportedly provided to Beacon Press for publication. that Paul Chretien of OTR is an acquaintance of the Senator and mayto assist. Carver said that the four volumes probably pertainettlement and outlined the sensitive material containedrecommended against our involvement in this matter andthe Department of Justice query Beacon Press. Maury said thatinstructed that we do nothing until Maury consults withCounsel to the President for Legislative andwho is out of town and will not return until the first of nextthe meantime, Maury noted that he will determine from Johnthey have considered consulting the Department of Justice onio the chair)

"Maury said that he called White House staffer John Lehman yesterday and cited the Code which would permit the Justice Department to go alter tho four volumes of the secret Pentagon papers reportedly given to Beacon Press. Lehman's reaction was that, since there is an existing policy preventing the use of subpoenas on this matter, he still hopes we will assist in determining what Senator Gravel may have given Beacon Press. The DDCI asked Maury not to utilize Paul Chretien's entree to the Senator without prior consultation with the Director, and Carver commented that he is opposed to our(see Morning Meeting Minutes of (DDCI in the chair)

. "Tlie Director reviewed foronversation he hadoung lawyer who has reviewed the secret Pentagon papers in response to .the Justice Department's efforts to prosecute. According to this attorney. Justice did not cite the appropriate provisions of the Code and haa presented its case poorly. "

Lehman raid that this is "leak day" in the Washington Postattention to the following articles: "Mao's Heir,Out in Power Shuffle" by Stanley Karnov, "NorthMove by Evans/Novak, and "lin Piao is 'Finished'- by(attached). He noted that, while the articlo byprovides good coverage of the topic, ittate He also recalled that onctober wesimilar to that contained In "the Evans/Novakmentioned that the Alsop article is probably tho moatIt includes material

)Tno Directorto do sonethlnp about this problem 'but advisedDP to cope with any adverse

reactionnoting the large volume of reports

on the political situation in Ccttmunist China.

In response to the Director's.question Carver said that some work requested by John Ehrllchoan is pending. Tho Director asked to be fillod in later on the details.

Lehman said that Jack Anderson's column in today's Washington Post, "Hussein: 'Help or I'll Ooontains verbatim language from an ExDls message from King Hussein to the President and added that ho Is looking into the distribution of this oesaage.

A-DDI called attention to Jack Anderson's columns in yesterday's and today's Washington Post (attached). He noted that thoecember piece contained material from three SALT ExDis oemcons and added that today's column contains quotestate LixDis cable and two TDCSs. rief discussion followed, the DDP observing that, if theBe security breaches continue, ve will have to limit severely the distribution of sensitive intelligence information.

Maury said that according to Prank Slatinshek, Chairman Nedxl will rely oa ue rather heavily for support during bis bearings on the problem of classification and handling of Government Information (see Morning Meeting Minutes. The Director encouraged Maury to see Chairman Nedzl next week, and Houston suggested that tbe Chairman be provided with tbe Rehnqulst atudy.

DPP briefed on work under.way to limit distribution of reports Jand.notedI Iseview of steps which mignt oe taken to restrict dissemination of sensitive reports from all sources.

Maury related that Frank Slatinshek Is pressing for background materials pertaining to past efforts or studies related to the classification and control of information. Be added that he and Houston will meet with tbe Director later today to discuss the availability of the Rehnqulst otudy.

Mo vary/ Briefed on his and Houston's session with Frank Slatinshek and their provisionarge volume of material on past efforts to develop effectiveaws.

Houston noted the President's nomination of Henry E. Petersen to become Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Clminsl Division of the Justice Department. Be observed that Mr. Petersen has been most helpful to the Agency in the past, particularly on tbe Itkin case.

Maury noted that the draft revision.of Executivelassification Procedures,'* which Is being circulated by the RSD staff for comment.ollow on to the Rehnqulst study.

DDI called attention to the article In today's New lork Times, "Nixon Acts to End Security Leaka." (Excerpt: "Laat July, two embers of the White House staff, David R. Young of the national Security Council and Egll Krogh Jr. of the Domestic Council, were asked to investigate earlier leaks and prevent recurrences.")

3 February Iff*

A/DDS reported the House ApproprlaticnB Committee requestinance officer to assist then in work on the budget. He added lhat we have provided such assistance in tho past, and the Director interposed no objection.

Houston explained that no action will be taken In the near future with respect to the Hans Tofte case, since tbe Judge* has been stricken with hepatitis.

DDI noted the article by Kichael Getler in Today's Washington Post, "Hew Spy Satellites BCB Planned for Clearer, InstantAter in the meeting the Director asked tbe DDS to advise tbe Director of Security to undertake an Investigation of this leak of EOl-related information and to convene the USIB Security Committee.

II2

Carver noted his handling of White House suffer Sven Kraemer's request to FBIS for material. POW's. The Director reminded Executive Committee members of Dr. Kissinger's request that any inquirieo from elements of the White House staff be referred to his staff for conveyance to the Agency.

Houston highlighted tbe meeting with John EorUchman on the HSC draft Executive Order on security classification. Be noted the related article by Sanford Ungar in today's Washington Poat. "BSC Urges Stiffer Law On Secrets."

lb2

I^baan noted plans to continue briefing Attorney General Mitchell, whose resignation isarch.

Houston related that White House staffer David Young has invited him to review another MafflMSffiOOI draft of the new Executive Ordor on security classification.

Houatca said that heDeputy Director of

Security, recomoend the Director concur Inew Executive Order on classification. In light of their undemanding with NSC staffer David Young, that some of the featureshe Executive Order say not materialize. rief dissuasion followed and the Director ashed Houston to review the natter with bin.

HXMU*VKXMI8TM

Houston reported that the draft Executive Order on classification hasew minor changes. He noted Director's letter to John Ehrliehnan,ith respect to our position on problems related to declassification and suggestedopy be provided David Young, NSC starrer. rief discussion, tbe Director Interposed no objection.

The Director noted his memorandum to the Deputies and Independent Office Heads, subject: "Allegations of Assassinations." He asked that it be mentioned at Staff Meetings.

Tne Director said that the President has seen hisebruary memorandum on reducing diaclosures of classified intelligence and directed the White Bouse staff toemorandum urging that all agencies comply with proper disclosure procedures.

Houston reported that he is scheduled to meet with John Ehrllchman this morning.

Maury reported that, after checking with Egll Krogh of the WhUe House staff, be has made arrangements to briefolff of Hew York on the Agency's role in international narcotics control.

DDS related that the Director of Security hasequest from the Secret Service to provide two technicians in support of the Vice President's trip to Tokyo. The Director concurred.

DDS reported that tbe Director of Security basequest from tne Secret Service for counteraudlo technicians to support the President's trip to Moscmv. The Director concurred.

II2

Houston noted his correspondence with White House staffer David Young pertaining to our problems with Executivend added that Kr. Young has accepted our position on aboutercent of our problems with the implementing draft directive.

Houston explained that he bad obtained White House Staffer David Young's understanding that we will not meetune deadline^ for producing Internal Agency regulations implementing tbe NSC dire cove on Executive* rief discussion followed on tbe cumbersome bookkeeping end declassification authorities which may be required. Tbe Director observed that the topic was sufficiently important for us to be in no great rush toune deadline and Houston assured him that Mr. Young understands.

to2

Thuermer explained that be will continue working with the General Counsel in response to Charles Wesson's efforts toubpoena on him in connection with the Ellsberg case. He noted the related article by Robert A. Wright in today's Hew York Times, "Hearing Is Asked In Ellsberg Case."

7 June

Houstonetter from the Justice Departmentubpoena directed to Angus Thuermer in connection with the Ellsberg case. He highlighted tbe schedule of documents requested, most of which were mentioned in footnotes to the Pentagon papers. He noted plans to ask Justice to declare the material irrelevant to the case.

Houston said that ba will beeeting called by" DOD General Counsel Buzhardt, who is recommending that Justicebe case against Daniel Ellsberg.

Tne Director noted theune arrest of James W. McCord and four others who were apprehended at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate.. With the Director of Security present to provide biographic details, the Director made It perfectly clear that responses to any Inquiry with respect to HcCord or Howard Hunt, who may be implicated, are to.be limitedtatement that they are former employees who retired In KgUM August and0 respectively. The Director asked that this guidance be disseminated via staff meetings. The Director asked that any inquiry from other elements of the government be referred to the Director of Security who is to be the focal point. Inquiries from the press are to be referred to Mr. uhumb who may eay that McCord worked in the Office of Security. The Director noted that we have no responsibility ith respect to an Investigation except to be responsivo to the EH FBI's request for name traces. It was noted that Howard Hunt may have done some work since retirement in connection with the preparation of supporting material for some awards. Theirector was asked to review this topic and report to the Director.

In response to the Director's request, the Director of Security highlighted developments over the past twenty-four hours with respect to the McCord/Bunt, etituation. He noted that the late edition of the Hew York Timesifferent story by Tad Szulc than that which appeared in the edition received here (attached}. The Director of Security anticipates some inquiries on' Bernard L. Barker's situation, and It was noted that Mr. Barker vas hired by the Agency0 and terminated The Director complimented Unumb on his handling of inquiries and asked that future inquiries be metesponse confined to the fact that, now that we have acknowledged that both McCord and Bunt are former Agency employees, ve know nothing more About tbe case and tbe caller should be referred to the FBI as appropriate.

gQ2

DDS noted that In response to State's request its chauffeurs vbo drive the Secretary of State and other senior State officers vill hene-day defensive driving orientation

The Director noted receiptaperafehouse In Miami which is being made available to the Secret Service in support of its work in connection with the Republican and Democratic Rational Conventions. He asked the ADDP and the DDS to make it absolutely clear!

that our cooperation inis to be confined to provision of the safehouse'It is not to be usedite fortc. The Director added that we will notto the FBI or Secret Service in connection withat the Conventions nor will we provideto the

In view of the coverage in today's New York Times and Washington Post, Maury recommended that Chairman Nedzl be briefed on the McCord affair and that this briefing* include all our information about the others Involved. The Director asked Maury to touch base with the Director pf Socurity andriefing paper on this topic for his review. Citing tbe number of distorted rumors about this matter, tha Executive Director said that during the course of the day he hopes touggested Headquarters Bulletin for all employees for the Director's review.

Unumbumber of inquiries from the press with respect to the Cuban-Americans involved in the bugging attempt at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and their alleged Involvement in the Bay of Pigs, etc. Tbe Director asked that such inquiries be met with an explanation that we are not prepared to be helpful on this matter.

gg2

Unuab observed that Inquiries on the McCord/Hunt situation seem to be slackening off.

The DirectorCT's attention to coverage of tbe McCord affair in the Metro Section of today's Washington Post and asked that future issues of the "CIA Operations Center Morning Newspapernclude press iteoh on this topic.

Maury noted that be briefed Chairman Nedzi on tbe McCord/ Hunt situation andecurity case.

Houston noted the Fensfervald Freedom^ of Information case, "fhe Director endorsed his plans to concur in the FBI's release of three photos, one being of Lee Harvey Oswald, which were acquired In Mexico and previously furnished to the Warren Commission.

Houston called attention to tbe Judge'b ruling in tbe Ellsberg/ Rubso case denying tbe HKSaiOffi defense motion for an evidentiary bearing,esult of which the subpoena directed at CIA le suspended.

DDI noted presa attention attached to Secretary of Commerce Peterson's planned trip to the.Soviet Union and observed

secretary aseignea to wnummaut *to the President for

it was also notea that Peterson's office when International Economic Affairs, continues to work for him and may go to the Soviet Union. She will beOP status during the remainder of her tenure with the Secretary.

Lk2

Carver recalled that we have provlddd some briefings to Senator Eagletoo on Vietnam. Tbe Director .said that in time we will receive instructions from the White House on briefing Senators McGovern and Eagleton.

uly

Houston reported that tbe Justice Department is anxious that no comment be made on the Ellsbe rg/Pusso trial and that any inquiries should be referred to the Justice Department's Public Relations Office.

uly

Houston noted that he had called David Young's attention to the fact that the White House (NSC Staff) is not utilizing the new classification procedures.

uly

'Maury reported that according to White Houee StafferDavid Young is of the opinion that Estimates are subjectafter ten years. Houston will see Mr. Younghim out on

uly.-

Theent on to ask the DOS for the background

ecision tothe Office of Security accompany

Fred Flotthite House survey of the drug scene in Southeast Asia. Tbe Director said that in the future his or the DDCT's prior approval vill be required in all oases vhere the Agency is asked by the White House or any other element of the Government to send an Agency officerarcotics-connected mission.

DDP reported that Cord Meyer advised Bud Krogh of the White

House staff of our unwillingness toa new

narcotics survey team to Southeast Asia and the possibility that Krogh may call the Director to reclame. The Director briefed on the background of this decision and noted his conversation with Al Haig on this topic.

related that Mr.

the CI Staffall

the Secret Service requesting1 our training film on defensive driving. The Director interposed no objection to making this film available.

Houston reported that Judge McArdleotion for summary Judgment in the Tofte cose.

",- ;'

Houstonelephone call from Howard Hunt whohis attorney was with bin anduestion about aoffillatlon with the Agency.hae

reviewed the employment, and Houston reported tflat heto Hunt's friend,that his old

affiliation should create no problems in"connection with his appearancerand Jury.

Thuermer reportedallr. Crevdscn of tbe Hew York Times who said be vas "formallyhotograph of Howard Hunt. Tbe EDP observed that we are under no obligation tohotograph, and Thueraer said he had declined.

DDIetter from the McCovern campaignthe FBIS WINS daily white book and any recent studiesAsia. rief discussion followed and the liter will

lfc2

Maury reported on his conversation with Messrs. Flug and Epstein of Senator Kennedy's staff In response to the HfcKDOCB Senator'sugust latter to the Director Aiwtm, lanroper contactI

|Uor details see uu;-b

NCGoranauQ-ror the ltecorarn

Thuermer noted that white House staffer David Young willeeting today to brief the press on tbe implementation of Executive.

Warner reported that Marchetti's lawyers have been in touch with Justice in connection with ACLU'aecret brief with the Supreme Court and said that tbe Office of Security will pick it unonvenience to Justice.

Warner noted that the Director is one of several defendants Inivil case filed by Ellsberg and Russo.

Unumbequest from the National Observer for biographic data on Howard Hunt and James McCord in connectiontory they are doing on tbe Watergate incident. The Director endorsed his having provided only the dates these individuals left the Agency.

The Directorall from Assistant Secretary-of State Slscoi

ctober lQ/fg

Maury noted hia responseequest from CSC General Counsel Anthony Monde Lio, who was reactingequest for tbe personnel filee of those former Agency officers involved In the Watergate Incident fron Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures. Be added that ve are exempted from related CSC regulations, and the Director endorsed his plan to proviete only the cSatcs of their departure from the Agency in the ovent the Senator'T office calls ua on this matter.

Houston recalled that last August he reportedallHunt and his subsequent guidance tobow

to handle affiliation with the Agency,

The Director highlighted his conversation with David Krajblov of the Washington Star flews and his flat denialroposed story that the Agency was asked to report on,tho Democratic Party which led to the Watergate incident and others. Tbe Director noted his plans totatement of denial iftory.were to appear and suggested that Tbmermer cons leer drafting one for contingency use.

DDPeport from Chief, WH Division thatr. Harper of the Hew York Times waa workingtory which trios to link the Agency with Cuban emigres, the break-in at the Chilean Embassy, action against Daniel Ellsberg, and the Watergate case. Thoermer observed that this is the first he has heard about this topi and the DDP concluded thattory could have no basis in fact and it would be inadvisable to try to straighten out Mr. Harper.

alled attention to Jack Anderson's column in today's Washington Post and the quotes contained therein from an Agency reportamous singer. The Director highlighted his brief conversation with Jack Anderson and explained that tbe Director of Security is looking into this matter.

Warner related that according to Assistant Attorney General Henry. Attorney Earl Silbert has several questions on the Watergate case. The Director indicate*be will review this matter later.

Thuermer noted an inquiry from Dave Burnhaa of the New York Times, who appears to betory on the twelve New York Police officers who were briefed by the Agency on information processing. rief discussion fallowed, and Thuermer will advise Burnham that we have occasionally provided briefings at the request of various police organizations, but these are exceptional cooes.

The Director noted tho article by Thomas B. Roes in yesterday's Evening Star-News, "New Watergatend the impression left therein that tbe Agency was involved in the Watergate incidentassport bearing the name Edward Hamilton was found on Frank Sturgle. Any inquiries from the press or elsewhere are to be metthis Is nonsense" reply. The Executive Director noted work under way to identify the genesis of the passport story.

ecember"

Uauab reported that Seymour Hersh of the New York Times, who iatory on the Watergate incident, had asked if Martinez had been employed by the Agency. Acting DCI recommended that the Agency not assist Mr. Hersh's efforts.

Maury related that we will be on firm ground In responding to Congressman Koch if we indicate that our assistance to the HY City Police Dept. was not trainingriefing on an essentially unclassified basis undertaken in response to the suggestiononsultant to. Thuermer reminded those concerned that

ormer Agency employee.

Maury noted press stories that Watergate defendant Martinez was on the Agency pay roll untilune and anticipated some inquiry on this topic. The DDP endorsed his viewhereas Martinez was intermittently usedource to report on Cuban exile matters, this relationship should cause no serious difficulty.

The Director called attention to the article by James Reston "The Watergate Spies" contained in tbe Hew York Times, and wondered how Reston got the erroneous Impression that Hunt. Operational bead of theuban Bay of"

Kaury reported that when he and Dave Blee, Chief/SB, saw Chairman Kedzi with respect to the Chairman's forthcoming trip to ncjland, Leningrad, Sofia and Aghens, Chairman Hcdzl briefed on his November conversation with New York Times correspondent Seymour Hersh. Maury went on to highlight the several topics and allegations Hersh claims he bas with respect to Agency activities, particularly allegations that we are engaged in extensive domestic operations. Maury willemorandum oa the information Hersb claims be has. The Director explained that we shouldenior team to meet with Chairman Nedzi and clearly outline what we do and do not do in the United States. Tha Executive Director called attention to his2 memorandum to tbe deputies. Subject: Allegations of Agency Involvement in the US, and suggested that It might serve as an outline for material to be covered with Chairman Nedzi.

Maury noted that In rooponao to Ton Korologta' (Special Assistant UHM to the President for legislative Affairsequest for materials on Instances where classified Information had been leaked to tbe press, beaper on this topic and provided itote than an examination of most leaks reveals that as* the White House and Executive Branch are the guilty parties.

Maury reported that Chairman Nedzi would like the full Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations toresentation by us on Agency activltity in the United States sometime In aid-February. The Director noted that his decision of yesterday to turnenior team for this briefing stands.

General Walters noted Howard Hunt's appearance on television last night. Thuermer willranscript of the program, and the Executive Director noted his concern over Huigt's suggestion that be is no longer bound by his secrecy agreement.

Executive Director noted that the terminal secrecy agreement which Howard Hunt signed said that he will be acknowled;ed as anemployee. His eesejion that be is not bound by tbe agreement because we did In fact acknowledge his employment here is therefore ill-advised.

The Directorall from Elliot Richardson asking about some information that Seymour Hersh has developed to the effect that HEW automatically provides Ute Agency with travel orders oa Its employees and that this agreement was made in Secretary Ribicoff'e time. Tbe DDI will determine what this is about and advise.

Maury noted that he met with Congressman Koch on our minimal assistance in briefing the New York City police officers. The Congressman would like something in writing on this, which Maury will prepare and sign.

Thuermer noted adviceormer Agency employee that Seymour Hersh haa been assigned full time to the Watergate story, but In the meantime, Kr.a Ins be has evidence of Agency Interest In an arsenal in theap-making facility tn Vermont, and in Camp Peary.

The Director noted he has' advised the Director of Training of Mrs. Lyndon Johnson's request for Marie Chiarodo to handle the large volume of mall she has received.

DDI reported that be has been unable to turn up any information which would lead Seymour Hersh to allege that weap-making facility in Vermont.

Thuermer reported that the Virginia Gazette seems to be persisting In its efforts to embarrass Cafe* Peary and has been in touch with Victor Marchetti and Patrick McGervey, who have tended lo confirm allegations that the Phoenix program was supported by contract assassins.

Maury noted that Mr. Helms Is appearing before tbe Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning on police training, ESI ITT, and the Watergate Incident. He also noted that be has solicited the support of Senators Humphrey, KcGee, and Scott to make appropriate public statements following Mr. Helms* appearance.

Mary advised that in response to Chairman Holifield's investigation of Agency training pf policemen, be will meet with Herbert Roback, Counsel of tho House Cove race nt Operations Committee, to explain our briefing of various police departments.

Tbe Director noted bis scheduled meeting tomorrow with Defense Secretary Richardson and asked Executive Committee members to giveote on any item they, wish blm to raise with the Secretary. Candidates Secretary Richards oris1 earlier concerns with respect to HEW providing the Agency with travel plans Of officers going to CommuniBt Bloc countries. Cn the latter item the DDI explained that since Secretary Richardson's inquiry to Mr. Helms (see minutes ofurvey had been undertaken and reviewed with HEW, which had no problems with these old arrangements but is shifting the point of pickup to Its public affairs staff where such information is available to anyone.

Maury noted the statement by Senator FuH^igbt following Mr. Helms' appearance yesterday before the Senate Fcregin Relations Com It tee In which the Sentator expressed his opposition to the whole concept of the Agency getting Involved with tbe police even In an innocuous way. Maury added that he will see Chairman Hollfleld'e staff assistant Herbert Roback today. Maury saidtement had been transmitted to the White Houso yesterday for John Ehrllchman's possible use (attached). The Director askedontingency document be prepared along the'lines that we will continue to comply with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act8 which approves of our assistance to various police forces when KitKMiQQI authorized by the Justice Department. In response to the DDI's suggestions, tbe DDS will review what assistance to police forces had been given prior8 and adviBe.

Ma cry concurred In the Director's Judgment that it is Impossible to keep all congressional elements happy and that weeriod of Increased criticism from this quarter which must be met with firm assurances that what we are being criticized for is fully authorized and Justified. Unless tho facts Justifytatement, ve would be well advised to terminate the Activity In question,-

Maury recalled that we are obligated to sit downKedtl and review what we do and don't do ininutesandanuary). The Director

concurred. The DDI suggested that we undertake an in-house review of what it Is ve are doing within. and identify and eliminate the marginal.

Maury said he spent an hour yesterday with Congressman Hollfleld and they decided to have their respective staffs worketter for Hollfield to send to the Director suggesting restrictive, but not prohibitive, guidlines regarding such activities In the future. Maury noted Chairman Nedzi's current concerns about this topic and said the proposed PfflK letter may satisfy his worries.

Thuermer noted advice from Htcholas Horrock of Newsweeksoft story" is floating around Newsweek on the general topic of political espionage and ex-CIA agento. Mr. Horrock asked what constraints we have on former employees. engthy discussion followed, noting In particular that the only legal constraint imposed Is the terminal secrecy agreement as reinforced by tbe MffliKS coujs in the Marcbettl case. Other than this, there are no constraint except moral ones. Ttilrmer will advise Horrick that thousands of employees have gone through CIA, and Itatter of considerable pride thatandtful have deported themselves improperly.

Maury added that he went over (with Nedzl) Seymour

Herat's charges with respect to the Agency and our position on each. DDI recalled our obligation to Brief Chairman Kedzi on Agency activities in the US.

Maury related that Herb BH Boback of Senator Holifield's staff is being asked by David Burnham of the New York Times for the names of those city police departments we have briefed in the past. Tbe DDS called attention to our obligation to clear with these police departments any mention of their having been briefed. In response to tbe Director's suggestion that the Agencyress release on thieengthy discussion followed end tbe Director asked the DDS to report to him on what our understanding with various police departmenta has been prior to our agreement to brief same. He also asked that editorial comment on any past Agency briefing of the press or press releases be assembled and explained that in principle ve should from time to time anke it known that we are part ofovernment.

. OViury noted that Herb Roback of Senator Clifield's staff and Chairman Nedzl have concurredetter for ihe Director's signature.which will indicate that we will undertake training. palice"only for the most compelling reasons." ief discussion followed and the Director observed that it is important for us to decide what we do and then advise the Hill accordingly.

Zt3

The Directorall from Senator Jackson, who askedmeet with Senator McClellan sometime next week with regardHolifield's inquiry concerning Agency training of

Maury related that former Director Hichard Helms has been asked by Senator Fulbright to reappear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Maury said that Mr. Helms would probable be queried on the Watergate incident, Agency training of police, and ITT and went on to describe Mr. Helms' anticipated reponae..

Kaury reported that Congressman Holifield'e staff Is anxiouslyetter from the Director in response to the Congressman's written Inquiry on police training. The Director noted plans to toward it.

Maury highlighted yesterday's UG meeting at the White Bouse and his recommendation that ve not provide examples of Congressional leaks of classified Information for White House use in reacting to Congressional criticism of the Administration'sbe DDS advised that the Office of Security iseasonably complete record of obvious leaks of intelligence information in the press and elsewhere.

.'. Maury highlighted the statement Congressman Hollfield will Introduce into tbe Congressional Record today on Agency briefing. police forces. He alsoelated news release that will be issued by the Congressman's office.

Maury highlighted Congressman Koch's reaction to our'isponse to Congressman Holifield's letter concerning policat training, as reported in today's press. Meuey noted that Congressman Koch plans to ask GAOulinghis matter, and the Director suggested that Colby provide some guidance to Comptroller General Elmer Staata.

The Director noted ftyrtee that Hugh Sldey of Time magazine plans totory alleging that Howard Hunt was employedover organization,obert B. Mullen Company, when he left the Agency. Colby noted that this companyompletely private concern but has provided cover for one or two officers overseas. The Director asked Thuermer to be prepared to cojSe with any inquiries when the story appears.

DDI called attention to Joseph Alsop's article in today's Washington Post, "Analyzing the CIA'shich erroneously refers to San Adamsormer employee. Later In the meeting, Houston explained why the allegation that tbe Agency has tried to muzzle Adams is false. Be went on to brief on i

communications with Justice and the fact that tue juuge rujaa

Adams' material was not exculpatory. In response to the Director's question, the DDI reported that Mr. Adams has not been placed on probation. The Director found' thin unsatisfactory.

Houston explained the legal implications of the subpoena served on Tcjrmer for documents related to the EUsberg case and advised that the Director may have to claim executive privilege.

Houston said that tbe judge squashed the subpoena served on Thuermer (see Morning Minutesarch).

Included in this folder are miscellaneous items, including the following:

Chuck Brlggs' submission, including support of the Committee on narcotics Review of Minutes of Morning Meetings

Agency funding of heroin study.

Tom Parrott's involvement with David Young

Gary's memo on briefing of Special Subcommittee on Intelligence Of House Armed Services Committee (this relates to the McCord letters to the Agency)

Broe's report of his and Colby's meeting with Nedzi

ejjp^

sffbft

|MmM iM ta Ir

General

i nfi^vf

to.

11.

14.

"whassififh

uJiiriDEHIlAL

H3DRANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ifee of Disguise Materials and Alias Documentation

Within.

REFERENCE : Memo dtdlayo DTR

Issuance of Disguise Materials tor Irobable Use. or It's Territories

Associate Deputy Director for Operations haswe giveetailed report of the actual use that theTraining has made within. of all disguise materialsdocumentation we have obtained for our staff members and students.

Materials

OTR has obtained from OTS disguise materials -wigs, mustaches, and special shoes to increase height -staff instructors at the Domestic Training Station. The purposematerials is to increase the difficulty that students in theCourse and Advanced Operations Course will have induring problems and exercises conductedr'

DTS. Exercises include surveillance, countersurveiliance, orusirpasses, and dead drop problems in which instructors monitor student activity. These exercises are run under carefully controlled conditions only in areas where adequate liaison exists with local authorities to avoid any flap should difficulty arise during an exercise.

COMriDCHTIAL

The sole use of disguise materials by these instructors has been or will be in support of the training exercise noted above. At no tune have the materials been used for other purposes.

3. Alias DocuTjents

U.S. alias documents consisting primarily of business and social cards, but also including drivers' licenses and social security cards, have been used for moreear by

sc-iiiuitBa to estauiiMujig iwna

it required, during theroblcn thatart ofexercise,|

... e conclusion ot tne course, the alia*

tocuraits are collected irom the students and returned to CIS. docunents are used only under carefully controlled conditions inadequate liaison with local authorities exists

"j ' exists

to contain any nap; and the documents are used only for the purposes stated.

horough canvass of all elements of OTP. discloses no other instance in recent years in which we have used disguise materials or alias documentation within. or obtained such materials for that purpose

cc: ADDO

ol Training

"COMFIDEMTIAL

(ORANDUM FOR:

Chief, WH Divi bio.i

Mr.

* Executive Secretary,

CIA Management Commi toe

ReturnG

^UJvVi

STS5W'SECRET CONFIDENTIAL hu UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: John Dean Allegations to Newsweek Magazine

Mr. William Jorden, the Latin American referent on Dr. Kissinger's Staff, called today in reference to State cableatedune (attached). He said that he had specific reference tof that cable and would like to have "everything and anything we know" on that subject in the Agency.

The undersigned indicated to Mr. Jorden that he had checked out the allegation that some low level White House officials had considered assassinating Torrijos when the story first appeared in Newsweek and,despite checking outside WH Division also, could find no-one in the Agency who could recollect or find anything relating tolan on the part

of any portion of U. S. officialdom. old himelt sure that nothing of this nature had come to WH Division's attention because for the period inad been Deputy Chief of WH Division and had heard nothing about any such plan. Mr. Jorden asked if the Agency knew anything about Howard Hunt havingeam in Mexico "before the mission was aborted"ndicated that as farnew, the Agency had noon Hunt being in Mexico onission. lso indicated, however, they could have been and the Agency might well not know it simply because he could have used an alias and he is an American citizen, which is outside the Agency's province and really the FBI's business. uggested that it might be best if he checked the FBI on that particular angle.hecked with Mr. William V. Broe. tha IG. and Mr. John Horton, recently returned

and both indicated that they had not run across any information concerning this latter allegation of Hunteam in Mexicoission related to Panama.

3. It was apparent that Mr. Jorden was under some pressure to refute these allegations and was casting about in all directions to make as certain of his ground as he possibly could before he tried to do so.'

Attachment:

As Stated Above

YLL aAr^kjj

SV Of

STATE MESSAGE

JUN 73

U'juuu HOC:

nussvA

, v- UUUUU ZHH v

un .

SHCSTATE WASHDC

SSY PANAHA IMMEDIATE V-

LPtLJ/PANCANAL "

LPAs.MMEDIATE % rv

CLAS STATE

0.1

as: proR, pn

3JECT: ALLEGATION'S HADE BY JOHNEWSWEEK MAGAZINE

THE FOLLOWING IS EXCERPTEDRONT PAGE ARTICLE OH TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES WHICH REPORTS ON ALLEGATIONS Dc BY JOHN DEAN TO NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE.

"SOME "LOW-LEVEL" WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS CONSIDEREDIMG PANAMA'S RULER OMAR TOfcRIJOS, 8ECAUSE THEY THE INVOLVEMENT OF HIGH PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIESTRAFFIC AND BECAUSE THEY FELT THE GOVERNMENTUNCOOPERATIVE ABOUT RENEGOTIATING THE PANAMA E, HOWARD HUNTEADER OF THEEAM IN MEXICO "BEFORE THE MISSIONNEWSWEEK SAID." RUSH :v'V;<

: If

OQCUOT AS REFTRRFJJ Ta

ay m

subsidiary.

Becanse ot far morediscknurw. Watergatehave not actively pursued Ihe Chilean case in recent weeks, beyond asking aor two about the jreak-lns (luring interrogation* of the Watergate burglars,

However. Senate invest tpa!-

'ai^rjate committee aijd the Watergate, prosecutors Inout the details of Ihe four break-ins at the offices and residences of the

JOceuired Jn New York-

ember ot lite special intelligence unit of the New York Police Department was said to havo concluded that the three break-ins thatIn Manhattan were no routine bursts net. And investr fttora in Washingtonthat the four break-ins had followed similar patterns.

They wcte apparently done hy professionals,ew items takenc break-in* appear lo be burglaries,said. Other valuable Items were left behind, how. ever, and sensitive papers were disturbed, possibly in me course of heme photographed. Investigators reconstruct the break-ins as follows:

Then, first known break-inon the afternoon of pfil1 ai iha Manhattan jsidenee on Lexingtone of Humberto Di.ir-Osi-nucva. Chile's Ambassador to the United Nations The Am-hawdor reportedly (old Ihc police that the intruders had stolen such icnuair-dryerair nf bonis andthai gives ihem lime to escape if ihey are surprised during the course of an entry.

The third reported break-in took place onnvestigators said, at the Hew York rriidt-nce onth Street of Victorhilean official at llie Unitedadio and a

laken and paper* disturbed.

Tne fouiih and most pub-lici'.cd bieak-ln took place over the weekend oft tlit Chilean Embassy in Washington. Files, of theand his firstFernandn Bachelet, were reportedly rifled and twotaken.

Chilean officials have been ordfred by their Government; not to discuss the matter,trcc* close to Ihe case saidi ii'it Ihe former Chileanassador, Orlando leicller, had cnnftmicd thai the Wjsliinsion inthidcrs apparently weresensitive Government

Speculation by Invesligaiors

Capitol Hill Investigators have speculated lhat themight havo beenvidence of links between Cuba nnd Chile, or kxikin- for politically sensitive documents relating to the udce-over by Chile. propeities.

No evidence has turned up that members o> MM leant lhat broke Into the Watergate were involved la the entries,hi nil thai soeM of ihem mayparticipated have come from Ihelorida.

Firal reportsreak-In at the Chilean Embassy bo-gin to circulate In Miami week or so ancr Ihe Watergate hreaV-lo ofnd there was speculation that the lghtbeen related. Thai link never hat been proved and some investigators douhl lhat il.exists.

spccula-

One explanation ottered for the Chilean break-Inthai!

lion begun in Miami. Chilean) officialsdgedrcak'in and renorted it to the. citywho warted aavesiigaitoo that has been in-conclusive.

Eaft.er this month, aFelipe tfeby StaleE. Gerstein In: - In the

brt'.-irt at tbe oflkes of Dr. Daniel UUsbeig'sos Angeles.

He and his attorneylhai. If fraitied immunity, Mr. de Diego might shed new ligiil on oilier surnptliiousajungion.so Miam later inebcai-ed tliat these operatiejii might include the Chilean break-in or break-ins.

V.J

Colby

OIG

BfPLT

hepit

HrnutU:

Nothing startling, but something you perhaps should be aware of.

Sit " /

- - /

fOUO HCBt TO RtTL'rfN TO HHDM

IQ, ggafr

UNCLASSIFIED | 1 OONFIPFNTlTlT'l

IKRO. Ill Uhtift*

SECRET

Z$3

MEMORANDUMfE RKCORD

SUBJECT: Disposal of Classified Trash lor the National Security

council (nso -r.

material contains docu tionodeword and other ce community. This practice in effect. Pick-up ofags of

of classified tra from theocuments from in1 is made each Th

2. Under, no*

matter would not be-

Lmes and circumstances such abut given the recent furor caused.destruction ofby Ihe Acting FBI Directorit is feltgpiatter should at least be highligluedconsideraUc$^>

1.emorandum for the record by the Executive Officer of the Office of Logistics points out that this Agency is disposin

. At

DOCUKMT DCSCOIPTIOn

ot rtCt* t

- ^

ATTtHTIOH XhU lorm writ beOm lop af andeeeetnnd IUI-*I

O* foj .'. remain altaehaik* deeimml unlit mrfti. Ir l>. o*

-CM. o..

, to the mtrfntr. Too AmrCHPfl QfUart vfto nwnh* hwm tap hint mii-uhb

prrtotfii.-i; i-jmaHntfuJ una1ft* fan ircrtt (gnM milln Ift*

ivtd

Colby

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby SUBJECT

MHCHAOS and

all.tg^yourttached sensitive annexes to2 report of survey offBUR Division. You have seen them before,reshhem might bo In order in tho light of currant de vclopmc nts. 1

revelations about the activities

Evaluation Committee are getting close Io our jyHJJHAOS program. We are particularly concerned about ^vJfjbHAOS because of the high degroe of resontment we found among many Agency employees at thoir being expected to participate in it.

ovov 72

'.-

Copy of 4

For Yourl<

SJJJtfP CONFIDENTIAL UHCUSSI

SEpRtt

FOR

FROM

SUBJECT

Director for Management and Service Director of Security

DD/MtJSatergatclncident .

This memorandum is for information only.

2. Inhe Nev York Times featured an article under the by-line oFTftTTxam Beecher which contained an exposition of the then current status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It was evident from this delineation of these talksilliam Beecher had obtained the information from highly. Government documents orerson or' persons having had access to such documents.

3- In this regard, Mr. Egil E. Krogh, Jr of the White House telephonically contacted the Director of Security, of this Agency and requested that this Agencyolygraph examiner to conduct polygraph tests on four Department of State employees. In conjunction with Mr. G. Marvineputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, this Office arrangedolygraph examiner to conduct these examinations but with no CIA involvement to be acknowledged. In other words, this Office loaned the polygraph examiner to. the Department of State and the polygraph examinations were conducted for Mr. G. Marvin Gentile.

4. This Officeequested approval to have disguise kits issued to approximately fourteen people. The disguise kits were never issued for operational

SECjfi

purposes/ but they were issued for practice surveillance, to train local field office personnel in their use,I

fourteen

disguise kits, four were returned to the Office of Technical Services.

5. In regard to other activities that this Office has conducted domestically, the following two projects are submitted:

A. Project WESTPOINTER: Inndroject, sinilar to Project SRPOIKTER, was conducted by the Office of Security, East Asia Division, and the Office of Technical Services in the San Francisco, California, area. The target was mail to the United States from Mainland China.

Office of Security

employee who will retire atreckye3 had a

the substance of the chance meeting was an exchange

toward Director o

ot pxeasanlries.

Fas* 1

ther ctudent activist STOCBM

produced ta7 at Walt Rostov'srage typescript study of the 3DS and Its foreign ties.

In ihe sua=er8 CCIat Rostov'sn Restless Youth. The first, and most sensitivehilosophical treatment of student unrest, its itotlvatlcn,history.t drsw heavily oji oirsrt literature and FBI reporting on 3D3 and affiliated groups. The second section comprisedhapters on foreign student dis3idence.

fages2icallS3

CCI began following Caribbean clack. radicaUsa la earnest Two papers vere produced on the subject, one in9 end the other In

CCI was asked in0eaio with special attention to Units between black radicalise! In the Caribbean and advocates of black power in The =eao was produced in typescript and given to tho DCI. -

OCI3 wrote periodic typescript ceoos oa StoKsly Cancichael's travels abroaderiod when be had dropped from public view.

againsts. US citizens

conduct hearabiltty

tents of certain HF long-distance coSnercial telephone circuits between the U3 aad South Ararlca. The circuits carried drug-re Is ted traffic.

M) rce tasts verc successful. Vci activity

..'vas jar.ollowing XC deteratnaticnere Illegal.

We conduct aa iatorcept ope rati 03

intercepts Contain a

od radio telephone conversational

jihew in!

er of unrelated eoaveraatlons often Involving us citizens.

* Testing in the U3 or OSO-developed eXectroaic collection oysteos occasiooally result ia the collection of dcaestic telephone conversations. When the tests are complete, the intercepted notarial ia destroyed.

conducted tests,in the Kiaail area in

August lyyi of DF gear intendedoviet agent in South Vietnam. While wholly innocuous, the tests preceded the holding of the conventions there and cculd be construed as being scoehov related to then.

In2 CIA asked an official of ATM for copies of .telephone call slips relatingalls. The oporaticn lasted for three or four months and then dried up. CGC stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate tbo Ccnaunications Act since eavesdropping was not Involved.

Pagecove raw

SinceCIA hasail Intercept prograa of incoeing and outgoing Russian-cail and, at various ti-es, other selected sail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. Tela progna Is now dortaant pending decision on whether to continue or to abolish it.

ATTACHMENT

FEDERAL BUREAUrfVESTIGATlON

had a. close working relationship with, the FBI over-the past few years. The "BI is the only organization that has been fuUy.brlefed.on/TSL, iudio techniques and equipment. -Tuf following tfre situations where/I'SH/equipment and guidance ware involved in operations;

TSD has fuxBUhed equipment items whichcapability to engage in photo and -audio surveillance operations which might not.-known to tho Agency. In one case it is known that relatively uned device was useddomestic .; '

'j^scrivb .'Vrly cf t-tft

v.-jj'anrss-i. Its lOtivoSlca,..

ii^JC rvsj^rsiag OSaffiliat-sd sr-vips. Vjndhaptirs on fo^-lsalx-iO*nc&.

2 c* ridlgalisa

rsllisisx-Caribbean bias*ia same at In

IJcS. Tvcareubject; oca in9ha other inC. .

CCI yaa esked- ia0 toaeoo withttention to links^betueea black radicalism in tha Ceribbean-and advocfttis of blackn tha US. Ihe ceao vas produced in typescript and given to the DCI.

dropped

. CCI inpsriodic typtscrlptcasly.travels abroad duringiad droi i'roa-public

conducted tests.in tht Miasi erea in gear intended for useoviet agent in South Vietnsa. -Tails wholly Inaocvous, the ttstc prectuedlaiag of thethere atad could be eoustratd es being somehow related to then.

In2 CIA asked en official ofor copies of telephone call slips relatingChiza calls. The operationor tiirae or four oonths. and then dried up. CGC stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Ccnriunications Act since eavesdropping was not involved.

s^veraga

IA hasail intercept progran of inching and outgoing Russian, call and, st various tines, other csleeted rail at Kennedy Airportw yorl; City. Thisorrsetlsioc oa whether to continue or to acolish it.

as furnished equipment items which constitute an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency. In one case it is knownelatively unsophisticated device was usedomestic target.

Kaitfc univreteod it tots-tusn thaeeti:^, Rathered that it was lased on thoVriefissg

I, andre;d, that wea status report on where thein the >hf.siv, aturate section would cover those things not included in the >fcdci briefing. He got the rough notas dictated by Mr. Colby on tape andad xerox copies aids andhe iriginals tc

Khen

the Colby notes, it be case

apparent that he was isuiRg instructiens on whateite=s. 'Tniv, in effect, prs-eeptic the status report we were preparing. honed Evans, saying thats th? care and that we proposed sinply to eoit.the naterial for Colby (Colt-had told se he planned to sen5 it to us for editing after reviewing i*vens said he wouldote on the papers telling Colty of this.

SUBJECT:

r'r:.'C*pBls -ur Ij-.clL-cct

memorandum responds to the Director's requestt-pjrt of ?nyitv-oUyith Messrs. Hunt, 1'cCord, Ll^dy, Young, or Krogh;

1 have had none with Hunt, Llddy or Young.

My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime during thesm Director, Office of Computer Services. pposed plf.ns for Technical Di-irion, Office of Security (under Mr. McCord) toeparate computer for its In-PIace MonitoringTD) was the computer individual wofKing wira lDhink, would hive dcteils.

The Krogh contact also wasnd involved his request, first throughhat CIA fund foreign travel onof the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency

focal pointsI understand

has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of

'also.

5. i.-Jf meeting yesterday tohe request to nil OPP3 employees. One officer who wasuneral will not bo available until tomorrow.

I6 harles A. Brisss

A. Briggs

'of Planning.

Programming, ond Budgeting

Attachment

memoranda from Messrs.Colby arc attached

P-sb 72

7 Feb 72

'cr, 0M3

ck. Mmcf-nin tcr.nctllon withrfcs u* to thefrr.Mwifcr funds for Cam

IVSVf!.

Follow-up from Taylor:ips ftr 3InoatK. Minnick ready tofc-ip.plugged in,

vlffil.

Feb 72 Seeraenw fromo Colby ^nd

follow-on memosnd Colby

ayohn Hurley, OMBiorJnS possibleaitendancoin Ana-ScMI (Sutlorion He also said JeffHouse, was laying w.

himself, Shepherd and Mirk Alger. OMB to Europe.

Jun 72

on Krogh/Mlnnlck inicrcst In getting CAncluding large-scale PM, on narcotics front.

Jul 72

Notes say only: 'Minnick-Hurley film.

will send."

Aug 72

re Colby lelter (Attached). Said travel

orders ready; noed money this PM (No record in my notes as to whotraveling when, but have faint recollection of Its being to Kfcrucond Ben Evans contacted by

Nov[

Mexico."

Again notes are cryptic:

JSurvey BNDD problems/

MEMORANDUM FORCOT.OY

SUBJECTS BUDC^TARY SUPPORT VOR.AlJiNEtfON INTKUXATiONAI, NAltCOXiCS OO.Vj AOL.

The Cabinet Committee ona1 Narcoticscreated Suptcmber/ ihe President io centralize his attack on ihedrug traffic.

Tlie Committeeoteparate budget.

. The Bureau of Customs, BNDD, and AID/Office of Public Safety have provided support to date.

Tho CIA should be prepared to defray not more than fifteen thousand dollars in overseas travel expenses for Cabinet Committee staff during Ine remainder of

Walter C. Minniek, the Committee's Staff Coordinator, can be contacted lor further details.

Thank you for your assistance.

Egil Krogh, Jr. Executive Director Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control

CC: John Ehrlichman

Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairo Mark Alger

OMB. Chief. General Government Programs Division

UiA Kcpreaentative, CC1NC Working Group

lCf.3

ORt Deputy Director, for Plana

upportat CosntfitttM ia Zetejqptfcaal Narcotics Control <CCIr*C)

REFER^CS;

Memo io MnDlrDP/NAaCOQ "idZ; ssme

This is Ia response to the referenced memo regarding use of CIA funds to cover travel expenses fori-.ita House Cabinet Committee Staff for Fiscal.

You are authorised to obligated upDD for tbe use of tbe White House Cablnat Committee Staff for travel expenses during Obligation should be recorded againstDP allotment aud travel ordsrsgainst yourproprlate fan number.

To the exteat that you are unable lo absorb this requirement within your present allotment, we will have to arrange aoine ropro-grarr-mlajj later in the year tois unbodgeted item.

W. E. Colby Executive DirecSar-Cowptroller

2 Aug 72

OrigR

1 -PPB Sub)eading

Review of Minutes of Morning Meetings

SUBJECT

Per your request relayed through Ben Evans, we haveinutes of the Directo'r'* morning meetings covering the0 through3 looking for items appearing to relate in any way togency involvementominating conventions, or any^hermii^ln course of our present inquiries. We sifted rather finely and ended up withages of material that we have in roughoubt that it is worthwhile typing them in final, since you woulaoS" little enlightened by wading through them. We gave Benopy at his request. The following are highlights:

5 entries during July andelating lo the Pentagon papers.

Directoreptember memorandum

DDCI in the chair)

caileo' attention to the Presided anclurn on "Disclosures of Classlft (din at ion and Clearance of Official

ecember

' Execullecembetatements,

John Bross on Daniel Elaperg (sic). He asked thehis clearances and to make this fact known in .vjtvi:

s believed to be tho result ofby the Director and Admiral Anderson. tivc Director said that he will meet with selected Executive Committee Members next week to discuss the memoran implicit.onatfind-to develop recommendations for actio the DivectprRSIv^ew of the special responsibilities plao on him by thp .gsgsident.

a July _

DDCI reported that John EhrUchman had telephoned to advise us that tha White House is appointing former CIA employee Howard Huntecurity consultant.

Another account of the Morning Meeting of this date reads:

It was also announcod that Howard Hunt has been named security consultant to the White House. General Cuehman told EhrUchman that Mr. Hunt would have full cooperation from CIA.

Carvor saidmost appreciative of the timo

which Houston spent with

1 (the day Howard Hunt came to eee General Cushman)

Carver highlighted his session yesterday with NSC staffer David Young, who la assisting John EhrUchman in reviewing the secret Pentagon papors.

A-DDP noted that he has reported to White House staffor David Young on the results of tho Deputy Director of Security's survey of those who saw the classified assessment upon which Tad Snulc baaed bisugust articlo.

U November *

In response to the Director's question Carver said that some work requested by John EhrUchman is ponding. The Director asked to be filled In later on the details.

DDI ^allod attention to tho articlo In today's New York Times, "Nixon Acts to End SecurityExcerot from tho article: "Last July, two members of tho Whito House staff, David R. Young of the National Security Council and EgU Krogh,f the Domoatic Council, were asked to investigate earUor leaks and prevent

Sktht

DDI noted the article by Michael Getler in today's Washington Post, "New Spy Satellites Planned for Clearer, Instantater in the meeting the Director asked the DDS to advise the Director ol Security to undertake an Investigation of this leak of EOI-related information and to convene the USIB Security Committee.

The Director reminded Executive Committee members of Dr. Kissinger's request that any inquiries from elements of tho White House staff be referred to his staff for conveyance to the Agency.

Lehman noted plans to continue briefing Attorney General Mitchell, whose resignation itarch.

The Director noted bis memorandum to the Deputies and Independent Office Hoa subject: "Allegations of Assassinations. He asked that it be montioned at Staff Meetings.

The Director said that the President has seen hisebruary memorandum on reducing disclosures of classified intelligence and directed the White House staff toemorandum urging that aU agencies comply with properprocedures.

8 June -

Houston said that he will beeeting called by DOD General Counselo is recommending that Justice drop the case against Daniel Ellsberg.

Tho Director noted theune arrest of Jamea W. McCord and four others who were apprehended at tha Democratic National Com- jj, znittea headquarters at the Watergate. With the Director of Security present to provide biographic details, the Director made it perfectly clear that responses to any inquiry with respect to McCord or Howard Hunt, who may be implicated, are to be limitedtatement that thay are former employees who retired in August and0 Tho Director asked that thie guidance beia staff meetings. The Director asked that any Inquiry from other elements of the government bo referred to the Director of Security who Is to be the focal point. Inquiries from the press are to beto Mr. Unumb who may say that McCord worked in the Office of Security. The Director noted that we have no responsibility with respect to an investigation oxcopt to be responsive to the FBI'sfor name traces. It was noted that Howard Hunt may have done some work since retirement in connection with the preparation of supporting material for some awards. The Executive Director was asked to review this topic and report to the Director.

"la response to tho Director's request, the Director of Security highlighted developments over the past twenty-four hours with respect to the McCord/Hunt,, situation. Ho notod that the lata edition of the New York Timesifferent story by Tad Ssulc than that which appeared in tho edition received here. Tho Director of Security anticipates some inquiries on BernardBarker's situation, and It was noted that Mr. Barker was hired by the Agency0 and terminated Tho Director complimented Unumb on his handing of Inquiries and asked that future inquiries be metonfined to the fact that, now that we have acknowledged that both McCord and Hunt are former Agency employees, we know nothing mora about the case and tho caller should be referred to the FBI as appropriate.

Tho director noted rbcolptai erafehouso inhich is being made available to the Secret Service In support of Its work in connection with tho Republican and Democratic National Conventions. He asked tho ADDP and the DDS ta make it absolutely

our

ia to be confined to provision of the safehouse ind that it ia not to be usedite for investigations, interrogations, ortc. The Director added that we will not loan people to the FBI or Secret Service in connection with their responsibilities at the Conventions nor will we provide equipment unique to the Agency.

In view of the coverage in today's New York Times and Washington Post* Maury recommended that Chairman Nedzl be briefed on the McCord affair and that this briefing include all our information about the others involved. The Director asked Maury to touch base with the Director of Security andiing papoit-on this topic, for his review. Citing the number of distorted rumors about this matter, the Executive Director said that during the course of the day he hopes touggested Headquarters Bulletin for all employees for the Director's review.

Unumbumber of inquiries from the press withespect to the Cuban-Americans involved in the bugging attempt at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and their alleged involvement in the Bay of Pigs, etc. The Director asked that such inquiries be met with an explanation that wc are not prepared to be helpful on this matter.

Maury notedriefed Chairman Nedzi on the McCord/ Hunt situation.

Houstonelephone call from Howard Hunt who" explained that his attorney was with him anduestion

riend's past affiliation with the

DD/Sec,#ias reviewed the employment, and HoustoH"rcportea that he replied directly to Hunt's friend, Mr.

that this old affiliation should create no problems in connection with his appearancerand jury.

Maury noted his responseequest from CSC General Counsel Anthony Moodello, who was reactingequest for the personnel files of those former Agency officers involved in the

Watergate incident from Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures. He added lhat we are exempted from related CSC regulations, and the Director endorsed his plan to provide only the dates of their departure from tho Agency in the event tbe Senator's office calls us on this matter.

Houston recalled that last August he reportedall from Howard Hunt and his subsequent guidance to)

bn how to handle affiliation with the Agency,

The Director highlighted his conversation with David Kraslow of the Washington Star News and his flat denialroposed story that the Agency was asked to report on the Democratic Party which led to the Watergate incident and others. The Director noted his plans totatement of denial Iftory were to appear and suggested that Thuermer consider drafting one for contingency use.

DDPeport from Chief, WH Division thatr. Harper of the New York Times was workingtory which tries to link the Agency with Cuban emigres, the break-in at the Chilean Embassy, action against Daniel EUsberg, and the Watergate case. Thuermor observed that this is the first he has heard about this topic, and the DDP concluded thattory would have no basis in fact and it would be inadvisable to try to straighten out Mr. Harper.

Warner related that according to Assistant Attorney' "eterson, U. S. Attorney Earl Silbert has severalthe Watergate case. The Director indicated he will reviewlater.

ecember

The Director noted the article by Thomas B. RossEvening Star-News, "New Watergatethe impression left therein that the Agency wasthe Watergate incidentassport bearing theHamilton was found on Frank Sturgis. Anythe press or elsewhere are to be metthisreply. The Executive Director noted workto identify the genesis of the passport

anuary"

Maury noted press stories that Watergate defendant ;/ V. Martinez was on the Agency payroll untilune and anticipated some inquiry on this topic. The DDP endorsed his view that, whereas Martinez was intermittently used as^ source to report on Cuban exile matters, this relationship should cause no serious

difficulty. :

' Maury reported that when he and Dave Blee, Chief/SB, saw Chairman Nedzi with respect to tbe Chairman's forthcoming trip to Finland, Leningrad. Sofia, and Athens, Chairman Nedzi briefed on his November conversation with New York Times correspondent Seymour Hersh. Maury went on to highlight the several topics and allegations Hersh claims he has with respect to Agency activities, 'particularly allegations that we are engaged in extensive domestic operations. Maury will circulateon the information Hersh claims he has. The Director explained that we shouldenior team to meet with Chairman Nedzi and clearly outline what wc do and do not do in the United States.

Maury reported that Chairman Nedzi would like theoh Intelligence Operations to hear aus oi> Agency activity in thetates sometime in The Director noted that his decision ofturnenior team for this briefing'

General Walters noted Howard Hunt's appearance onlast night. Thuermer willranscript of the program, and the Executive Director noted his concern over Hunt's suggestion that he is no longer bound by his secrecy agreement.

anuary.

Executive Director noted that tho terminal secrecy agreement which Howard Hunt signed said that he will be acknowledged as an Agency employee. His assertion that he is not bound by thebecause we did ih'fact acknowledge his employment here is therefore ill-advised.

Maury noted that Mr. Helms is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning on police training, ITT, and the Watergate incident. He also noted that he has aolicited the support of Senators Humphroy, McGee, and Scott to make appropriate public statements following Mr.appearance.

Maury recalled that we arc obligated to sit downNedzi and review what we do and don't do in theDirector concurred. The DDI suggested thatwein-house review of what it is we arefiend eliminate tho

Thuermer noted advice from Nicholas Horrock ofsoft story" is floating around Newsweek on the general topic of political espionage and ex-CIA agents. -

Maury related that former Director Richard Helms has been ashed by Senator Fulbright to reappear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Maury said thas Mr. Helms would probably be queried on the Watergate incident, Agency training of police, and ITT and went on to describe Mr. Helms' anticipated response.

Maury highlightedeeting at the White House and his recommendation that we not provide examples of Congressional leaks of classified information for White House use in reacting to Congressional criticism of the Administration'she DDS advised that the Office of Security iseasonably complete record of obvious leaks ofinformation in the press and elsewhere.

6 March

The Director noted advice that Hugh Sidey of Time magazine plans totory alleging that Howard Hunt was employed bya cover organization,obert R. Mullen Company, when he left the Agency. Colby noted that this companyompletely private concern but has provided cover for one or two officers overseas. The Director asked Thuormer to be prepared to cope with any inquiries wheu the story, appears.

(Sienod) fflllien V. Bros

William V.: Inspector General

"9-

Excerpt, WVB Daily Log of

WVB, to bringw|his attention the fact that

Kissinger haa asked for some papers hc'drebuived in summerow wants to see them again. One, Restless Youth. OCI wrote

the CS (since left and other countries for

a whole set of country chapters; and CIA)ore sensitive piece drawing mjUS a

examples to make its point. OCI balked--didn't want to do anything onside, ^he whole^roject eventually wag'tbrned over to

also. left--in Boston).

XliX, inecause we had done so much work

weeparate paper "Student Unrestof the

country studies.

WV-B: There was athe Caribbcan--black aspects.

WVB is familiar with thedidn'toUt the aspects.

had told Latimer "Yoif guys sentwprx papci ith some nice words on it--would like to see again" (not a

Per

I sent it back w

direct quote). WVB said he had the DDI'.scopy. Whitman says Latimer

only the othe detail. Latimer is Mrwi [gling with Kis

WVB said he'd check with

has copies of both reports. His records suggest that carried to San Clemente perhaps by Gen. Cushman had,been unable to deliver it didn't see

was

ay 73

ml*

. .1

'im

11.

12.

14.

15.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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U Division hastheldcopy attached) by Joel* AnJorson nnd findst it con-tai.ia no nev information. To Shef tho Division, there is no foundation to the allegation thatoward Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking; into Chilean diplomatic Installations in Vanblttfftoa and Raw York.

2. Any connection between ITT ana th3.se break-ins is pr.rely conjectural ind tbe coluanr.re to point this out.

Unuii wu hmm v. mnj itd

(that Anderson night Implyelationship inolunn nnd had assured us that this was not true.

Attachaent; As atated

haeklty

Theodore G. Shacklay Chief

licfttcrrn Ifjraispb^ra Division

y::'t'Ji

- ii

li. ttl or ri'.M

Stevens" E. Eatler

a/a

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it. Btr-.tt "isi

OET*1LS OF IMCIOtNT liRlif LY Cii::iBt IhCOIftT,I'.'ltttliSHTITlW

0 hours. Kor^ay. Pay Hf lv7Pr Pm-Mpn Kirslo^ nivig^n-

Priviftr-rt, nnvjlarynofp.stqchunotfrs Avenue, Wrrffnd ohnrs this

Si*rcpant- RiT'y y.eignedriSfipaichf-rf at. apnrnylFS^Iy

ours in Cruiser #

Thees_?dvisgd

of the Embassy oi" Chile, that the Chsncorv of Chain was entered end nll-tho offices

wore ransacked.'At thishe method of entry or itcjs taken is cn-moim.

Kr. Navarro revises that he .fill -contact the Foreign, fissions RLvisien-Watch

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Sergeant Stevens E. Butler

micl

Captain Pete K. Kanthos

(li IV-UMeteagvTe-.is (l)ater,bcr

(') :

Stevens E. Butler

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Captain Pete N. Kanthos

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PROPERTY in POST if*MO

use con1

Re space is needed. record valuestimated by victim.

ONTTrtUATIOftl OF ABOVE ITEA3iCMi iTElcluuzLve.RIEFLY DESCRIBE IKCTOCNT AND AC'iCC* TAKEN.ate DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED.

sktuit**}

NUr-'HM

A TIME THIS REPORT

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in nvnuo ini

partment of Stc'e

ACTION

i-JFO OCT-CI SS-1* CPR-02 SY-P3 USSS-03 NSC-10 CIAE.0?

DOftE-0* INR-06 NSAE.00 3 RSC-01 USIA-12 l 0 W

TM AHCltBAStV SANTIAGO TO SEf.STATE KaSHCjC &

ukcla';3

itprjj unauthorized entry intoe anonmtn statement

following is our ihporhal translation of statement |unnecessary

cm;ttedi fonmin undersecretarye press EVENJAlG

MAY .QUOTCl CHILEAN IN INFORMED THAT OVER WEEKEND CHANCERY OF EMBASSY IN F' TE ?EO ILLEGALLY (VJOLADAI 3Y UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS *H3 T3 FORCE OPEN DESKS AND KARDfXES OF EMBASSY'S -

CHANCERY OFFICES. IN ADDITION/ WERE ENTERED LBEIT ON LESSER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DISCLOSEO OF DOCUMENTS/ BOOKS/ RADIOS, ETC AS RESULT THESE SERIOUS ACTS, CHILEAN AMp TO US ADVISED STATE CEPT WHICH EXPRESSED HT9REGRET" AT WHAT HAO OCCURF.O-

AFTERN0CN-UNDERSEC7ETARV CALLED IN US AMBASSADOR TO EXPRESS GOCSUT SECURITY CF ITS DIPLOMATIC

MISSION S, ReOUESTlNG RaPIO *ND RIGORCUS INVESTIGATION aS

HELI. AS ESTABLISHMENT OF POLICE GUARD TO PREVENT REALIZATION OF

THESF'LAMENT*3LE ABUSES

"FOR ITS PART OUR VT HAS AOOPTEO MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD

THESE JURITY OF R COMMUNICATIONS AND OBLIGATORY INVESTIGATION

iSL'maP.IOj hAS BEEN ORDEREO- UNOTE.

IRTUALLY ALL SANTIAGO DAILIES THIS MORNING CARRY TEXT OR FAITHFUL SUMMARIES PALMA STATEMENT WITHOUT COMMENT OR FANCIFUL

Department of State

. iccfctcn

Department of State

PAGE <M

ARa-I*

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fJF'* c3 ? t.* DOpE-pP

"PC-^l |

NSC-lfl RSRoV|

R AY 7?

fm *vFhw*Fpv Santiago

TO -tCCSTATC fiC O.'fioc'JTIAL SANTIAGO

SUBJTTi UNAUTHORIZED entf" jWTO CHILEANSSY

|. INISTRYAL"*.FD ke L on

HiH today AT SiS?. f f AD ROM CKINfl tqn

A=tOUT ulhllthorizrr CHILEAN elfl-SSr to

EXPECT. PAL"* aSPADOROFFICE SH0VE0 Slf-NS

Ot-I*3 BEEN CRFFiiLLY SFiIR PaPFRS WHILE

NOT hfc* TOUCHED.HF SaIO CHILFaN GOVERNMENT ASSUMED MOTIVF

h*0 =re*- POLITICAL- from HIP OW" RElENT EXPEDIENCE HITONa

said, he kmE* protection riven Chilean fmrassy wap lf*=s

EFFrriiVE TH*N JT might Etd CHILEAN GflVFRMMFNT MADF . SPECIAL RnTFCT. EP AND RFSIDFNCES in SANTIAGO -IN PaQT brcatlse OF DELICACY OF OUR DELATIONS - ME THOUGHT usg SHOULD aLSO strive TOE CHILEAN OFFICESOES BETTER HE-*ILL PROTECTION. ME THAT GOC HAS Nnhat THIS IncIOfvT PF inHESLIGHTLY TAKEN ABACK WH^N I NTIOK"0 that INCIDENT WAS ALRrAQY on pvfss SERVICE

2- I EXPRESSEDpT THAT CIPCNT HAD OCCURRED AND ThANKeDr " e DECEIVING. R as yP CE-^imstraI [on IN FRiNT Or consulate a few HOURS AGO. |

iould "asp on goc rfqufst ?or< increased protection.

*jfi state 5 ARRIVED A few moments AGO. ADE NO MENTION OF PROPERTY OaMaGE OR theft of RaOIO.

XTUFISHER

S/CPR-HDAVIS '

immediate : Santiago

SUBJ: BREAK-IN AT CHILEAN

HILEAN rilNCOUHS VALDES PHONED DEPT -tFISHER>IS TO REPORT THAT UPON ARRIVAL SAME HORNINGPERSON OF PERSONS UNKNOWN HAD ENTEREDSATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY NIGHT> AND HADOFFICES AND TAKEN SOKE RADIOS AND BOOKS. NOTIFIED APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES-

PROTOCOLYND DEPTOFF <GIRDLER> VISITED CHANCERY TO .EXPRESS CONCERN AMD REGRET -

2.DURING VISIT- ADB LETELIER AND EflBOFFS DISMISSED -ROBBERY AS POSSIBLE MOTIVEi STATING IT IMPOSSIBLETHAT FOREIGN CHANCERY LOGICAL TARGET FORBERY AMD CONCLUDING THAT REAL PURPOSE UAS SEARCH FOR tUNSPECIFIED> DOCUMENTS. UHILE TERMING INCIDENTTHEY MADE NO HINT OF, OR REFERENCEOSSIBLE PROTEST OR CLAIM FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE. VV .

bocirar as retimd 7fl

official use

Reported loss at that time consisted of four am/fm radios and one electric razor. The police investigation identified some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints was made. Since the reported loss wasnd there was no evidencerossing of state boundries, rhe FBI did not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

stant General Counsel

cc: Legislative Counsel Inspector General

'.' 'i '

. ft. j'.l

rs TSD (now OTS) Intervl&va.

Kanes revealed ia Office of Security report -

Retiringeferredord for Job

KcCord offered parttill employed)

Lectured for >fcCord at Ibnt. Jan Cell0 Flsned to vorV

Wanted to raise icndoxd

Where do ve stand with!

Were to havo been interviewed

Steve KuKn

Bruce Solie

Piulhink WB has Interviewed following!

Fart

Kd Ryan Cord Mayer

Whose nanes appear Itf ny notes to see

SDB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DDI "Trap" on Leaks of Narcotics Intelligence

1. In material provided by the DDI on contacts with certain persons on the White House Staff, there2 memorandum from Mr. Helms to Dr. Kissinger relating the identificationeak to the press as having been in the BNDD. The memorandum states in part:

"After noting that Jack Andersonource for classified documents on narcotics, werap so that recipient organizations of CIA Intelligence Memoranda (IM) on narcotics could be identified. "

3. This course of action was at the initiative of the Directorate of Intelligence, without consultation with persons elsewhere in the government, except In reporting the results to Dr. Kissinger. Itconceived attempt to targetossible source of leaks. We doubt that it would be susceptible to misunderstanding if exposed to public view, but the fact is that it was something of an attempt to trap someone, and itart of the general attempt to sealeak similar to those leading to the "plumbing" operation. Because of tho latter consideration it Is noted for the record.

S. D. Breckinridge

tsttColby

nfsl'.t- bj ycy iii Ly

iiiSul en cur cti^Esloa snc^svll&tsactivities. Uyeaba ftAlc.lns oa*EUyi

leostOn (bisects)iva to Oca&euata Heicl's qusbtion.

Aa explanation cf eagtttcsvtor umA -or

(which

An IG-lnitlated follow-up on was dfrely notftd oa7 of ths original sensitive suznary.

wo IG-lnitlsted foUov-iqs ont*iat ware included In toe Initial Direetcmta subclsslcna but were too fragmentary for Inclusion tn our original sugary.

Cnsl&ti?ly nay lteo that aurffccffd In th* course of our inquiries.

Tbe tabs ara not arranged in any logical crd?r, because we chose to place the bulkiera the bottcn of the file to cake for easier hw-rtllng of it. Tbe followingreakdown of tbe tabs by Initiator of follow-up. (Both you end .Tedtl askedollow-up ca the itea In

Dolby-lnltlated Wadzl-Initiated lnitiated Hew submission

Williao V. Broe Inspector General

010

vows

ddi

all ont-erial la tooedoday.

it isthat raterial bo cardedards forpassible usa. it should shew (l) the nasa of the triors* in upper lef handans of person belna reported ontmt, mccord,vent reported, if significant-andvord "rootlne if notdentifying reftrsnw to tsao in which information is reccrded.

if an event reported in thisis slginflcant,eport it iewdlately for hsndlinulewou' or southing connected with voter gat. and assoelsted cents)

reese raise any qusstionsur as you get into the caterlal. especially, as you get ideas aa work progresses, plcaso put thsm forvard. .

*4*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Broe

Roported Ageacy Funding of Heroin Study

' 1. ORD, in reporting association of employees with Egil Krogh in connection with the government narcotics program, referred to an Agency funding action oa2as transferred to OST (the Office of Science andunder the Executive) from ORD's budget. The money was totudy proposed by IDAm told this is the Institute for Defenaend was approved by the DDI,,

acting for the DDS, and Mr. Colby as Executive Director-Comptroller.

c- 2. udge this toroper and normal expenditure within the government in connectionigh priority government program on narcotics. ecommend that this not be reported as an action subject to external criticism.

S. D. Breckinridge

DDCI uPiiSS

(uPI)CIA OFFICIALS TESTIFIED WEDfcESUAY THEY FOHGOT

DD/HVS TO ItLt CCSGRESS CR THE AUENCY'S vlRECTCK,SCKLESIK6ER, AbGuI DDOSS IHEY RECEIVED THATHIIE kqusz *AS TitYIKSns/T PIN BLArtE CN THE AGENCY FOH THE VATtKiiATE SCAKDAL.

D/OCI REP. LOCIEfl NEDII,lCH., CALLED THREE OFFICIALS OF. THE CIA IO ONE EXPLAIN *HY THE LETTERSHICH HAVE BEEN THACED IO WAIEKGATE OSR CONSPIRATOR JAMES MCCORDDID NOI SURFACE UbTXL TWO DAYS AGO. OSI (2 "ONE CF THE REASONS THEY GAVE WaS THE FAMILIAR 'I FOHGOT,'" NEDZI Ch/OpS'SAID. "TKZY ALSO SAID IIATTER CF TURNING II OVER IO SOMEONE OB tUE AND ASSUMING HE WOULD PASS II ON."

SIX LfcTIERSCNE CF IHZft .SIGNED "Jin" AND THE OTHERS

I A"

oso

rcea fa wh eur

DDO'DO ANONYhOUSWERE SEM TO FORriEh CIA DIRECTOR RICHARD HELKS BETWEEN !

ASI

REOil SAID II HAU BEEN "PRETTY DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED"

CRf.ZR CIA AGENT, WAS THE AUTHOR OF ALL THE LETTERS. TO SAY WHAT WAS IN THEtt, BUT REP. WILLIAM BRAY, ERE "CONFUSED" AND "DISJOINTED" WARNINGS IHAI THE WHITE HOUSE TRYING TO HAKE THE WATERGATE BREAK-INlA

BOTH NEDZI AND BRAY SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAI ClA WAS IN ANY WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN.

NOI

Osborne

"uynor

TESTIFYING AT THE SESSION WERE PAUL GAYNOR, HOWARD OSBORNE AND huermer WlLLlArt 6RAUX, TO? CIA OFFICIALS WHO HAD CUSIODY OF THEco LEIfERS AT VARIOUS STAGES AFTER IHEY WERE SENT.

INITIALLY SPELLEDAhE AS BROE AND SAID HE DID

KNOW IF IT WAS THE SAflE HAN WHO TOLD THE SENATE COMMITTEE ABOUT MEETINGS HE HAD WITH III PRESIDENT HAROLD GENEEK TO DISCUSS THE CREATION OF INTERNAL ECONOHIC STRIFE IN CHILE.ED

Comment:

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the neus services.

I*c.

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT: General: Watergate '

Specific: Tom Parrott'a Involvement with David Young, .0

lfc

We met with Tom Latimer this morning to get from Mm thecopy of the sensitive attachment to our family jewelsorder that we mightemporary atayback burn copy. AtLatimer said heall in to Broe to report that whenwas DCI duty officer some time in2 hecalls from David '

- : w

I called Parrott's.home Thepresumably Mrs. Parrott, gave me his telephonethe Environmental Protectionalledand told himould like to meet with him to debriefthe substance of calls he received from the White House whenDCI duty officer in Tom said he would bemeet with me but that he saw no reason why be could not giveinformation over the telephone.

Tomall from David Young at about midday on a Young was calling about that morning's program byin which Rather included materiallassifiedwanted to come out to the headquarters building to seestarted chasing It down. He Bpoke with Bruce Clarke whoDDI duty. It turned out that Bather's comment was made onof the previous day and that it was basedeportout of George Carver's shop. The report was distributedseven or eight copies, and only two of them had gone outsideto

Young gtt lost trying to find the build'ag and did not arrive until about one. By then, Parrott had identified the Carver report andopy of the distribution list. Young was shaken uponhat the only external distribution was to Kissinger. He was extremely

arrogant, wanting to know who each of the Agency recipients washe hadopy. He wanted to know if any of thobad talked with Rather. Parrott called Thoermer atfound that no reports had been made of contacts withremarked to the effect "that's what they say" and asked ifthese people had been interrogated. Upon learning that thedone nothing about the alleged leak, Young left In Huff sayingwould be back in

Sometime later Parrott got the transcript of the Rathercomments boreemote connection to the content ofreport. Parrott cannot now recall specifically what theconcerned. Rather did imply criticism of the President inand this may have been the basis of Young's concern. Parrott got in touch with Carver, and the two of themHelms and briefed him on the episode. This is the lastof it. Parrott commented that he had no other contacts,remotely involved with Watergate or related matters. he may hayeemo for the record of .the Youngis not sure. His duty secretary may remember. This wouldeitheris also

possible thaVva

I called Carver. He said that he thenemo in the mill, which will reach us during the course of the day.

that she had traded the duty wit

thinks that Parrottemo

files were destroyed when he left. She has no idea whathappened to the

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of House Armed Services Committee

his morning Messrs. Lawrence Houston, General Counsel; William Broe, Inspector General; Howard Qsborn, Director of Security; Paul Gaynor, Chief, Security Research Staff; aadl-

Secretary to General Walters, appeared beforo the atx>va Subcommittee about Agency acttotfjafcen on letters received from James McCord. Tbe meeting lasted from WOO hours5 hours. There was no technical sweep of the6 Rayburn House Office Building, and the room was not kept under technical monitoring.ocretranscript was taken and is on file in the Office of Legislative Counsel.

2. Present for the session werei

Luclen N. Nedtihairman F. Edward Hebert

William G. Brayeslie C. Arendsob Wilsonalif.)

3. Present from the staff werei

Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel

William Hogan

V During the hearing, -Chairman Nedzi and Mr. Slatinshek criticized Mr. Houston rather severely for the Agency's not reporting the.exint.-neetho McCord letters to thethey weren this connection. Representative WilsonVsald he wondered if the Agency had actually gone along with "McCord's gamee said this would explain why these letters were just now being surfaced. Mr. Houstononversation with Nedzi and Slatinshek at the conclusion of the hearing and it seemed he was able to dispel some of their concern.

5. Followup action:

he Committee asked provide copies

of her shorthand notes of the memorandum which she prepared for General Walters and copies of the Xerox copy which she made of each of these.

ib. They asked for the exact dateStffianMr. OsWn was

called

Acting Legislative Counsel

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

On this date Mr. William E. Colby and the writereeting with Congressman Lucien N. Nedzi. Tho reason for the meeting was to review with the Congressman material sent us by the Directorates describing the Agency activities that had flap potential.

, At the outset, Mr. Colby advised that the Director had issued Instructions to each directorate to come forward with descriptions of activities (especially involved In the domestic scene) that had flap potential. In addition,emorandum to all employees of the CIA, the Director had Instructad all employees to report to him any activities the Agency was conducting that they construed as outside the Agency charter. Congressman Nedslopy of this Agency notice be furnished to him.

The full report, including the sensitive section, was discussed with the Congressman item-by-item and in roost cases he actually read tho text. This took two hours and the Congres 3man followed the material with great care.

With regard to the item concerning Mr. McCord's letters to tho Agency In July and2 ande expressed astonishment that tho material took so long to be surfaced and when surfaced took so long to get to the Director. He was very outspoken in his criticism of tho people Involved.

I will not try to set forth all his reactions to tha material,elieve he found sobering,ill set out hereinafter the Items In which he showed special interest:

a. Allen documentation furnished to the Secret Service. He desired more Information concerning the reason why Issued, the use, and how controlled.

support to tho White House inthe replies to letters and telegramsesult ofspeech on Cambodia Heinformation on this subject.

furnished Ambassadors. He waathe number Issued to Ambassadors and the position thetook on the use of these beacons. Ho wasthe Department of State was pushing this program, asthey should

acquisition of police equipment. whether LEAA, Department of Justice,be doing this rather than the Agoncy.

e. He noted Logistics furnished telephone analysers, and desired to know what they were and how used.

crash project concerningy the DCI. The Congressman was interested inthe Agency Instigated the project and why was It stopped.

ORD projects indicated research doneof the host system or on unwitting subjects. Hetho opinion that this was risky and recommended It He stated he would Ilka toirective gothe researchers concerning these practices.

I. John Dean's request ro Investors Overseas Service. Ho reviewed the six reports that had been furnished. Ho noted, however, that the item stated "there were multiple channels to tho Agency from the White House" and requested Information concerning theso channels.

j. Allen passports. Mr. Colby advised that he planned to review this whole subject and tho Congressman agreed with the need to do so.

(

The Congressman noted that in connection with John McCone's consultative role with the Agency the Director had stated some time in the past that he planned to take action regarding individuals in this category. The Congressmaneport on what had been done.

Mr. Nedzi asked Mr. Colby if the Agency had considered how much of the information just reviewed with him could be made public. Mr. Colby stated this had not been done yet, and spoke to the question ofmethods, and tHs- impact oiwthe institution. Thestated that in the current climate he felt it waa necessary to open up more information to help clear the air. Mr. Colby stated the Agency would give the matter deep consideration, and added he hadeneral statement along these lines to bo used at his confirmation hearing.

The meeting ended at'clock noon.

[Signed) ffilliaa t. Bros

William V. Broe Inspector General

Distribution:

Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Colby

Office of Legislative Counsel

NOTE: The above listed items, except for item j, are being pursued by the Office of the Inspector General.

[BJTEl

howardho, being fir.sc duly sworn, doposes and says as follows:

aa the Director of Security of thoAgency.

purpose of this statement is to record,

to tha best of ay knowledge and recollection, circumstances involved in the receiptorios of uasignedreceived by the Agency during the periodugus

Tho significance of these letters is that by their content and by the handwriting on two of them, they are believed to have been written by James W. McCord,f "he defendants in the Watergate trial.

Ky first involvement in this natter occurred

on tho 2nd or 3rd of2 when an envelope addressed to Mr. Holes, then Director of tho Central Intelligence Agency, vith no return addross, and postmarked2 was routed to ay desk fron tho Director's officeoutine piece of "crank nail". The envelopearbon copyypewritten letter signed "Jim" with tho nacio in the '

salutary addressDear After dismissing

tho letteriece of crankad second thoughts anJ recognized the handwriting on the envelope and tho signature "Jin" on the letter as being sinilar to that of Mr. McCord, who forasrly worked for neecurity officer before his retircnent fron the Agency.

1. j-'o

id told hia thntnot 1 Luro r.i.v'itl Lftitt At wasrgthohad boon font to hin hy Mr.ord. od

evar to tUe Federal Bureau of Investigation. us, after soae rofloction, decided that ha would like to navVa.&gal opinion on tho matter andd Mr. 'aw.-oi'.coGeneral Cour.sal of the Agoncy, to his office and had hia road the letter. After he had finished reading the letter the ensuing discussion, to tho best of ay recollection, contored About whether the Agoncy had any legalto forward tho letter to tho Justice Department or tho Federal Bureau of Investigation. Both Mr.nd Mr. Houston decided that thure was no such obligationas told to hold the lettorecuro file In ray office and take no further action on it. Mr. Mains instructed no to restrict knowledge of the existence of tho letter to an absoluto Minima nuaber of people.

S. The next onvolope recoived was addressed to Mr. Paultaff chief in my officoormer close friend of Mr. NcCord's, on ot aboutd of The next envelope received was addressed to Mr. Gaynor's residence and was undated but postmarked The two envelopes contained one or nore unsigned typewritten pieces of correspondence which appeared to relate to Mr. McCord's involvement in tho Watergate "affair" Both of these letters were handcarried by ae to/Ifrs. Elisaboto

lcy/i

IS. iO2 3rc raci-ived by Mr. Gaynor at his residence and promptly delivered to ns for raview and subsequent inclusion in the secureid not bring tJiyseo irxaadiate attention ofIlalaseek or so later delivered toolder with all copies of the letters we had received. ecall, ray i request to hira was for guidance as to what action should be taken with regard to them in tho light of his departure froa the Agency incident to his nomination as Unitedignato to Iran. After reviewing them, he informed ae that ho did not see any reason to take any 'action at that time, but askedhow then to Mr. Houston and if Mr. Houston had noas to retain thenecuro file and take no action with regard to them.ecall, Mr. Houston was out of town at the tine and it was several daysad an opportunity to give him the folder with the copies of the letters in it for roviow. After reviewing them, he informed me that heo objection to the instructions Mr. Helms had given ineo informed Mrs. Elizabeth Dunlevy, secretary to Mr. Helms.

7. Onr. William Broe, Inspector General of tho Agency, and his Deputy, Mr. Kenneth Greer, met with iae in my office in connection with an investigation they were undertaking at the direction of Mr. Schlesinger to determine if anyone in the Agency had any contact .with

V .

t.-o ., .t,

v'.ooJ'jicybjoa

Xl -. Mh1 f* tho MiUnLiuii off ayold th-.rar.fcnynor

. -R* Mr. "cfrjt that Mn, that' kdt*rMcCord sinco the Watergate incidont. (Iiron Mr. Gaynor that he has not seen orrfr. McCord sinco his retirement from tho Ago/icy on 31 lso told themr. Leo Rosonbaura, antho Agency, had requested an appointment with mo totho feasibility of contributing to Mr.ad convinced him that this wouldto the best intorests of himself, the Agency."'cCord. lso stated that Mr. Kosen^axralien1weeks ago to say that ho was well known as aof Mr. McCord's and night be called to testify atSenate Hearings. dvised hia to seekthis regard from tho Office of General Counsel. othat he did so. hen remembered tho envelopespurportedly originated by Mr. McCord. IBroe and.Mr. Greer on tho circumstances involved inand subsequent handling of them andopy,of them and delivered them to Mr. Broa tho nextalsoopy, at tho sane tine, to my immediateIlnTold

8. ew days afteras contacted by Mr. John Greaney, Office of the General Counsel of the Agency, who asked me about any official or unofficial Contacts anyone in tha Agency had had with Mr. McCord. entioned

. i

io orJal'M.wtin-lag

Mr. Grcaioy indicated that ho would rcco::jond to Mr. Houston

Lc ; *3 Mr. Houston aakcdopy of it'ij lotiirs. On this saneas instructed by Mr.Schlesinger, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to participate in certain Congressional briefings on this natter and to preparo this affidavit.

toh of3 when IEroe and Mr. Creer of the envelopes and theironly persons knowledgeable of the existence ofaddition to no, were: Mr. Ileitis, Mrs. ElisabethKr. Houston, Mr. Paul Gaynor of ayKathryn Aldridge, my secretary who prepared theLoo J- Dunn, my Executive Officer, knew of theand correspondence but not of subsequent envelopes.

only other natter pertinent tonatter was the fact that on intermittentthis Office, wholose personal friend of Mr.relayed to Mr. Caynor and his staff certainthe porsonal situation of Mr. and Mrs. McCordafter the time ho was in Jail and sinco he hason bond. This sourco has been utilized by thisi.iany years and by rty direction, no effort was nade* tofrom him about Mr. McCord and the infornation provided

was dono so purely

Howardsbom

Subscribed and sworn to beforeotary Public, in and for tho

County of Fairfax, State of Virginia, this J3 day of

Hy commission expires

had told him that

LLLi tohat

at the time heinoi

miitlors for the DDP, knew Liddyaj probably

Involved with Uvn.f. hat lime Lou Cone inr<:ng

at theoujcanted to meet Conein. Ct

mders Caroling that Hunt may have introduced

to Conein.

queried as to what would be the best procedure

ivi-i'or advis-ad that we should interview

relationsddy, would do so.

and Conein, and that this office

Insp

bneral

MEMORANDUM

Employees

Agency Invplvement in the Watergate Case

leadership of the Agency continues to make aeffort to investigate all aspects of Agency involvement with the "Watergate" case or any of those persons connected with it. The results of these investigations have been given to thelegislative, executive, and judicial elements of theinvestigating these matters. Each employee has been asked and is directed to report to the Director any knowledge he or she has of the Watergate affair and related matters, any personswith it, or any other illegal activity in which they believe the Agency was involved in any way.

In consonance with the foregoing, anyone who has had auy connection or contact with individuals on the attached list, or anyone in their offices or anyone purporting to act for them or acting pursuant to their authority, should report these contacts fully. Activities of these and other individuals include not only the Watergate affair, but any investigative work on the Pentagon Papers/ Ellsberg case and any contacts relating to the Executive Branch and White House efforts to locate and stem leaks of classifiedto the press starting as early as

Any work done by anyone in the Agency on any of these subjects, or any knowledge related thereto, should be reported to the IG through the appropriate Deputy Director, or directly And personally to the Director.

4. It is imperative that every piece of information bearing on these matters be reported immediately for evaluation by tbe senior management of the Agency, The public interest requires that all information be produced and reported to ourlassifiednecessaryj so that the Agency's actual role will be clarified with respect to various charges and speculation.

Executive Secretary CIA Management Committee

APPROVED

James R. Schlesing Director

io-

OOf/it

MEMORANDUM TO t Executivo ^eerretiiry

CBA Xsnafjement Cosnndttee

Loan of Television Systin to Secret Service

for Use at Duaooratic and Republican Rational

Conventions2

attached^auntnary reports tho loan ofby the Agehcy to tho Secret ^urvtca for uae duringand Republican "ational Conventions laat year. waa for use in helicopter aerial BurvolPanee,control. The assump'ion is that it was used for thatequipment was recovered

transactiontraightforwardto tho legal responsibility of the Secretthe fact that the Aftancy proMrtod the equipment for use

oaaatic political situation could bo presentedifferent light.

WVB

m^hawum ?o

Secretary CIA WinaKeaentee

Testing Program

The attached suanary from ORD describes roaearch

ehavioral drug. Conversations with pari

indicate that the reported drug waa partarger progran in which

MonoA? the Agency had relations with commercial drug manufacturers,

vherehy they passed on drugs rojectsd because of unfavorable side

ving

effects. The drugs wore screened ulth tho use of ADP equipment, and those selected for experimentation were tested at

hsiriR monkeys and mlco. Materials

aft/further Interest, as demonstrated by thia testing, were then tested at Edgewood, usin^ volunteer members of the Armod Forces.

Z. Tha program vas terminated last fall. The computer progmn remains in tho machine, its final disposition not yot having boon decided.

3. Carl Duckett omphasiaea that tho program was considered as defensive, in the sense that ve would be abla to recopniae certain behavior if similar materials were used against AmericanBo

wvb

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and

Technology

Involvement in Domestic Affairs

In surveying all of the people within the Office ofDevelopment in search of specific contactHunt, Krogh. Young, and Liddy, an additionalwhich ORD supplied equipment for domestic use wasis attached.ave also provided the additional informationonProject

S&yre bWvwiH

Director of Research and Development

Attachments: As stated

m2kcranem for the record

SUBJECT: General: The raaily Jewels Exercise

Specific: Meeting with Colby This Dote

Broe andwith Mr. Colby5 hours today. Colby

asked that we provide hira with fuller information on the following items:

kahat do- these-.agents do

Wna-tr

CCI'fi recorts-c.

used Tm unwitting

v irm atlx wpurivga&&Kgxsai

MuldiufeH Ueuu uil lUo.

-or whcis? For what purpose?

undown Tjn-

..Colbtf B HUUjjlg-

Aireuf FIl LHvlUuu'a

employee bulletin

359

Hay

DXi STATEMENT ABOUT THECASE

The fcViov.'inj statemant was made by lieutenant Generalecent appearanceongressional Ccemlttee.

Unas orderedhone message from my office to bee White House at0 with Director helms. ad lunch with Mr. Helms and we went to Mr. Ehrllchman's office at tbe

Write House. Present werecl-.tm.oyself. ecall it. Kr. Haldenan Sdld that the'.as casing trouble and was being exploited by the n dtcldetf at the Khlte Houseulti ceFBI Director

k.erc arresceo, fdrCMr enquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter night .jeopardize some of the CIA's covert ectfvltfes in that area. An appointment was made for me to see Mr. Gray0 that sane Say, tht ever andd ocon directed by too White House officials tototexican aspects of the Watergate episode might jeopardize some of the Agency's covert actionshat area. He said that he understood theent between the FBI and the Aaency regarding thylr sources but thst this xplicated cast. IU uhldvio'.aie ciw npiniira-lt with CI* regarding sources. On my return to thehecked to see whether there was any danger In the Agency's covert sources If the Mexican part of the investigation continued and ascertained that no one relieved that this was the esse. No ce had any knc*1edye of the plan to bug 'he Democratic Rational Ccnittee.

On Ovinehe Counsel to the President John Dean called ine ando come and see him about thead discussed with Haldeman and Ehrllchman. Heould check with Ehrllchmanid. Heould talk to Oeanent to Dean's office5 or.

I Informed Deanad chocked Carefully; -hither there was any jeopardy to the Agency's sourcesurther investl-

gatiorf s. ajVri wnct^er tv CIA have tzi.ia porticscde witnout ray knowing It. aid thai this was not

possible. new that the Agency had had no part In the operation against the Democratic National Conmittee. herefore could not say that further Investigation would jeooardize Agency sources. elt that someone had bungled badly and that the responsible parties Should be fired. He asked whether there was not sonahich themight have been involved. aidad checked with Director Helms and was convinced it was not. Any attempt to stiflewould destroy the effectiveness of the Agency and

Tha followingawsin in his office at his "ssuast. He again reviewed the Watergate Case saying that some witnesses were getting scared and were "wohbHnn". tthat ro ratter howhey got, they could not involve CIA because it was not involvedhe hugging of the Katero-ste. He then askad if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects' salaries while they wereail,overt action fuji-is for this

I replied that this was outuestion, it would implicate the Agencyomething in which it was not lipnllcatprf. Anv such

actIcm by the Agency woule imply an trier fro- thelarlyyai.eraveto the Presidenthe country and would deUrov the CIA's credibility with tha Cong.vss and treocid resign rather than do this and, ifo doh. Pra-JJ to explain the reasons for ay refusal furthernorerwheiiAaerrv

hado taa Overset

CoitYntuees of the Agencyongress. He was much taken aback byagreeo that risksfjllcatin? th? CTASI li;e enorrcous. aid

a mortal one, tana: was now e turnedulti-megaton explosion". gain advised him to fire the responsible parties.

_ Again Csan sent for rce onih of direawt his office0 that day. Ha CRqyfreiad Earned anything more about CIA Involvement. tevel vaunt of the Agency in the bugging of'ata^ate. He tr.en askedad any ideasaidad none whlcn could be helpful. Perhaps the Cubans who were anti-Castro might haveand inut the CIA did not.

ti'igfthat he could nit

aspects of this matter ur.less re: na?'letter frw tha-

i told himould not tall hiai that further investigation would jeopardize the agency's covert sources. ad checked on this andas not so. ad ascertained that general cosh-ran had initially authorized the issuance of some equipment to howard hunt without knowlrg its purpose otrer than it was,nderstood it, to shut offhis was long before tha watergate bugging. sincead carefully checked and there was no other involvement of any sort by the cia inelt-that

yev.dent andccvnir-*. oyid have iiorf was suit* oraire red tosstfa. ij x: : -co wis pre-erea to resign on tiiis issue. cvef thethe agencynd the account of our dealings with the former cia employees up to tbe termination of their enolovment with the aoency lona before thepisode..

i saw gray again or.h of july and gave him one additional memorandumnt-*cthunt. ireiterating the position ws hidpreviously. o idad tali dean that the best solution wcnu: be tc fire those responsible. siki he had made the same recoim.endatio.i. once again he agreed that anytnino that right damageiiteyrity of1 and cia wouldrave dis-

in3 shortly after hr. schleslncorcld him of my conversations-with haldenan, ehrliclwan and oaen. In february dean called dr. schlesinger to see if the agency ecu id getrom the fbi the materialit to *tsoiconcerning our contact with hunt. dr. schlesingergreed that this could not be done. ttempted to contact dean but he was in florida. on hisaw dean it his office on februarynd told mr hist wc csu'd not ifa tZl tor the material back, luac wouleerve to implicate the ciaon id not and would not do it. ad seen acting foi director graynd told hisn of dean's request and our refusal. he agreed saying that he could not dohing.

since thatave had no further contact with oean. the above represents my recollection cf what occurred and the dates are checked in my appointment book.

distribution: all employees

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ff ICE Of THt DIUCTOK

ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached draftill be making to the Senate Committee on Appropriationsay. As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance in responseequest by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law enforcement bodies Information about these activities and willto do so.

All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of issue. hall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which falltrict interpretation of its legislative charter. ake this positionm determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

I am taking several actions to Implement this objective:

I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me Immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone onhe past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.

I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. nvite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretarynd say that he wishes to talk to me about "activities outside CIA's charter."

4. To ensure that Agency activities are properheereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:

Any CIA employee who believes that he has received

Instructions which in any way appear inconsistent

with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the

ector of Central Intelligence inrnediately. "flu

dames R. Schlesinger Director

P.1Ttvr - THTFPHAI IKF flHI Y

BEFORE

OPENING STATEMENT

Hr.m here to discuss the questions which have arisen over CIA's real and alleged role in events that occurred1aveetailed investigation into the precise nature of thatan report to you on what Agency records, now being intensively reviewed, reveal at this juncture. o not yet knowave all the facts in the matter. m pleased to present to you such facts as are now available,ill certainly provide you with any further details as they come to my attention.

Let me start.with the Agency's relationship with Hr. Howard Hunt, whose testimony has recently been made public. Mr. Hunttaff employee of the Agency9 to At that time ne retired from the Agency. He performed one editorial job of writingeccrcnendation for an award for one of our officers, ine was not paid for these services, although the Agency placed the sums0 in two charitable 'organizations for the service performed.

In earlyeneral Cushman, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,elephone call from the White House. He was informed that Hr. Hunt hadonsultant on security affairs for the White House,equest was made that Mr. Hunt receive assistance from the Agency. The minutes of the Agency Morning Meeting1 indicate that the DDCI (General Cushman)all by John Ehrlichman stating that Howard Hunt had beenhite House security consultant.

On1 Mr. Hunt visited General Cushraanatthe CIA building. According to the records, Hr. Hunt stated that he had been chargedighly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit information

fron an individual whose ideology he was not entirely sure of, and for that purpose he said he was asked to cone to the Agency to see if he could get two things: identification documents in alias and some degree of physical disguise,ne-tine operation. He stressed that he wanted the matter to be held as closely as possible and that he would like to meet the Agency people in an Agency safehouse. Agency records indicate that. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Hunt referred to Mr. EhrUchman by name and General Cushman acknowledged an earlier call from Mr. Ehrlichnan to him. The Committee may desire to query General Cushman whose knowledge would not come from such secondary sources.

General Cushman directed the appropriate technical service of the Agency to be of assistance to Mr. Hunt, based on the above request. On1 Hr. Hunt was given alias documents,ocial Security card, driver's license, and several association membership cards, in the name of "Edward Joseph Harren" similar to material he had been furnished for operational use while he had been an Agency employee, under the name of "Edward V. Hamilton." The same day Mr. Hunt was also given disguise materialsig, glasses,peech alteration device).

By calling an unlisted telephone number given him, Hr. Hunt arranged several additional meetings with Agency technical officers, the dates of which cannot be provided with precision. In these, he requested and wasommercial tape recorderypewriter case)ommercial Tessina camera disguisedobacco pouch. He also broughthen-unidentified associate (later identified from press photos as Mr. G. Gordon Liddy) and secured forisguise (wig and glasses) and alias documents in the nana of "George F. Leonard."

The Agency "technical officers met these requests despite the absence of the procedural steps and approvals normally required by Agency regulations. However, they became increasingly concerned at the escalation of Hr. Hunt's requests for, assistance. These finallyequest from Mr. Hunt to be met on the morning ofpon his return from California, toilm developed and returned to bin. This was done the same day. He also askedew York mall address and telephone-answering service for operational use.

The technical officers raised their concern with senior officers, who noted the possibility that these activities could involve the Agency in operations outside its proper functions. esult, again according to Agency records, General Cushman telephoned Mr. Ehrlicbman at the White House on1 and explained that further such assistance could not be given. Mr. Ehrlichnan agreed. The request for mail address and telephone answering service was not honored. Onr. Hunt contacted the technical officers again,redit card, but this was refused. Hr. Hunt had alsoequest on1 for the assignmentecretary he had known during his Agency career. This was also refused. The earlier-furnished alias documents and other material were not recovered, however, except for the Tessina camera which was returned onugust as unsuitable. Since the end ofhe Technical Services Division has had no further association with Mr. Hunt. oint ofould note that the break-in of the office of Hr.sychiatrist took place on or

The Agency outlined the above events to Mr. Patrick Gray, Acting Director of the FBI, in letters datedeeting oneries of questions were asked the Agency on2 by'Mf* Earl Silbect, Principal Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Onttorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen revieweduly transmittals together with additional, more detailed but undated materials, that had been provided toirector Gray on The Agency is aware that this material was reviewed on2 by Mr. Silbert, who asked additional questions on that date as well as onritten responses to the foregoing questions were provided onn additional submission was made to the Assistant Attorney"General Petersen on This material was discussedeeting held with Assistant Attorney General Petersen and Mr. Silbert onf the foregoing materials can be made available to the Committee if it so desires.

eparate matter, which was not known by those who prepared the material for the Department of Justice in the fall of last year, the Office of Medical Services of the Agency prepared and forwarded to the White House two indirect personality assessments of Mr. Daniel Ellsberg. The Agency hasrogram of producing,elective basis, such assessments or studies on foreign leaders for many years. In1 Mr. Helms* then Director, instructed Agency officers to work with Mr. David Young of the White House Staff relative to security leaks in the intelligence community.

Nr. Youngtudy on Mr. Ellsberg In the latter part ofhich Agency activity was apparently approved by Nr. Helras. At that tine, Mr. Young supplied raw material consisting principally of newspaper and magazine articles together with some State Department and Justice Department papers. The first assessment delivered to the White Houseas judged insufficient. esult, there were several meetings between Qr. Malloy, Mr. Hunt, anddy, in which classified information of the Justice and State Departments was introduced. One such meeting occurred on Additional material was transmitted by Mr. Hunt onctober, and another meeting was held onctober. These meetings ledecond version of the assessment, This document was delivered to the Executive Office by Dr. Kalloy on Agency records indicate that Mr. Helras had previously communicated with Mr. Young indicating he had read both reports.

nother contact "about" an Agency officer arranged to provide Mr. Hunt certain unclassified materials from CIA files relative4 French case of leakage of Government documents. These were delivered to his office at the Hhite House.

Inould like to stress several conclusions of my investigation so far:

a. CIA had no awareness of the details of Mr. Hunt's activities. The Agency's inpression was that Mr. Hunt was engaged in an activity related to identifying and closing off the security leaks that were soreoccupation of the Government at the time.

Agency clearly was insufficiently cautious inof its assistance to Mr. Hunt. Later, when the natureHunt's requests for assistance began toossibleby the Agency in activities beyond its charter,terminated the relationship and refused further assistance.

preparationrofile on an American citizencircumstances lies beyond the normal activity of the Agency.

It shall not beave so instructed the staff. This shall beart of the regulations governing such activities.

ave calledeview of alland the termination of any which might beits legitimate charter. In addition to requestingfrom myave directed each employee andex-employee to submit to me any cases which they may question.

I am determined that the Agency will not engage in activities outside of its tf-.arter but will concentrate its energies on its important intelligence mission.

DCI:

Sy Hersh's provocative teaser for the day:

ave information that Cushman knew exactly what he wis okaying when he gave approval to assist

_^ttontioned Sy H. again to the TtateggaQfe had given to the Times already Slid toldnoted" whatto say today.

He has calls in for you, Houston, and Colby.

ami'

cci oac colby

response to press inquiries concerning mr. hunt's grand jury testimony

the central intelligence agency had no advance notice of any sort whatsoever of the break in by mr. hunt of the office ofellsberg's psychiatrist or of the watergate incident. the newspaper reports of these two events were the first notice to anyone in thell agency information onontacts with any persons involved in these incidents has been reported fully to the department of justice^ and as investigation of these matters is in the hands of the courts and the grand jury, all inquiries should be directed to the department of justice.

MEMORAffMJMxecutive Secretary, CIA ManagementEmbarrassing Agency Activities

The Office of the Inspector General has records on the following sensitive subjects that either have been or might in the future be the source of embarrassment to tbe Agency.

The report of the Board of Inquiry in the case of Hansbe Tofte affair was fully exposed in public, of course, but the report itself is closely held within the Agency. Thie office vae designated as the-custodian of the report, and we have the only' surviving copy.

An annex to the Inspector General's report of survey of tbe Technical Services Division done The annex deals with experiments in influencing human behavior through tbe administration of mind or personality altering drugs to unwitting subjects.

An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President Diem. The allegations were determined to be without foundation.

An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President Trujillo. The investigation disclosed quite extensive Agency involvement with tbe plotters.

An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency conspired to assassinate Fidel Castro. The story first appeared in Drew Pearson's column and has since appeared in Jack Anderson's column. While the columns contained many factual errors, the allegations are basically true.

rtage 1

sadttvltt groups

produced In7 at Walt Rostov'sreeo typescript study of tbe SDS aad Its foreign tics.

In tho HOTSDer3 OCI produced--again ot Bostov'oaper on Bestloas Youth. The first, and aost sensitive section,hilosophical treatment of student unreot. Its motivation, history, ond tactics. It drew heavily on overt literature and FBI ruporting on SDS and affiliated groups, fnc second occtlon comprisedhapters on foreign student dlasldonce.

Pogeo2 Black radicalise;

OCI began following Caribbean black rod lean in earnest In Tvo papers were produced on tho subject, one In9 oud the other in

OCI vas asked in0 toemo with special attention to links between1 calico in the Coribbcaa and advocates of black power in Tbe moo vas produced In typescript and given to tbe DCI.

OCIS wrote periodic typescripttokely Caralchael's travels abroaderiod vhea be had dropped frcra public view.

psgaagainst CCKntT vs. US citizens

Ino conduct baarablllty

teBte of carta In HP long-uiButue^ cerise rclal telepbona ctrcults between tha US and South America Thaarried drug-

rclutedI

testa vere ouccassrui. Ola activity was terminated onanollowing CGC determination that they were illegal.

conduct an intercept operationtargeted

on radio telephone conversations

Ipiese intercepts-moer or unrelated conversations often involving US citizens.

Testing in the US of CRD-developed electronic collection systems occasions lly result in tbe collection of dcaestic telephone conversations. When the teste are complete, the intercepted oatarial is destroyed.

ana conducted tests in the Miami area in

1 of DF gear intended for useoviet agent in South Vietnam.. While wholly innocuous, the tests preceded tbe holding of the conventions there and could be construed as being soaehov related to them.

In2 CIA asked, on official ofor copies of telephone call slips relating to US-Chima calls. The operation lasted -for three or four mcntha end then dried up. CGC stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Ccuxaunicn^laas'fict since eavesdropping vas not involved.

Pagecoverage

IA hasail Intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selected mall at Kennedy Airport in Ifew Yorlt City. This program la nov dorsant pending decision on whether to continue or to abolish It.

J-OR:

VV. E. Colby

Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

National Estimates

men ih on Proposed DCI Statement <Hum Case)

Since you are awareave no facts bearing on theake It that you asked for comment from the following point of view; will the proposed statement bo well received by the committee?

Tlie main questions in the- committee's mind will be: Did CIA cooperate wittingly In activities which were both illegal and outside Its charter? Or did It only respond supinely to higher authority even though it had some reason for suspecting Illegal conduct?

hink there would be advantage in coming to grips frankly wth these questions In the statement itself. The text in its present form could be takeninimum factual response which doesn't quite get at the heart of the matter.hink It preferable, in the interest of tlie Agency's reputation on the Hill, to proceed to candor directly rather than to be drawn to it by subsequent questioning.

Key follow-up questions which can be anticipated would include the following:

Why Is there no record of the initial Ehrlichman-Cushman conuct?

If Cushman recorded the conversation with Hunt, was he not already suspicious of the latter's purpose and why didn't he ask?inimum, could he not have Inquired whether "the Individual whose Ideology we aren't entirely sure of* was an American citizen?

I II II .'. i

When Cushman told EhrUchman on1 that CIA was suspending support to Hunt, was it only on the ground that the latter had become "too demanding"?

Why was the personality study on Ellsberg provided when It was obvious that this action transgressed the Agency's charter?

Obviously most questions which will be raised can only be answered by Helms and Cushman personally.hink the Da would be well advised toandid evaluation of these proceedings in his initial statement. To do so voluntarily would make more persuasive the assurances the Committee will want that nothing of the sort will be done under his direction of the Agency.

6*a

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

Recent press reports implicate CIA in certain illegal

allegedly committed in the United States. Without going

into the details of thesean assure yountend

to cooperate fully with the various law enforcement and Congressional

investigations of these matters.

CIA employees should understand my attitudeof thishall do everything in my power toactivities to those which fall within the strictest interpretation

of its legislative charter. ake this positionm determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

am taking several actions to Implement this objective:

I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might he construed by reasonable people to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.

I hereby order every person presently employed by CIA to report to me directly on any such activities of which he has knowledge. nvite ail ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information shall call my secretarynd say that he wishes to talk to me about "questionable CIAntend toighly respected person from outside the Government to review, investigate, and prepare reports for me on any apparent violations of the CIA legislative charter which are brought to his attention or may be uncovered on his own initiative. hall give this person complete and unrestricted access to all records and persons in the Agency.

4. To insure that Agency activities are proper in theereby promulgate the following standing ordor for all CIA employees: Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence immediately.

James Ft. Schlesinger Director

Retirement. Howard Hunt

Date of retirement: 0

System: CIA Retirement and Disability System

Grade and salary at time of retirement:

Creditable civilian service used in computing annuity:

8uneEconomic Cooperation Administration

98 to9 tate9 toIA

At0 per month

At present 1 per month (which includes cost-of-living

increases since date of retirement)

the time of retirement Mr. Hunt did not elect survivorshipmeant that upon his death, his wife would not draw a By letter1 he raised the question of changing

his election but was informed by tho General Counsel1 that this could not be done. By letter2 Mr. Hunt asked Mr. Houston to raise with the Director the possibility of being recalled to dutyhort period of time, after which he could retire again and elect survivorship benefits. By letter of2 Mr. Houston advised Mr. Hunt that to call hin back to duty solely for the purpose of permitting him to change survivorship benefits would be in violation of the spirit of the CIA Retirement Act.

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

'Attached in chronological order is that which MAG has produced and papers related to Management's reachereto on MAG's concern re domestic activities. It Is provided for your review and comment to Mr. Colby. This is our file copyould hope it could bo retrieved if required.

rOLP HERE TO^ieTUnM TO SENDER-

FROM: NAMI^jgtyfeii ,NO PHONC HO.

MC/Ben Evans UNCLASSIFIED | ] CONFIDE-

SECRET

DIARY NOTES

et with the outgoing and incoming MAG Cochairmen. Wcumber of topics but concentrated particularly on their two most recent memoranda concerning domestic activities. 1slight irritation with their second memorandum, whichhotgun approach to the problem, and asked them to bo specific if they have anything in mind.nderstand they have heard that weurveillance team to the Democratic National Convention.

that he made this statement because an Office

of Security employee reported in his presence that he personallyembeream which went to theI subsequently raised this with Howard Osborn, who after investigating reported back that the Secret Service asked us for two technicians during theNational Convention. These technicians were formally detailed to the Secret Service and went to Chicago, where they did RFunder the supervision of the Secret Service. The Secret Service apparently calls RF monitoring "audiond it seems that, during the discussion which took place at the Senior Seminar, those who heard this assumed that "surveillance" meant actual surveillance of the candidates, when actually the meeting rooms were being checked to ensure they had not been bugged. ave reported all this to the Director and shall discuss it with MAGave dinner with them onanuary.)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller

Domestic Activities

Memoranda on same subject dated1 and1

As requested, MAG met with the DDP onecember and discussed with him the referenced memoranda on CIA's covert domestic activities. Our exchange consisted primarily of the DDP responding to the MAG memoranda as they related to activities of the Clandestine Service alone. The DDP made

clear that he spoke only for his Service. Since MAG's initial concern over covert domestic activities extended to, while not being restricted to, the Clandestine Service, it recotnmends that the referenced memoranda be also brought to the attention of appropriate senior officials in other Agency components.

The Management Advisory Group

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEHT

DDP

ec 71

if.iic-eilv', loom numbi'. ond

boiling]

lo ihswho*

lift* miim|i> ollar]

Executive Director

BY HAND 1

COHriDEHTlAi flfc UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executivewith MAG Group

I met with the MAG group this morning for little over an hour,et forth aa candidly as possible thoseAnd counterespionage responsibilities of ours overseas which make it mandatory for us occasionally to take an interest in American citizens overseas. xplained the requirements placed on us by the Department of Justice for overseas checks, and also the fact that our normal overseas operations against Soviets and others some times produce leads to Americans in conspiratorial contact with our Communist targets.

I was asked about our having sent Agency representatives to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago8xplainedever hcaru ofhing and did not believe it.

I pointed out that, as they knew, the press had reported fully on the

Agency participation at the beginning of the sky marshalling program

ssumed they saw nothing wrong with this. They agreed. I

also pointed out that, at President Kennedy's funeral, with scores

of Important foreign personalities here, the Agency lent some assistance

to the Secret Service, and here again the group understood that this

egitimate function.

group made it clear that their concern waa overimage If the general public were aware that some ofwherever they took place, were targeted againstsaid that we did not target against Americans of any color inand that the Clandestine Service was color blind whento carrying out its overseas CI responsibilities and itto be so.

I agreed that the Director should be asked toittle more fully and clearly on whether we "target against American citizens" so that there is no ambiguity.

I told the group that we must expect all kinds ofaccusations in the press, such as the one in the2 issue of RAMPARTS magazine in which Bob KUey and Drex Godfrey, it is suggested, are still In the employ of CIA workingDV

plan to improve police organizations in this country. aid that this waa palpably false as anyone who knows Kiley and Godfrey would understand. The group mentioned Dick Ober's unit and said that thereot of scuttlebutt that the purpose of this unit was to keep book on Black Power adherents. enied this saying that our interest wasad explained it previously.

do not know whether thisair assumption, but

Dick Ober's machine program is not handled in the Clandestine Service and it is possible that someone is misreading and misinterpreting the intent of Ober's program from fragmentary bits and pieces that may be discernible from the handling of the machine program. o not state thisactave not examined it that closely.

told the groupad offered to enlighten itwhat we do so that they 'at least have the facta and II assume you would take it from here.

Thomas H. Karamessines Deputy Director for Plans

fJrv 7/

MEMORANDUM FOR: Tho Director

Executive Director-Comptroller

Domestic Activities

Memorandum, "CIA's Domestic Activities,"

MAG is seriously concerned about possiblewhich may arise as tho result of CIA's covert domestic activities. Public revelation that CIA has become Involved in collecting information. citizens would likely redound to tho Agency's discredit and jeopardize overall Agency programs.

MAG first expressed its concernabout CIA's covert domestic activitiesemo for the DCI, transmitted through .the Executive Director-Comptroller in the Spring

1 MAG's concern has increased recently because of such articles as Vic Marchettl's UPI Interview (Attachment B) and thectober New York Times article concerning rupture of FBI-CIA relations Both hint at extremely sensitive Agency involvement in domestic activities. Additionally, the DCI addresses to the American Societyewspaper Editors (Attachment D) and to the CIA Annual Awards ceremony (Attachment E) make rather categorical denials of Agency covert targeting. citizens. Agency employees aware of the various sensitive operations in question know that there is qualifying language explaining CIA Involvement. However, MAG believes that in the event of an expose, such esoteric qualifiers will be lost on the American public and that there is probably nothing tho Agency could say toegative reaction from Congress and. public. It is MAG's fear thategative reaction could seriously damage our Congressional relations, effect our work against priority foreign targets and have significant impact on tho viability of CIA.

are indications that the Agency, inCE/CI requirements, Is collecting information on selected

ScCfitT

D.S. citizen: both at hone and abroad. In operational areas which are highly sensitive and potentially explosiveomestic radical or racial groups) this Agency must carefully weigh the needs and pressures for collecting and maintaining this Information against the risk and impact of revelation should the operation become compromised or public knowledge. We therefore urge that all domestic collection and action programs be severely reviewed so that only those be continued which are of the highest priority and which absolutely cannot be undertaken by domestic agencies. CIA should not take on requirements .of this type by default.

4. Not all of the members of MAG are privy to CIA's direct or Indirect Involvement in domestic activities. Those who are aware probably know only parts of the wholo picture. But our Increasing concern and our Intense Interest in maximizing the Agency's ability to do its proper Job, impel us to bring our serious apprehensions to your attention.

THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

Br-"

Attachments B,nd E

ic Marchotti's UPI Interview,1 October

"Fearing today that the CIA nay already haveagainst the_enemy within1 the United States asconceiveis, dissident student groupsorganizatlonsTTP1

"Because the men of the Agency are superpatriots,it is only natural for thera to view violentdissidenceajor threat to the nation. Thereaction, he said, would be to launch ato infiltrate dissident groups.

That, said Harchetti, nay already have started to happen.

'I don't have very much to goo said. 'Justpieces that indicate. intelligence communitytargeting on groups in this country that they

know this was being discussed in tho halls of the CIA and that thcro weref people who felt this should be done.' "

ew York Times,ctober, "FBI-CIA Relations:"

"Information generally exchanged between the FBI andmight concorn such subjects as officers of theparty travelingnd Americansugar cane in

CI Address to the American Society of Newspaper

"Andmphasize at this point that the statute specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powors, or any domestic se.-urity functions. an assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security or our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and function; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."

CI Address to CIA Annual Awards Ceremony:

alk to the American Society oflast winter, as you know,id it for only Tha* was to try and put in theew ofthat we'vo all wanted to soo put in the publicsome time. And you can rely on those denials. and you can use that as any toxt that you may needthat we're not in the drug traffic, andnot trying to do espionage on American citizens in

at Advtoory Croup

s'03: Dig Director

Eia Executive Director

CIA Doaeatic Activities

i- " ' ;

. HAG Is concerned tlmt CIA cvold isvolrcnont in tin curroat expoco of the decaastio tntallic^nca activities of the Airy and other federal osenclC3. Via bollcca Chat there cro CIA activities sirriler to thosa co? uc2es ecratiny ulalch could causa great ceabarraaszent toncy uacausa they eppacr to crcced tio scopa of tho CIA charter. Except for tho Agacay'o statutory CL/CI respanatbilitica, KAC oypaaaa anyvhlch could ba aosatruod as tai-gatcd orpinot caywho enjoye tha protection c? tha US Ccnatituticnwhether or not he reoldostha united Statea. apt io thoao coses clearly related to national eccus-ity, so US ltlaon should bo thoIA cparatlcns. Uo rasltco thnt on occasion tha Agency vill goto lap icforze-lcn ctaut both cltiacn vho Is ensa^cu lu cctlvitioo tnlaicalnterests of tha XtattiSC Stctoa. Such lnforotlca OhCnldba turned over to thaclor; ol*for fur-thor action, even is St inaaao thai eaaatltao on oacontially horn-ortcntod cccrxy cay ta oalrJ to parrcraisttad cp-erottonal capacity evarjeas.

If we do not purauoay tho public and the Con.^re.is vill cona to have eravo doubts accut cur role Inaraly restrict car cblllty to pcr-fon. those teiUs proparly naais^ail to CIA.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy Director for Plans Deputy Director for Support

Deputy Director for Science and Technology Hoadj of Independent OiXicaa

(For Distribution to Office/Division Chief Level Only)

CIA Activities in tha United States

From time to time some of oar omployeon express concernious allegatioos or rumors of CJA activities in tha United States. The attached memorandum is designed to clarify this subject so thatcan authoritatively reply to any employees indicating such coacan. Ittatementthe facts of th* situation. If incidents or activities are reported which appear to conflict with this statement, they ahould beto appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if ua-authorized activities might have occurred).

3ecause of the possible sensitivity of this description of the Agency's methodology, this memorandum is not being given the usual broad circulation of the "FYT Allegations and Anaweri" series. Office and Division Chiefs are urged, however, to nsa it to inform Branch Chiefs so that its points can be readily available to supervisors to react toof employee concarn.

'HIofty,

Vf. E. Colby Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

ach

A/DCI (Thuermer) SAVA

USIB Secretary IG

A LLSGA TION:

ariety of ways it lias been alleged that CIA is working within tha United States, with particular attentiongroups.

FACTS:

1. f tha National Security Acttatos, "Tho Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In his speech to tho American Society of Newspaper Editors onho Director stated:

an assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protocting tho physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and oar classified information, we do not have my ouch powers and functions; wo have novar sought any; wo do not exercise any. In short, wo do not target on American citizens. "

In tho Director'3 "Stata of the Agency" aposch to employees ono said:

alk to tho American Society of Newspaper Editors Inst winter, as you know,id It for only ono purpoaa. That waa to try and put in thoow of these denials that we'va all wanted to see put in tho public record for somo time. And you can roly on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on American citisona in the United Statos, and we're not tapping telephone lines, and that we're notot of other things which we're accused of doing. Ono of tho things that tends to porpetuato some of those silly ideas are jokes that aro made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless giveamo which we don't deserve. on't say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some differenco, and this tends to spill ovar,ould liko to euggast that if you havo it in your hearts to do ao that you speak up when the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight. "

2. From time to time someave beta concerned thatactivities might conflict with thaaa statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do aot. For clarification, some activities which may bava been subject to miaunderstanding are listed as follows:

Contacts. The Domestic Contactdiscroot but overt relationships with Americancitixens, commercial, acadamlc and otherresident aliens for the purposes of collecting oa aforeign intalligenco information or soliciting theirin assisting the Agency to perform ito missionof tha individuals and organizations cooperating withare maintainedecessary practical element of

Investigations. Securityreon prospective employees, contractors, andon security problems which arise. These invaatigabionsa wide rango of investigative procedures, includinginquiries, checics with other Govemrr.aat agencies, reviewreports, and interviews with lormer employers and This is essential to assure that our personnelhigh degree of personal integrity, sense of responsibility,and to protect classified information and sensitivesources and methods. Tho resulting files are heldby the Office of Security and are not merged withfiles,

Resources. On soma occasions, foreigninterest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted toforeign operations.

CIA recruiterside varietywithin the United States, assisting individualaernployraant with CIA to leam more about it and to join it3force.

In the course of CIA bujiness andnumber of contracts for procurement, research, orariety. companies and individuala. Thia in.constitutes operations in. but rathar secures thoof theae groups ia carrying but tha CIA mission againsia.

i. Operations. 7 Katzenbach Committes rsport was approved by tho Director in7 and ia binding on any of oar relations with American organizations today. Ii specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to. educational or private voluntary or3anization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with nn Americanmust be and is within thaae guidelines.

or Loans. Oa rare occasions, details ofCIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIAhave been made available to. agencies atto assist them to carry out their responsibilities.is the akymarshal program, in which some CIAtemporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in aof that program. Such personnel and equipment areoperational control of the receiving agency. Assistance ofIn no way constitutes an assumption of responsibilityby CIA for the program,

and Drugs. To carry out itsfor counterintelligence, CIA is interested in thoforeign nationa or intelligence services aimsd at. extent that these activities lie outsidencludingaimed at.. citizens or others, theyCIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage ofwithin. lies with tha FBI, as an internal CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to theaspect of the problem, and any actionawor internal security nature lies with the FBI or local (CIA's assistance to. Government programand drugs is handled in tho same fashion.)

1. Operational Support. To support CIA operations,are made with. business or other entities to provide cover or othsr support for CIA parsonael or activities abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by CIA. Whila these may csisi within the U.heir purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad.

j- Defectors. As provided byoccasionally resettles in. dsfectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This resettlement mayew identity, relocation, employment, etc. Although this activity takas place in this country, its purpose is tha support of operations abroad.

PVh-wimud i

skchkt

ROUTING SUP

AND AOOftcSS

Co-Chairmen

i 4

KM.Y

SIONtlOlf

MAG review and return. Please do not reproduce.

POLO MXftC TO

Directoi

T CO.triUKftTlAL

cot i

for : Deputy DirectorlAfcolUfvaea

C*puty."orD>patyr Support

DtpOtV Dirscior for Science and Tacaaoiogy Gtneral Counsel Inspector General Aaslitant to chs Director

Allegationgency Involvement in.

The Managemeot Advisory Group, among others,reported on the concaroi of some employees teat the Agency isto the charge of having aa operational Interest. cltUens or organizations in violation of the National Security Act. Attached is myunderstanding of the tacts. If it is in error orsk that you let rao know orally or ia writing.

1 have drafted the attached with two purposes in mind: First,aals for some type of lssuanco that would advise, the cornrnand Una and seoior supervisors of policy andad, socond,uture issue of "FY1and Answers. " ook forward to youx commoni in tho not-too-distant futurs before it is formally distributed.

.xecutive Dirsctor-ComptroUer

^fee/gEvanSr

Distribution:

O-DDI

ach other-R

A*iv

a variety of ways it haa boon alleged that CIA ia working within the United States, with particular attantlon to extremist groupa. ecent axaraela waa in the Quick3Jlvsr Times of2 (attached)*.

FACTS:

1, f tha National Security Acttates, "Tha Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enlorcamsnt powers, or internal security functions. "

In hia speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors onhe Director stated:

an assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own per jonnel, our facilities, and our classified Information, wa do not have any auch powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target oa American citizens."

In tha Director's "State of tha Agency" Speech to employees one said:

alk to the American Society of Newspaper Editorsnter, as you know,id it for only one purpose. That waa to try and put in thaew of thaaa denials that we've all wanted to see put in the public record for soma time. And you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in tha drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on Americanin the Unitad States, and we're not tapping telephone linaa, ande're notot of other things which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of thaso

The two gantl=mjn ciced are former CIA employees.thajf nor tha organizations with which thay ara currently aaaoclatod have any operational connection with the Agency.

vUlyokes that tfrtiabouttham, particularly aho-.itespionage. Althoughjokes have bo basis la factoverthalcss giveame which wc con'; djserve. or.'c say lhat thai tnikes ill [hat much cifi'jrenca,oeu make some difference, and this tends to spill over,ould Uka to suggestou have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when tho occasion arises and try and so: the facts straight."

2. From time to time some employee! have been concernedy activities might conflict with the Rational Security Act and the Agency's statements. They can be assured that Agency activitiest. For clarification, some, activities which may have been subject toare listed as follows:

a) Security Investigations. S* cur icy investigations are conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants. Theyneighborhood checks on the background of these individuals. This is essential to meet the security requirements of the Agency. Tha resulting information ia held in separate security office files and not merged in other Agency iiies.

bj Domestic Contacts. Or. ar. overt basis the Domestic Contact Service makes visits to American private citizens, firms, and other organizations, soliciting transmission to the Governmentthey have learned abroad. The purpose and content of theare restricted to foreignntelligence on developments abroad. The records o; the firms and individuals as sources are maintainedurely practical element of thisprocess.

c) Foreign Resources. ariety of foreign citizens of interest to CIA visit or on occasion reside in America. Occasionally they are contacted and recruited for work abroad in the course of travels to their homeland or for continuing collaboration with the Agency in their homeland after their return from the U. S. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the collection of io reign Intelligence.

d* Recruitment. CIA recruitersiety ofwithin tha United States endeavoring to assist individualsir. employment with ClA to learn more about it and to join its employee force.

CorXracliait. la tha cou/.ia of CIA buataaij undumber oi contracts for procuramanl, research, or analyaiaieariety ol U.ompanies and individuala. tm3 ia no wa/ cor.atitutea operation* in. but rather secures theo: these groups in carrying out tha CIA mission ofc j.

Operations. 7 Kataaabach Committee report wa3 .ipoi-ovaa hy tha Director la7 and ia blading on any oi our relations with Araarlcan organisations today. It apeclficallyovert financial assistance or support, direct oro aa/ U.ducational or private voluntary organisation. Any relationship or operation tha Agency has with an American organisation must be and ia within these guidelines.

or Loana. Cn rare occasions, details ofCIA paraonnel or loana ol CIA equipment have been madeU.S. agencies to aaaist in tha carrying out of thair An example ia the skymarahal program to which someware detailed ia order to assistapid initiation'of Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes anof responsibility or authority by CIA for the program.

To carry out its responsibilitiesCIA ia interest sd in the activities of foreignor intelligence services aimed at. To the extentactivities lie outside the U.ncluding activities aimed. citizens or others, it falls within CIA'a Responsibility for coverage of the activities withinlies with the FBI, aa it involves an internal securityresponsibility and authority are limited to the foreignaspect of the problem and any actionaw enforcementsecurity nature liea with tha FBI or local police forces.

Aa provided by law, CIA occasionallytha U. S. defectors and other foreign individuala ofjit, Thia rejettlemeat may involve their assumption of alocation of employment, etc. Although thia activityin this country, its purpose ia tha support of operations abroad.

- 3 -

j) Cover. art ol CIA operations abroad, arraaj-irri'tnt.iir.A'Jiumber. aruulsj to serve aa tbe ostensible sponsor ofabroad. This caa include business entities eontroXUd by CIA, or proprietaries a. aila tasy may exist withinheir purposeo conduct or support operations abroad.

(

..1

i - .

CZ4 egcdquzrterv 7ixf-r'ia

yard

Iho. Central i't-tc'Ugcr.ccalwaya Infills Its mi) aren't in-.votvetl in conjitlc police work.tut in Chicago CIA agents have been working with tc-.ur. Hi in jo effort lo pis [he oast boraing* on raiical groves.

it, clandestinepoliceithin tha III was centered around counter eiploiugc efforts lined at thu

l.CIA. pjjnlalnt secret bases in allUSUh ha;ir.ps iah-zrc. - s reg-ulir rilltfj- 1- ta*

IAciTHTil,lisr* of the Chica-a

They net there withraii-'d, and taken to the1. That vas thetv- tfce aiency that th#

CIA had been -lw> the go ahead to cove Into dortistlc police opeietions.avor-rone denied tt. tha theory mi that the CIA was told to got th* radicnls,

Tvo recent personnelopecutetion. doof Dele'srt Hiliy. liley fcaadUdoperations Ehrosgh1acades.sthe Policee*kits umilliongran;'.ancyd to iv-srev* localsecond personnel* fcnid oiO-'ftC- oftrf. rjriinfi the - 1 t:;er nr'

crHTHtt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Asia Division

Central Cover Staff

European Division Soviet Bloc Division NARCOG

Agents in Leftist Milieu -Cleared with FBI

Statistics on Alias Documentation and Other Cover Support

Research on Vesco Case

Relations with FBI and Local Police

Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Including Information on American Citizens

Foreign Intelligence

Staff

Counterintelligence Staff

Telephone Links

Security and Exchange Commission and Vesco Case

Agency Funds Made Available to FBI

Vesco Case < Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

.MHCHAOS

Group

Foreign Resources Division

Police Academy

Locations, Recruitments, Use Aliai Documents

'O ion

" I 'iniLi

OFFICIAL ROITINC SLIP

ANO"I

Mr. William E. Colby

BY HAND

PKPIT

tint

Remark*:

FOLCI tO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME.NO.

Elde

ran.

riiVsV'

1 June3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr-ctivities

Following our recent conversation,ave searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files tor examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge andpecial kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter.

First, as we discussed,CI McCone, under pressure from Attorney Ceneral Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identiiy their sources for classified information which wasin their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally,id. nderstand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

yi i: lift L I

4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, thereelieve, three examples oi such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.

r -

One involved chemical warfare operations agamst|_

A second involved

tates Government,as briefed on such planning. hird, which

ew significance today,roposal by Angleton and Helmsreatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning alsocheme for selected

exposure oi KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to briei the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This ledeated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCbne's office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, butof this operation had to be rather widespread.

(in connection

with elections Invi May lye*eeting ofommittee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it beingecure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings,n not surprised that HcConc has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected tho Agency, and particularly Cord Meyer,

into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate tho quarrel between George Heany and Walter Reuther. Cord Meyerery skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes .

are three examples oinow to be controversial. One wasof aoney under Project MOSES inrelease of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Detailsoperation are best known to Larry Houston,George MacManus, and James Smith. you well know, when Lou Conein received hisreport to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on

1arge amount of cash wont with him. My Impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to Improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the Whi te House.

raise these issues of funding because Ihe Agency's everely b) Appropriations Subcommittee for having spentstamps in connectionrogram to buysecure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business,now that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,

his inner office, his dining room, his office in East

Building, and his study at his residence on Shite Haven

Street. o not know who would be willing to raise such

an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to

spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.

11. Also under the heading of old business

| Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, thoreisposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

During my stint on the 7th floor therepecial arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center andopyolegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secrotary Goorgc Ball, Eyes Only. He returnod to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it In his possession before Ball did. Ben Road in the Secretary of State's officepent several weeks putting this one to rest.

Finally, DCI McCone, as youell know, operatedery lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July4 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gaveiftuncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book. The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did notomma,oubt that this old saw wiilever sing again.

17. The abovo listing is uneven,inking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would over set the record straight.ay be of any assistance in tracking down furtherm of course at your disposal,ould point

outas very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or.

WAI.TEK KI.UKR

Mr. Lyman

In2lrkpetrdck that he had, at one

time, been directed by Mr.to assume responsibilityroject involving theof Patrice Lumumba, then Premier, Republic ofwas to have been tha vehicle es ho

made reference to having been instructed to see -pr. Sidneyn order procure the appropriate vehicle.

EALTttCRE IV-XS AFRICAN

PR TO

The CIA and AllendSe

jonx v. ttocue

current fmbroftio over Ihe io!eCentral lntell;fenec AgencyiheTelephone and TeVgraph(or considered pUjmji inihe,f CvWu Presidenthas ill lartakn.'g jnd pcrpieirg -

bend 1TJ TtNnk Ihey could pull off some ol the slums conttmplited nthout ihej. out and working massively ia favor of Alitnde' Bul underlyingbrawlm of tery difliculi question .

ol principle.y nothing of.

t all. whit constitutespublic or prlynir) Iniervenilon in the.inter- -nar affairsnother state?evolution (oi Teddy Roosevelt did lo break Panama low from Colombia)'. ii meui bviKvenipwiOf ing revo- -'utions ond tvolly eliminating any ArKeri- -can activity outside of the Waited Suits,ine on ikea line 'that gen fuzzierne further you

.aa be coc-stroed as ieieneman - .pt'i'. Nasser -brought thai knVMV* Dulles*inal io help froa-xt <ie Avaun Dam was a* lorm ol intervention, and Kanew confeeproducing nuioni in Latinprotested io ihe Orcjniratton ofan Siates thai our refusal to rig coffee prices intervened in their infernal aifatrs.

1 would argue that the very existence of the United States at Ihe moste world automaiicully in-crvtnei in the affairs of eery othernd ihe coffee pioducersright: fraction un part can have as eeai a" impact as ae-Uoc To take ainstance,ad rax shipped militarytmPeiri Haibor, ihetoecenJd have been lost.

i II vc accept thai proposition, ihe futile argument over Hhetherhould iMcrvtnc autcmaticatlv too by the Maids. Then.turn lo the hard one. Toends should we (Dublidy and privately) .ntrrvene?

* Shouio we protec! democratic (or ocanations from ioi>liiarianor subversion? Shouldat.

oesotnessts is prw. ia ihc ruser

' iheid billor ahbiild .wsttrictly hands-offroach?

, ll as it Ihis poini thai Iheracas comes backn. and asl sMmbles accun. tet us suppose tx auut ibefhi-rxci bj ihe World Ccwsnl ol Churches and black militants.oonduit io black liberation movements in South.uslni" iii.business connect-ons io provids arms and other aid to iheWnu'd ibis teaai-e CIA.wsivst cos'er, shioped iflto $ai-io osrr.ifto iho

w-ar^fJT*ji^fdhe trultl OiCiaiOf

itHo? ti don'l know how nt leels aftnut il jjr IT'norhirilc'an 'mjjxsjljii

fj> thought lhat interventijn was,ibina; uxe the discovery ot Air tnca.l

Whatomes donn ioIIvtnea-lion is ayou happen to favor ihe cause fnvoltcd, but isand immoral, if you disapprove.of iheperfecily human morose, but hardly one cn WMch sound pubuc poltcv can be foimuiat-edThefniag us CMItM assets does nottears io my ryes or lead me to wish mr sullupph"nf run* boaii in stock. Capitalism, Tm told,taVniR risks, andi 'ir.vtation may In Ihe end be reimbursedticy set up ia piov:de ia*urarce tor such

No. *hat to*hers nr is thead hnc reaction of the Si-iute cummlitret* ing thee'MiHild be far brtiir served by Sen. Church ami his colfcasuei ir they spent les* time bjing outrascdi tierying to lormuiaie goteral fUKkl.nes.outh America and Soath Afncs.e ;uM and the unjust ahkc, hweter defdied.

UNCLASSIFIED k rjlft

TIAL

SECRET

AND RECORD SHEET

v.-u.

1tVovtV

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Robert L. Vesco

OnHDJwas contacted by Mr. Jorden, Latin American roferent at" the N'SC. by telephone In order to determine if jiKHERALD1 had any information on Vesco. Mr. Jorden was advisedheck would beile review un

ollowing:

>alled Mr.

. . Vesco was known to us as head of IOS. had re-

iTad^ tC0S'l?ICa 8ndesire to settleadd.tjon.^was known that Vescotf

to the attention of

b)Pyalso advised Mr Jordan that vP?C0 Md

N.J. [Subsequently, NSC was making inquiries juuut vesco.

advised that the

CHAMBER-trAIN*

CfttAHTT

RETURN

VrcwV^ 3

DA J'E

^-1 'o_ &^

FOR

of Central Into!licence

General

and Control of Disguise end Alifs Documents

Action RgQueated:

attached report resulted froo our generalWatergate-related issues and contains recocEBCndotions9 for your approval.

Background:

the course of collecting information on variousof the Agency with flap potential, weumberon issuance and use of disguise and aliasExecutive Secretary, CIA Managei-tent Conaittee noted on thethe summary submitted hy the Office of Technical Servicesmaterials issued hy it that it would be interesting to checkof other components to see if they matched with OTS In fact, OTS is not the only coaponent to issueand the review was broadened to include thecomponents and their procedures for controlling The attached report summarizes the findings.

Ltonaid F. Chamberlain Inspector General

Attachment As Stated Above

AND CONTROL OF DISGUISE AMD ALIAS DOCUIEiiTS

ral

policy, responsibilities, fcnd proceduresdocuiic-otation issued toalse ide^Utythe Directorate of Operations are set forth in CSI (nowdated Thisevision of

atedepresents extensive upgrading in the definition of respcnsibilities and in establishing procedures ensuring that each request has the apj-rovalefignaled senior official in the component. The current instruction, furtherraore, requires that each request be routed through Cover and Coi.isercial Staff, Official Cover Branch (CCS/OCB) for concurrence, which, in effect, makes CCS/OCB the one component retaining complete records and details of every request. There are no other regulations applying to this subject, but it currently is observed by all com pi rents.

Issuing Responsibilities ana Procedures

major components are responsible for issu5ngand/or disguise. The specific responsibilities ure:

this office issues non-oac?.stopped doc'iunentswhich are used exclusively for flash Birth certificates inonsidered tospecial document andniquely prescribedand control. This Branchesponds to-

issues' Oliver's iicenses which are luiiy cacK5toppe< as fully backstopped investigative credentials

3- All requests to any of the above three eorpoiients Tor alias documentation or disguise roust be by mctoorand'Jia iJid must te signed by one of tvo authorized officers designatede requt*st-ing component- Tbe instruction requires that this approvalbe confined to the chief of the division or staff, orenior operations officer specifically designated liy the division or staff chief to exercise this function. Tne request is routed throughB for concurrence at which time the requesting signature is verified as being on the approved listf the documents requested are recorded in the OCB file. Ail requests for documents to be used in COKUS &re then routed to Office of Security, Operational Support Division, Special Activities Branch for approval and then are forwarded to thehich Is to is^ue the docu-ijents. 7ssuing components arc required to iiaintain controls on accountability and establish conditions for use ofat they issue. OTS isew computerized system which is scheduled to become operational in Every six months each component will beomplete listing of all documentation and disguises issued to them and they will be required to either Justify the continued retention of the documents or return

CoiBprncnt Controls

It. There is no established procedure prescribing hew each component is to control the documents issued to it. Thedo require, however, that the documents willidled as controlled documents from the time of issue until their ultimate disposition. The general practice is toecord of all documents received within the component, but to issue the documents to the appropriate officers who assume responsibility for handling them properly. There is no evidence of periodic spot chocking. At least one area division of the Directorate of Operationsrocedure which requires that the documents be retained in the front office until needed for an operation, being returned afxer the operation is completed. On the surface this may appear totrict control, but in actuality the documents are retniiied in individual packages for each senior officer, and arc never inspected before they are issued nor after they are returned; in effect, no record accountability by the officer is required.

Ultimate Dociment Retrieval

5. Every employee using alias documents is now required to process through CCS as part of his exit-out process for either resignation or retirement. It is at this tine that he is given ist of all alias documentation issued to him and is requested to return all such documents. If there ore any of these documents

vbich he is unable lo produce, the caployce matlerted written statement describing, to the best of his ability, theunder vhich the document or documents vcrc either lost or destroyed. The controls tliat now exist were not in opt ration Vhaa Kevard Hunt was an employee, which cayw ba was e'^Je to retain documents issued Id- "or do thcaa controls apply effectively to non-employees over whoaer.cy hu no control. Host disguise notarialother them documentsicgnrdcd ts perishable and non-sensitive and OTS is >iot too concerned if disguise nat-erial la not returned.

new computerizeds being readied calledBadge and Credential System). Initially this systeaall of tho issuances of the badge office, CCS,and the motor pool. The system wilt provide ato these four components of all credentials issuedbe used to roqueat outstanding credentials at tho tine ollow-up the systea willeeklystatus of all employees who haveut for whr-mshews outstanding credentials.

Conclusions

tha Issuance of DOI 2fc0-'i thereeen ainprovement in the controls exercised over alias By requiring that every request be routederyle of all aliaa documentsbeen compiled. The probability is slight that an Agencyresign or retire without having been queried about ulldocuments which had been issued to him. This procedure,observed in the Agency, has no standingeneraland exists only as an administrative instruction in one

of the Agency's directorates.

OTS coaputerlzed system, when oparatlooal, shouldreduce the nurber of outstanding dDCunents since asix Booths will be required for their retention. Thewill not only aike the CCS/OCB control even toremechanizing the up-to-date listing but in the rarean officer might depart without turning In hiowill provide this data weekly to allowollow-up.

j-ieTi'j^Uoqs:

an Agency Headquarte-sissued forcalizing the requirenx-nt forAgency control over Issuance,frJid recovery of alias documentation.

each component design'ite ancontrol officer who woulddocuments, issuing then only forandolicy ofend return of documents upon theof the operation.

.-J' UNCLASSIFIED COKF. SECtCT

ROUTING ArW^felroKD SHEET'

subject:

ACTVITIES OF'itLTERESTJTO^

FROM:

(OfTiiai dftignolio*. loom numfcw. ard

tOtwitolO

.oth toM.

n CHOW O OCIOM .ul.iT.r. jl.i

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL Jg^g UNCLASSIFIED

FOR: SUBJECT:

Chief,

of Possible Interest to the

1. ew years agowas asked to

est program and feasibility study being

When this

jeer concluded, thewas given permission

RD toand TV image transmission system for further experimentation.(

who crris TV data link

Branch. He stated that.

2. In early2 had been the Projectva-iurfting system, phoned the[

Secret Serviceequirement for this TV camera and data

sked that we make the

link system. It was our understanding that the amera would be carriedelicopter and would be used for crowdduring the Democratic and Republican Conventions

at Miami Beach, Florida. Mr

equipment available for the period desired by theand indicated that the equipment would be returnedwhen no longer needed. Onr. Michaelaccompanied bypick up tne

equipment. Mr. Casey of' tne oecrit Service was not Bade witting of the fact that | frs an Agency facility. |

3. Onohe equipment,esultphone call fromwas picked up at Secret Service

Headquartersfew of the system's

compone were th missing

equipme off its

worn wa into th

were missing when it was returned. Theseandle, tripod and electrical adapter. Later the components were returned to us by the Secret Service.

A few months ago, Mr

iRt

called me about this nt and said thatwould line1 to get the equipment books since none of it would be needed in the future He offered to transfer the equipment at no cost to Branch. hort time later the necessary paper ormed to reflect the receipt of this equipment Branch inventory.

Special

IbTan-Cn Division

SUBJECT:

a Headquarters initiated program

which has as its fundamental objective the long termof selected agent assets operating against EA Division difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets toractical knowledge of the leftwing, radical, communist world. Thereossibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is kept informedegular basis.

Subject: Cover Support Bill:

1. In addition to the matters listed in tho CCS memorandum on CCS Cover Support Within the United States the following bigoted cases should be noted:

nave no indications that either of these cases might create

problems.old youon't foal the same waythe cover situation of the personnel in

'Si

JIB:..

MWoaANfjJM FOR: DeputyRis

CooajT I

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Hm%W

I*. * Do-* ah* m*

' 1

aCONHMHTInt Sohu ukclassif

7 May

(Revised)

SUBJECT

Deputy Director for Operations . CCS Cover Support Provided Within ' the United States

Used in_Cp_nj

junction wi/thDocu^ta-

1. Support to BNDD Activities,

2.Tho following general Information pertains to domestic cover support activities outside the purviow of CCS:

73 (Revised)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

CCS Cover Support Provided Within

the United States

1. The following specific information regardingcover support provided by Central Cover Staff la submitted in response to your requesti

a> Aliases Used in Conjunction with

NOTE: The above figures are based on the CCSsystem initiated in

2. The following general information pertains to domestic cover support activities outside the purview of CCS:

a. . drivers licenses

CIA credentials

Chief, Central Cover Staff

Kg**.

CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTnUCTION

CSI

TECHNICAL SUPPORT0

U. S. DOCUMENTATION IN CLANDESTINE SERVICES OPERATIONS"

o o

CSI

SERVICES DESTRUCTION

TECHNICAL SUPPORT9

Released by: Richard Helms Chief of Operations

RICHARD H. DISS ELL, JR. Deputy Director (Plan.)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

CCS Cover Support Provided Within

tho United Statos

1. The following specific information regardingcover support provided by Central Cover Staff Is submitted in response to your request:

a. Aliases Used in Conjunction with

"SE6REIiJ

SKfiET,

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Research Project on Robert L. Vesco

In2 Office of Economic Research asked

etingumber of OER officers.

During the meeting,that the

Director of Central Intelligence had levied aon Dr. Edward Proctor, the Deputy Directortoaper on internationalL. Vesco. Since the Director hadcontributions from the field

our Division to help in procuring them.

thereupon cabled various questions suggested by

0ER ind asked for replies by

ctuoar. answers Wire turned over to OER in

memorandumhe caserief reference in one of the field messages to an earlier high-level American intercession on behalf of Mr. Vesco, we asked Mr. Helms through his secretary whether this was relevant, information. The response, again._received through the secretary, was that it was not relevant.

after our memoranda had been submitted,

the Director wanted

everyone to forget the Vesco project. This was communicated to all DDP Headquarters personnel who hadand in the project or had been made aware of it.

We never had any indication as to the reason for or the purpose of the project.

We understand that OER has recentlyemorandum on this matter for the DCI.

Archibald B. Roosevelt Chief, European Division

'DC"

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

for Possible Uso in Briefing

the DCI

i. mis pieuiui iiiiuuin is suuimiicu til

identify to you for possible briefing of Director activities which in certainonstrued as delicate or inappropriate.

3. Marshal'

2. At the request of the Director of Security,

jcivilc tur use. Attorney who reportedly was assassination by organized criminal

telv2 to mid-January Iwas made available to the

by an Assistant under threat of elements.

residence

S. Since2 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to theirresponsibilities.

7 W' if?3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

Narcotics Activities Having

Domestic Implications

This memorandum is in response to your requesteview of activities and relationships that might have domestic implications.

We occasionally report on the activities of American citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. This information is normally disseminated. law enforcement agencies and other recipients of our reports. We also occasionally. law enforcement agencies for name traces. citizens who are known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking abroad.

7 MAV

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

Narcotics Activities Having

Domestic Implications

This memorandum is in response to your requesteview of activities and relationships that might have domestic implications.

We occasionally report on the activities of American citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. This information is normally disseninated. law enforcement agencies and other recipients of our reports. We also occasionally. law enforcement agencies for name traces. citizens who are known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking abroad.

officials working abroad on foreign narcotics The present method of handling such requests is for us to request the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations prior to asking the Technical Services Division to conply. Ke insist on knowing the true identity of tho persons to use such documentation and limit them to staff officers of. law enforcement agencies. We also require that we know the purpose and intended use of the documents. Finally, we require receipts from the headquarters of the agency involved and the individual, and also require these documents to be returned to us for destruction after they havetheir use. We have turned down requests from BNDD for alias documentation for domestic use. There are some indications in the files that there have been requests from BNDD for domestic documentation inwith their domestic investigations. These predate NARCOG, and we are unable to determine how these requests were handled.

6. We periodically receive requests for technical assistance in the form of photographic and audio devices or guidance for use of such items. law enforcement agencies in connection with their foreign investigations of illicit narcotics activities. We require these agencies to adhere to the same procedures we require in our own operations. From timo-to-tirae we have honored these requests and have provided sterile equipment when the requests have been properly presented and approved. Our records show evidence that several such requests were made prior to the existence of NARCOG in connection with narcotics law enforcement investigations in nited States. We are unable to dctermino whether the requests were fulfilled.

Chief, DDO/NARCOG

OOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

fftr-

REGISTRY

NUMBER: _

OF DOCUMENT:NUMBCR

NUMBER OFOCUMENT Ml NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS:

OFFICE

NAME

Genera]

C3oncunencn

Information Direct Reply

Preparation ol Reply

Signatun!

Return Oiipatch

REMARKS

CCH^riDENTrAL SECRET TOP SECRET

[YES DriLY

DOCUMENT

registry

NUMBER:

OF DOCUMENT: COPY NUMBERUMBER Of PAGES:

G&CUVEUNO:

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OF ATTACHMENTS

Chief,ed

OFFICE

ciioo

Comment Concurrence!r mi lion LZI Direct Reply

Preparation ol Reply 1 ecommendation

] Signal unRiiurn

SECRET TOP SECRET

FOR

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

Director for Operations Chief, Division D

Potentially Embarrassing Activities Conducted by Division D

Your staff3

1. There is one instance of an activity by Divisionwhich you are already familiar, which the Agencyhas ruled to be barred to this Agency by statute: international commercial

radio telephoneseveral Latin American cities and New York, aimed at the interception of drug-related communications. The background on this is briefly as follows:

JThcrctore on

beptemberSA asked it"ould take over the coverage, and on2 we agreed to do so_. Oneam of intercept operators from the^

began the coverage experimentally;

mite to say that the test results were good, and that it was hoped this coverage could continue.

uestion had arisen withins to the legality of thisuery was addressed to the General Counsel on this scoreereto). With the receipt of his replyhe intercept activity was immediately terminated. There hasubsequent series of exchanges betweennd the General Counsel as to the legality of radio intercepts made outsideut with one terminal being innd the General Counsel

has ruled that such intercept is also in violation of CIA's statutory responsibilities.

2. We are carrying out at present one intercept activity which falls within this technicalf having one terminal in. f

r.ne

JinK oeing monitoren tarries.

a large number of totally unrelated conversations, thedo intercept other traffic, frequently. citizens--for example, BNDD staffers talking to theirave described this situation to the General Counsel, and his informal judgment was that, as long as the primaryof the coverageoreign target, this is acceptable. He suggests, however, that it might be desirable to inform the Attorney General of the occasional incidental intercept of the conversations. citizens, and thus legalize this activity. We will pursue this with Mr. Houston.

went contact was made of the Miami Beach Police four different hotels, one

4. An incident which was entirely innocent but issubject to misinterpretation has to do with antest run byin Miami in At that time we were working jointly to developagent DF equipment for useoviet agentVietnam. field test was agreed upon, ine Miami area was cnosen,team consisting of Division D, Commo,

to Miami during the second week of August"etective Sergeant Department, and tests were maae irom

a block away from the Miami Beach Auditorium and Convention Hall, esk clerk in this hotel volunteered the comment that the team was part of the official security checking process of all hotels prior to the convention. (The Secret Service had already been checking for possible sniper sites.) As the team's report notes, "The cover for the use of the hotelatural."

5. Another subject worthy of mention is the following:

panics

Febru

v.b. teiec

OTTinumcanons com-

copies ol the telephone callUhina calls. These were then obtainedby Domestic Contact Service in Now York, pouched to DCS KashingtOBj and turnedor passage to FE/China Operations. The DDP was apprised of this activity bynnd on2old DCS to forward the call slips to CI Staff, Mr. Richard Ober. Soon thereafter, the source of these slips dried up, and they have ceased to come to Mr. Ober. In an advisory opinion, the Office of General Counsel stated Jts belief that the collection of these slips did not violate theAct, inasmuch as theyartormalfunction of the telephone company, which does not in any way involve eavesdropping.

Atts:

A. DivD memo to OGf:an 73

B. OLC memo to DivDan 73

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

Intercept of Conounicatlons in the U. S.

trgquency, international rauiuHew York and being

>uth Araerlia ui to N'ew York

is intercepting at our coanunicatlons sitefrequency, international radio tele-

phone calls on broadcast to Sou

froa South Aaerica. Soae calls arc relay calls through New York but not originating or terminating there. ine colls involve both U. S. citizens and foreign nationals.

teara screens tne tciepnone cans ntar erug-relatcd natters. SA receives the traffic fron CIA[in the fora of nagnetic tape.

ould appreciate your very early views as to where this intercept activity falls with respect to V. S. law. Even if it is legal or we can secure the necessaryit seems to rae there is extra flap potential associated with reports going into the 3NDD nechaniss, particularly since they -my well becflse the basis for executive action.

ISUnedl

Acting duet.

ddressee

MEMORANDUM FOR: Actingivision D

of Communications in the U. S.

Janemo for GC fr AC/DMflion D,

Same Subjecf

I. In referent you request our views as to the legal aspectsadio telephone intercept activity carried on at our communications site

2. The baste law is contained inf the Communications Act., which prohibits interception of any radio communication without theof the sender and also prohibits divulging the substance thereof to any person. f Title IS. U.akes the interception of any wire or oralrime punishabler five years' imprisonment, or both. There are two exceptions to these prohibitions:

first provides for applicationDepartment of Justiceederal court fororder authorizing such interception forin cormecrlon with law-enforcementthis Agency is prohibited by statute fromor law-enforcement activities, obviouslyoperate under this exception.

other exception ig contained in- S-t. Thisthe prohibition cited above on interception shall not

limit Lhc constitutional po^ver of th* President to take suche deems necessary Lo protectAttack, to obtain foreign intelligence information itemed essential to the security of the United State* or to protect such information, and to prelect the United States against overthrow by force or other unlawful ms^ns or againstther clear and present danger to thebr existence of the Government. *

The type of information you describe in your memorandum does not appear to fall within any of Jhese categories and sinceultimate destination is BNDD, it appears to he collection fornforcement purposes, which as noted above is barred to this Agency by statute.

For your information, in most erases where there is a

criminal prosecution for violation of the narcotics laws, the Depart*

menl of Justice queries us as to whether we havo engaged in any

would

dxx uruMumiy cuecution

interception in connection with the defendants. ase should

involve the Interception being made be deemed to be unauthorized and in would have to be dropped by the Government, It is our view,that such interception should be carried on by appropriate law-enforcement agencies in accordance with the authority off. C.

Distribution:ddresseeeneral Counsel

LAWRENCE B. HOUSTON General Counsel

MEWDRAHDUH FOR; Deputy Director forfor the List of Delicate Hatters

The Securities and Exchange Coramfssion has asked CIA toon any foreign connections with organized crime inStates. The record indicates that Mr. David Young, ofHouse Staff, asked Mr. Colby to setontact forC. Barreaux, of SEC. Mr. Barreaux discussed the matter withV. Walsh, of DDI, andarreaux andcameeeting at CIA with Mr. Lawrence HoustonFI Staff, DDO).

Since that meeting, we have received no specific requirements fron Mr. Barreaux, but have provided hia with one pieceanking transactionobert Vesco.

Unlet

Foreign Intelligence Staff

UNCLASSIFIED | ONKIDENTI | SECKt_

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

NAMEOtlRESS

General

RtPLT

REUT

TO SENDER

MO.

MC/1

sioiaai idiliMi

Prior to ny seaigrrant to fcSaaato tho CI Su.'I Tor approxinotelyonths. as via th*as lad to believe trat on*ron iht ground Jwea involved in

operations. elieve their target (i) were ainorlty groupThe rjiimfwty Chief of the Group At MatWt Kc> Obor ond respectively. One of their Case Officers,

spont over SOS of his time TOY within tho United States. It van reystay reported only to th* Whit* House and to lack Belns. Other ngnber* of tho Staff, including nyself, had United access to Uie

le;

Loreif i

area, onlyeassary and aseortod at all tinea. Perhaps you voro or are now aware of what tho operations aro. ould bo ranis* in not responding to the book cable And perhapo tholr operations night hove boon outside the legislative charter.

also, during ny Mar with tho CIocldontly.learned thoy launched ecneone Into Vletnaa while you and

the Case Officer waa

nonLion the latlor only

of the following! When thoy laarnoda oeing reassigned fron Saigon to Chief, Operatlora, ft, they also learnedriend

not to discuss any of tholr operotlcnj with.

iy.

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

BKHSULD

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

and AOORU1

General

CUD*

urn

Mr. Broe:

Dick Ober has been advised that this package ia being sent to you. Since knowledge of the existence of this Committee has been strictly limited. I've asked that il be delivered to you unopened. Although it has an ER number on it. it has not been sent through that officeave them only the day, subject, and originator.

note on the

omnittee per your request

of this morning.

2. Copies of memoranda con cerning Agency support to Secret Servicepril and.

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

Formed December0 tonational domestic intelligencestudies on demonstrations, subversion,terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation; DepartmentSecret Service; National Security Agency;Agency; and as necessary representativesDepartments or Agencies (following have Treasury and State). Staff: IES,John Dougherty and later Bernard WellsDepartment of Justice with title of Special Assistant

to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistantfor Internal Security Robert Mardian andOlson. IES has received requirementsand delivered reports directly to John Pean nfHouse. The White House'Kas> insisted thatof this Committee be kept secret. its existence within this Agency has been limited-

CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agencyon the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is thefchicf, Counter Intelligence Staffj_.}

Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, This study was initiated 'in1 by the White Mouse as aof the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and C. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partlci-

pation was editori^^efeview.

Republican National4: At the request of the Whiteeries of estimates was prepared by the ?HS on "Potential Dis-ruptions at2 Republican National Convention, jTZ Miami Beach, Florida." Tlie Agency provided from February through2 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support forplanned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

Democratic National3: At the request of the Whiteeries of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potentialat2 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided be-tween March and2 contributions on foreign support forplanned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments:

EB WZ

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San

Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina,2 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully toall for international demonstrations to take place at the time .of the Republican National Convention. epresentative of the San Diego Convention Coalitionne of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World Assembly topecific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention

in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initialthat the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.

ritish subject, hassupport to Projecthich in turntravel expenses to the World Assembly of aof leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS*is tentatively planning to assist indisruptive actions at the San Diego"YES" is an adjunct to anotherupport edthe Election Year Strategy Information Centerwhich Rennie DAVISey leader, which was set upNew Left protest activities at theConvention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' the World Assembly met at least once with officialsRevolutionary Government of Southis not known if the Republican National Convention

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republican convention. orking draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the usepecial television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

Foreign Support for Activities Planned toHarass the Republican National Convention

SOMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts

to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republicanin San The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indocrrina, held in Versailleshere was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls forsupport to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations,pril tond concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic -Party.Convention at Miami on Julynd the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on"

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the *e'a"ce and Independence of the Indochinese People" ofrafted by the "Political Commission" states:

the United States particularly,he war is voiced more and more strongly, und forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, re

"SXfations which now affect even the soldiers, calls for support to these progressive and an

_the United States, and asks theo deserters and to support their right to re All together, the peoples of the worldo impose on. Government the restorat and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos

against er various sistance, demon-

The Assembly tiwar forcesrant asylum patriation. fficiently help ion ofnd Cambodia."

aiLJEXT GOVY DO not flH

DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalitionne of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican is planning, in addition to demonstrations,large exposition in the campsights (sic) calledhich with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Exposere believed to include (a) the usepecial television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympatheticelsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank NIXON domestically andnternational opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

summary:

There is little now evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, The Studentsemocratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, hasroposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in ain Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalitionnother domestic group targetting on the Convention, hasetter.of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as anof North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the

Convention of live telephone calls from tho Vietnamese in Paris.

developments:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, heldarchprilhe Studentsemocratic Society (SDS)roposal to hold demonstrations at the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National Convention. The proposal all for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occuriesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the formetter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People uasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is datedreat delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militantand friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and "send us malorials you have."

Foreign Support for Actlvttlea Planned to Disruptthe Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support. Influence, or exploit actions designed

to disrupt or harass the Republican Rational ConventionH

The British-based Interna-ment and Peace (ICDP) has

cioridi LonieaeraTit

Spring Offensive Calendar- of activities .United States against the war basedubmission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justicehe calendar Includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

The International Confederation for Disarmament and

ritish-based antiwar organization and one of the

more prominent member organizations of the StockholmhasSpring Offensive Calendar"ssue of its regular internationalVietnam International. The calendar had beenthe People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ)the following entry:

rULLASF

Republican Convention, San Diego.

Demonstrations organised by the San Diego Convention Coalition, San Diego,.

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations In support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts inspire, support, influence, or exploit actionsdisrupt or harass the Republican Nationals anember of the North Vietnamese DelegationParis Peace Talks in the plans of the majorin the United States for demonstrationswith the political conventions/fcf both

DEVELOPMENTS:

Inember- of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace -Talksisitor to contact him again when the visitor^returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalitionnd asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans forduring the coming summer. Tho North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take"of.activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami,

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed toor harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,onsist of the following: eader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied militaryabroad during the period immediately b'efore and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference'on Vietnam will

in activities in connection with the Convention.

*The Antx-War Unionomestic organization which has been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican Nationalelegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democraticof Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionaryof South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republicanonvention have been discussed at these meetings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an early2 meeting with prominent members of ^foreign antiwarepresentative of the People's "Coalition for Peace and Justiceho occupies antant position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that duringPeoples Campaign Against Bombing" would be waged. cities involved in theand shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJfurther stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by theParty National Convention Coalition" to occur on In an apparent reference to theugust actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. (Comment: He have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activitieswith the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Unionomestic group engaged counter-activities at the Republican Nationalhas sponsored the travelelegation ofParis, France, to meet with officials of theof North Vietnam (DRV) and the ProvisionalGovernment of South Vietnam (PRG). An advancealready met with DRV and PRG representatives toagenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. information is presently available indicating thatthe Republican Convention have been discussed or areto be discussed at meetings between the AWUthe DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of theparty have asked for advice from the PRGthe stance the AWU should take on certainto the presidential elections. It is alsothe DRV officials have questioned the AWU advancethe political mood in the United States. One ofdelegation members has stated that upon their returnUnited Statesome of thespeak at rallies, over the radio, and on

to "educate the American people about the consequences

voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to"

or Harass the Republican National

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to Inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,lthough meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnamurrently available information indicates that the

. DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by^Jsoth the DRV and the PRG officials;

. at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. econd group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or2 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

'..

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Unionepresentatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect toactivities at the Republican National Convention. Although therepeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to theConvention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the RepublicanIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, .refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate thatwill number0 at the Convention.

Following their meeting on2 with tlie AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there Is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris2 for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon- his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's chief target would be the Republican Convention.

CdUryj-l

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to Inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republicaniami,

CW/

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new' indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take cdvantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party- in Miami,

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference is'sued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

At-the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in Versailles here was mention of. American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference's "Action Commission"an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions .in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations,pril tond concludes with the state-ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democraticonvention at Miami on Julynd the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on"

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" ofrafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly-calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world willhelp to impose on.Blent the';Testoration of peace, independence and freedom inaos and Cambodia."

...

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt r Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

indications ofupport, influence, or exploit ac or harass the Democratic Nationalre limitedeite Secretariat of the Stockholm Conf statement previously issued by th and Independence of theronouncenent generally endorsed supportampaign of anti-Vie United States leading up toonventions, but made no specific ruptive actions at the convention fforts or plans to inspire, tions designed to disrupt

Convention inationember of the erence on Vietnamorld Assembly forndochina. The Assembly's the concept of international tnam War."activities in the emocratic and Republican

call for support ofhemselves.

World Assembly for Peace and Peoples of Indochina, of which theajor organizer, had earlier enunci in an appendix to the final draft res "Actionhe appendix ca support to six weeks of domestic anti strations,pril to ISstatement: "This campaignarty Convention at Miami on Julyarty Convention in San Diego on Augu

Independence of the ockholm Conferenceimilarlution of the Assembly's lied for international war actions andnd concluded with ead up to thend the Republican"

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Denocratic National Convention

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, is an expression of interestember of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

Inember 'of the North Vietnameseto the Paris Peace TalWisitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalitionnd asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans forduring the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions.

Do- 39

? '

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,

Director/Comptroller

Acting Deputy Director for Plans

Agency Support to. Secret Service (USSS) for National4nd National Republican4onventions

s for the infornatien of the Executive Director/Comptroller.

Authorization for CIA suonort to. Secret Service for the Dcr.ocratic and Republican National Conventionscoornndua2 fron Chief. CI Staff to the iXI which vas concurred in hr the ACD? and ao-.roved by the DCI on2 (copy attached).

withadquartors to

jsunport to thet I'sj'tiquartersifl.nl and

3. On2 the net vi

SSS rcprcscnt.itive and "r.

iscuss prelialnary

SSSununs.

"0with %'tf

oo prci tainary planningon

n2 th USSS rcprcscnt.itive and "r. discuss rrcljr.ir.ary placnin

uss-

hC cxtCttl oirequired by the

i. The basic anrcenent eutually concurredbv the USSS and lieadquartcrs representatives provided that:

bould conduct naae traces onCuti.ii ui uiil-ivm to the USSS.

b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.

C. CIA would Keen the USSS inferred ofver.ts In the Caribbean and Latin American nrcas th.it would have any bearing on the USSSssion during the convention periods. This would include briefinps on Cuba and Cuban policies toward thetates and on activities ef Cu^an Intelligence OperatIocs which could affect the security of the conventions.

d. Coverage of Latin African-roups in the United States vould be thoof the irl

an internal security function.

has arranged the rentalatencuse

about five ninutcs fron convention center hhich vill provideind nearby neetina; siteSS am! Agencysafehouse will bo availableior to and durlr.tr eadquarters officer vill TDY to "icsi sriorconventions and regain until the conventions aujeurnproviding the support described in paragraph

four above.

Stationlani is in daily contact with tho "JSSS in Miani, utilizings asite when necessary. The location of Station Bri/r'.iaoiras not been revealed to the USSS. CObKA Is locatedistance fro=dditionally, the Miaul Security Field Office naintains nornal liaison with the localiar ii unit.

that no personnel will be rrescnt at the convUnvn-rJH, that they will not provv-icnique to the Agency, nor vill it provide the use of any otiicr facilities other than tne safehouse described in paragraph six.

-s-

insure that theiaclinos and basic ac*feemaTTCS"

snni vita with tho Secret Service,

copy of this psnorandu;*being sent to

is fully ccnvc

and has all of tbo iaforcation agreed upon in Headquarters.

Theodore C. Shacklcy Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment

Distribution:

xec.cting DDP

2 -

Typed

FOR:

VIA: SUBJECT:

of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Plans

CIA Support to the Secret Service for the Democratic National Convention in iilami, Florida2

This nicnorondura describes the support which the Secret Service has requested froo CIA with rcrrard to the Democratic National Convention. It isthat the Agency furnish the suoport outlined Inf this oe/norandum and your approval Is requested.

farch (attached asne Secretsretin- wish appropriate Agency officers to discuss the Agency's supoorc to the Secret Service prior to and during the Democratic National Convention. The Secret Service plans to send an ar.ent to Mlani onpril to corj^encc preparations for the convention and wishes to have the neetinG with Agency Headquarters officers prior to the agent's departure for iiiajni.

hile details rcr;ardinr; the type of support which the Secret Service will request ofcncy will not be known until there haseeting with the Secret Service on this saucer, it is evident from the Secret Service mei.ioranoun and from our experience in supporting tne Secret Service at the Republican Convention in hlul8 that the Secret Service desires:

A) Briefinrja on Cuba and Cuban policy towards the United States. Counterintelligence Information on Cuban operations against the United States which could affect the security of the convention.

inCuban exllene United StateS.

hecks on hotel and convention

Secret Service

hreat to it3 protective rai3sion.

fAgency

orntheCconvenCior:lal thPMt t0

/liaisonosigr.ated officer

*uc Tine

'name eneck,ther files availabl

or the undo

James An^leto:,

chEef, ci st;-rf

ans

Theontained inj approved:

Direct,

UrccL ate

tULUhAijXirj^uo hqt ncmoc.

E iL.'artmknt cfu.tY

ec.izt service

t/.O. (

ot*/

ATTN: Kr

* DY LZ/.ZSCul

^ ( Central Intelligence- Ancncv

JAMCS J. ROWLEYIRECTOR

Democratic National Convention -Miami,

In view of our responsibilities regarding the protection of Presidential candidates, wo hava-initinted security preparations ;o: she Dcr.ocrncic National Convention, Which will oo held in Mia-ai, Florida, between

Weaeccinc as soon as possible between rcpreaeni tives of our Intelligence Divinion and your agency to discuss Intel licence support prior to and during tha Democratic National Convention. We arc specifically Interested in discussing tho appropriate channels for routing na.no checks of hotel and convention employees, as well as other individuals of protective interest to this Service. We anticipate there will he several thousands to be checked. We would also liiee to discmS3 the current Cuban situation, particularly any existing relationships betweengroups in the Miami area and mainland Cusa, since we ccnsitior chest Srcups tootential threat to our protective miasion,

(

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

You will recall that in Fiscal1elieve, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly heldpecial account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have ndditional information.

Edward L. Sherman Chief

Missions and Programs Staff

MEMORANDUM FORDirector for Operations

of Possible Embarrassment

to the Agency

Sometime in the spring or early summerr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Oversells Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific bul it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS,

There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:

Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to

(unnamed) in the White House to theCushman (sec attached telephonethat Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

Dean to the CI Staff. These varioussorted out in time and six reports were passedCI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

The telephone call of General Cushman'l is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days Io uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on theof the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. ew months, interest in thisdied down and we did not pursue it further.

Please return the attachments when they havo served your purpose.

5. lsohort note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity wat^ihe then Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robertr^ardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian ia now appearing before tbe Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency.

6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency representative,ad attended various inter-agency meetingsover by Mardian, xpressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. onfidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau.

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Telephone conversation of General Cushman and someone in Whiteob, how are you.

DDCI: Justust talked to Jack Sherwood and heiveuzz.

1 deeply appreciate it. sked Jack to call you. poke to Rose yesterday, and told herittle project here for John Ehrlichmaneed very discreet assistance from the Company,hould like to touch base with Bob. et him at Jack Sherwood's.

DDCI: That's right.

That's right and beyondould like to justelationship because from time to time weew noods in your area. Let mc tell you what we need to know here. Your Agency would be the only one to help. ave checked with the Bureau, Bob, and they havo nothing on this fellow. ere name check but it apparently has some significance, of course. Ray Finkelstein; born in Belgiumoved to Brazil about ageith his family. This might "be helpful. He now is working with one Gilbert Straub, apparently Straub is hooked up with that Kornfeld outfit: IOS. Weeed to know what Finkelstein is all about.

DDCI: We will do our best, of course; we have some counterintelligence files which sometimes turn up people but o'rdinarily, of course, we don't surveil any Americans but this fellow might have come to our notice.

He may not be an American,uropean Jew; that is the problem, the Bureau has come up with zero.

DDCI: Do you know where he is physically located? He may be in Geneva; Straub is apparently in Geneva. DDCI: Well, let me get on thisill get back td you.

ais mi Eye on Ilk Brother

l*rr idema* eh en

eat* lo

keep Ihe lYrsMrnTa hpf *hmllnT. Uer-'ld.f

hoi water.

il Ni>"'i 'n'or fa|lrnlilC foods andm^ney. Mr tried lo *alisfy lwdh anpeilirs i" Ifct ISTrfh hy "irfi'inf frov.rioo from bil-linnaire llnward I'n;hcs toa fcMturant chain, Ihe Home of the NKniihurCer, In Sotilhcrn California.

Two mnnlHirm.xle. tome offlownlo lurxry Iheoahihrn dtr cried Iheofhatpntf Ihioiieli Iheimportant

crediior*.

But il Wi| Ion late. Donald's rc*tauranla went bankrupt,the Nixouburcer nai lost to mankind.

The atoiy nf Iheloin Inked nutlUrampalcn for Ihe presidency, causing him political pain.

At one lime. Donald lneor-imraicd himself and becan scl-

sham 10 I

r-:j'ii have an Interest In hit hiand line. Ehrlichma*uently lo Donald that Mich venture! could cmbarr.ns hi* brother and Hint, for Ills hrolhcr'a sitae, he should at old ilr.il* Dial mlr.hl riflrrl unfavorably on Hieol lone afirrwanl. ImnaM becan dirVerlnc wilh .Inhn

'r -i'f

v.'f> miixl equipment, nhnIhe cnvrinmenl to lon'iilcThitInt wra* Illll Inld in D'n'tdauled In he the fampany't lint Coatlnl*ltre.il bM wantt In the fii for federal money. But EUrlleh-man quietly vetoed the pmj. Cd, and the President's brother wrote to Mill saylnc hono longer Interested in Ihe company.

nyor

Donald alioutset wilh Ivliiierawyer fniti aeronautical Com-ii.ni>'. Dul in deference torother. Donald look Stone through the cuarded While House jrMcac l'Jirlieh man.poVcman for Jljan Aeionauilralthat the pairl dropped by to let II he known that Sinn* was no loncrr nel-inc a*er.ilhii

When Donald

the Miii.-'ii Corporation in January. IttTO. Ehrlichnvin lummoned J. Wlllard >lairtoll and hi* son. Dill, to ihe While Home for an audience nith the President. Marriott had been chairman ot the Nixon Inniicural and Is trusted by Ihe Pre*ldonL

Dellcaiely. the President asVcd the Marrlotta to keeproltirr nut ol trouble.ant to ho sure that Don has noilh the federal cover nineaidant to be suren J* never allied to do any thinc that would embarrass

llv* of fire."

Tiiru Ihr rieviilent added ns an aflerlhuULiil: "Don Is the brrtan in (hemily."

The Marrlolls nr.rcrd lo watch over Donald, and Ihey have scrupulously kepi litm away from Washington. There has been only one awkwardPonald flew to Greecene of ihe three-man team thav'oftPred Marriott's airlinc-entrring service to Aristotle Oua*sis' Olympic Airlines.

Crnr-dsTJcarinp Gifts

The decks,ilitary -ovcrnment is unpopular In theolled oul ihe redor the Piesldcnt's faiolhcr. Tomis Iteimhliran money miser with oil interests in Greece,aiitli dinner for Donald In Athens and invited members ot the Greek militarynassis. the husband of the widow of Ihe man who de-fcaled Klchard Nixon forinent lons-.ilonimrd roses to Donald'som.

Washington whispers thnt Donald used his While House Influence to eel cateringlor Marriott wilhAirlines and TWA, we have established, are slrfcllw untrue.

Khrlichman aKnn-nld's son. Donald.'r-lure hefnic the boy went lo Swllicrlnndmnmer In workrola. The company haiirnn-.rened younfi Nixon lo the Uahniins.

Hi* falhcr, talkineew visilor.s, iiirhi-lini! my nr.sociain ficoiec Clifford, coiiMiWnl lint Donald, Jr, wai somclhincisippointmcnl toy, He had been off in (nc mountains avociatlnc withbefore the overseas job was airanccd.

The boy had said he was foing to work for Investors Overseas Service, whith lias been in financial difflrnlly.

told him not lo sayaidoteer-ation in hise;-around, he's fioingot ofold him |i* was to say hetinir to work for Internationalod Inlern.ilioiinl Controls are alliedul he's nol *np|io*ed lo say he's workincS. You know what would haupen If lhat cot around.

"Thai dumb so amisaid ol hb ton. "Johntalked to himouple of hmirs nnd Inld him lo behare himself over iherc. You know, he lold him he wa* the President's nephew and couldn't n> ii".ihuc ioIhe Piesklent."

' Brr<9lc*l*

MS.

JAMES R. POME

SUO

Edward C. Nixon, brother of llw Prciidcnl, is kcepine Wi silence in Ih? tec o( courtthat hooleang! re acampaign cojlribu-(Ion in cJJJiinaDeiw[ fraud.

'No comment that Isorihy. Trank you.Nhon said whenreached yesterday at his unlisted telephone number In Edmonds,eek o( calls. Then lieup.

A New Jersey cBmpaiso official,cars, has testified he was told tho Nixoa bro'herall to Washiocton to confirm that the donation hy financier liebcrt L. Vesco was wanted in cash.

Scars said under oath htf was present whenyear-old Nixon arrived at

Vesco'* bi'shcssinelicopter JIi"hl from New York City. howler, Seara said hetoy ioT'lbeiong Ni::on, Vesco andjocintca.

Tl'c Securities -ind Ex-chEiijo Canrnhsion Jwsril suitesco ae-cjsinjillion fraud inssels of his.nuliialivwl.

Edwardatt foidMresco eoiipary,cimd nrcmter ofrl-nt's family toinVd lo llu financier.on of thacthar brother, is Vesco's personalisla'nt,based io Nassau, the

robe histhe rxo,CW casli dwia. lion came fromalCahamasllV.liiD C. KIV)N

E.-tnks-a'r. TMwas flcanampaign failed tn report the donation wder the newlaw.

A federal court hearuifl Is scheduled .Monday in New York City onSEC's bid for nnain!lcf securities laws. Sears' tcstlmmiy cameretrial depxition in tbe SEC case.

Pit

his tl the

scardb. saiil Ih

tim 0

Trci-ui' SMU,celoy At. bsrlihiml

Joj bnfk-iin iloorrcr;cj Fran'rhi and 'IV day to forvcr.

Nix or

ropers Called

I Vesco Arrestssued by Federalor Grand Jury Inquiry

een in. For Montlu; His Lawyer Fears Panel Will Produce Indictment

oi aval S'af

I NEWdmundMiinilarrant for rbt aimii-itted New Jersey nnanetern ordu lo bHng him *tocfo"grind liry heit investigating his activities. MrlusM ft Inmom hi.

No criminali:-r' have brtnt Mr.But. Attorney'* of-rice, iihich requested the bench warrant,i.J the judge lo llnd Mr Vito Injs of court for fulling Ioub poena ordering him lo appaar before the grand Jury The government uied to serve theen April IS In Nassau, Bahama IiUndi

The grand Jury laethe circumstances ol Mr. Vcseo'sIn contributions lo Preildenl Nixon'seelection campaign. At Ihe time,ission *asell ptiblicticd inquiry Into Mr. Venn's butl-InfUbe sec file ctahugc dvU suitMm andther meo andeoneein'lie Niton finance committeer.ontribulloos to

Mr. Vrftroa attorney. Edward Bennel:told (he Jiidpe yealerrlay he ludI la believe Oul Mr. Vearo wocld be inuVWd by Ithe grand jury. Mr. Wiliams said Ural IIo appear. Mr. Vesco would Invoke his caiuillu-Uenal prljilrjd aeilntt arUiaerUMoilnK.he itir cranied immunity ngjiinaiMr. William* added thai Uie US Allot-nry'a office had already replied lo bun that It uoiitdjil riler Immunity.

Mr. Williams, who earlier had askedudgeismUs ihc contempt application on technical grounds, said Ihe idn'l call for Mr. Vesco's airesL

Aflcr the court was adjourned. Mr.declined lo discuss reports that Ihe ST-ycar-oldi Mr. Vcfco Intended lo renounce Jits US. dU-jeiiNhip. even Though the attorney al an earlier)d said he would raise tfie question Ol citizenship.

James W. RayhM. an.ey, broi.ghl Ihe matter up In court. savin? th* government had InlormalWn that Mr. Vesco was "currently attempting Io renounce his US. citizenship in Coslahere he last year took up legal residence. It's understood lhai Mr. Itayhlll wasn't referringisclosurelate Wednesday by Costa Rica'snl, Jose Figuere*.

President Figucres,wo-day visit lo this country, said lhat Mr. Vesco in annce or three weeks ago formally an-[noun.cr! his intention to. citi ton-ship.

In Washi.-glon. the Stale Department said Mr. VcseO hes told CO'la Rican authorities that hes renounced American citizenship before twoith bis lawyer's help. Hon ever,. Enibassy in Costa Rica con'lhai didn't count, because ll wasn't done beforeconsular officer. The Stolelegal experts are checking lowhether thai view la correct.

.xtradition treaty with Costa Rica, coveringrimes, includingforgciy, cmbculemenl, and fraud.. considers Its lMl extradition treaty wiih Britain la apply to Ihc Bahamas, but il isn't 'Mem whether the Bahamas agree* The British treaty covers such crimes as fraud andbut the warrant Issuedrnnd-jury appearanceailerhich cvti'adition Is possible.

Mr. Vescoome and familyul has bases of operations Inin San Jose. Costa Rica. Covcmmenteditors declined lo comment wlien ashedsteps lltcy- would lake In have Mr. VescoIf he were located in either ofJ

The EECs civil mil accuses Mr. Vescoircclinc Ihc "tooling" ofillion In assets four foreign mutu.il funds man-igcdtd. Mr. Vesco formerly headed both' nnd International Controls.

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

Background: Formed Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); FBI (active staffagreed to only in; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; CIA and any necossary representatives of other Departments or Agencies. (Following have participated: Treasury, State.) Staff: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General in reporting through the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olsen. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House.

CIA Participation: Jfonjributions 'on foreign aspects (by tie mora ndura with no agency letterhead or Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA.

Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure

of Classified In formatovember 1 by the White liouseonsequence of thoconcern about.the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

(Table of contents attached).

TDCT COPY DO MOT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Problems Relating to the Disclosure oi Classified Information

Executive Orders and Related Directive!

Effectiveness of Existing Security - , egulations

Lessons of the "Pentagon

Conclusions and

Program

^fcjiffcrlAOS programorldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

ThefMrJcHAOS program has not and is notefforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

FBI domestic sources whoin connection with their extremistaffiliations to make contact withpowers or with foreign extremistbeen briefed and debriefed by The briefing has includedguiJ-ince, including defensive advice.

Division)is

project of

similar

with existing extremisthave been assessed, recruited, testedabroad for PCS assignments asprimarily sources offered for such useFBI. When abroad they collect informationto (StjfcHAOS program requirements, asother Agency requirements. They are thusfor targeting against Cubans, Chinesethe North Vietnamese,s theirand their particular access permits. be noted thatof the

the-

yrtheglrjtHAOS PROGRAM.

3. As indicated earlier, (JnjfcHAOSoreignconducted overseas, except for the limitedabove. The program is and has been managedto achieve the maximum feasible utilization ofof Uie ^Oo^eratic' -, r :t'

have been recuited and run exclusively for the Instead, emphasis has been placed on theof new and old Agency assets who haveoncurrent capability for provisionresponsive to the program'shas involved the provision ofailoredrequirements and operational guidance. Thisprogram is viewed as an integral part of theand collection programsonon-and Kftrrpn -Pm**" Agents who have"Movement" background or who have knownwith the American "Movement" are useful asto obtain biographic and personality data, topossible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities,develop operationally exploitable relationshipstargets of the above programs. Theseof interest to our targets because of theirwith and/orthe Americanthe course of the^MfiTHAOS program, theremportant areas of operational interest.

jj^ich at the present time havejjeen reduced to aboutParis, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar'lEV Salaam, Conakry,City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong

The&rJ:rlAOSions, two ot which have been gets of special interest.

lso utilizes audio opera-implemented to cover tar-

S. /MIjfcHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who arc noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists,nd who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals areupon in response to specific Headquarters require* roents received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

. 6. All cable and dispatch traffic relatedMJ^HAOS program is sent via restricted channels, tit is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or theServices Division^ The control and retriev-ability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of theOperations Group.

Information responsive to specific FBIis disseminated to the FBI via special controlled disseminationy restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.

Information of particular significance, whenhas been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and Johns well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

* *

.check

ip)n top and

ROUTING SLIP

"nq

Halpern

DIRECT BENT

"IHT

HH (HI

Attached are the following:

1-background paper on TICommonts on facts andomments on AID by Mr.3 (which Mr. Colby might find of interest)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

Counter Intelligence Staff,

Police Group Activities

Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.

CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Dcvelopnent (OPS/AID)

ind its training facility, the International Police Academy CI/PG also administers and supervises Project

ft'additionmn-

"jCentral Intelligence Agency

ecl.nica! investigations Course. CI/PG provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in natters pertaining to police/security functions and activities. Specific details of these functions are as follows:

liaisom mn ops/aid

ci/pg liaison with ops/aid and ipa is conductedaily basis and consists principally of:

a. exchange of information on ipa participants,whom later attend

for inclusion of Agency sponsoredin IPA/OPS/AITf training programs,

for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tourspolice/security representativesCIA Area

Ii. providing general information pertaining to

police/security organizations, activities,and personalities requested hy Agency operating components,

F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Tecnnical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees vith the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized.

PROJECT

is engaged principally in training foreien

police/security personnel under

and selling pol ice/securityIqreien

ponce/security personnel and

provides special training programs and briefingspolice/security personnel of interest to

-uquxrea me capability ot providing training to lorcign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State.

CO'."in NT

docs not maintain direct contact or liaison

wit'n any raw enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by

nas

at nome and abroad becausene nature of itsof foreign police/security personnelnd its Public Safety programs aroundsuch contacts atocal and

federalecause its personnel arc personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout theStates. 1'cmhers of the

have appeared as guest lecturers ar sucn

institutions as. Park Police, IPA,. Secret Service, and. Treasury Enforcement Division.

n addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations. Tlie existence and extent thereof, however,ecision to be made bv the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of

Iwi th Dan

iitnone, who was murdered by tne lupamaros. itrione an experienced and respected law enfbrcenent officer,ona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and wasIA employee or agent.

"ounter

ton

Intelligence Staff

3 "

in c

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT

: Joint CIA/USAID Terrorist (Technical)

Investigations CourseEnglish language) CI Staff's Project

This effortoint CIA/USAID training program for foreign police/security personnel. The initial phase of the training will be conducted at the International Police Academy. during the7ho following subject matter is covered in this^phase of the training: investioative techniques, collection nnd preservation of evidence, records, files, and reporting, gathering of infornation on terrorist groups and their activities,tudent scr-inar devoted to discussions on terrorist and other hostile activities currently existing in their respective countries, etc. This phase of the training is concludedwo dav orientation hy thequad of the Dade County Police Department in Florida.

he second phase of this training will bo conducted _bv Agency'

cov

.duringS

technicians utilise"

The objective of this, pnase or tne training is to develop individual student technical capability toconduct investigations into known or suspected Incidents of sabotage/terrorist bombings by:

trainees with basic knowledge -inof commercial and military demolitionsas they may he applied inindustrial sabotage operations.

the trainees to commerciallyand home laboratory techniqueshe used in the manufacture of explosivesby terrorists or sabotours.

the trainees with thetarget analysis and operationala saboteur or terrorist Dust employ.

the trainees to boobyand techniques givingwith both manufactureddevices through actualthe necessity of alertnessand countering booby trapssaboteurs or terrorists.

several field exercises totrainee the opportunity for detecting /

- and neutralizing various explosive anddevices likely to be used by terrorists or saboteurs, including letter bombs, packages, attacho cases, etc.

several investigativeof explosive incidents totrainee to the need for and ciannorto colloct, identify, andednisable evidence for

he prograr. provides the trainees with ample opportunity to develop basic familiarity and use proficiently through handling, preparing and applying the various explosive charges, incendiary tifents, terrorist devices and sabotage techniques. L'SAID, International Police Academy (IPA) has received reports fron forser foreign police/security personnel who participated in the program indicating thatore called upon to utilize the skills they acquired through this training in the handling of explosive devices in their respective country. Attachedetterarticipant in TIC It"

seat to

the

nnbassy

letter bosu aovicc vnicfi was in

Subject course will) foreign countries.ight'CU) by CIA ondy

articipants fron 3ro financed by AID, thoir own governments.

AID/OPS TRAINING

TRAINING

AND STATISTICS

National Security

Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead

David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen

V,y Admiral Arleigh Bu&e, Dheaor

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR. REVOLUTION AND PEACE

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER,orkLiit.Joa

- Strategic Leverage Irorft" Aid and .Trade

K. SCHLESINGER

Summary

The analysis of this paper rests on Ihe assumption that American policy-makers should not be so concerned with the pursuit of hard-to-obtain ideological objectives that they exhaust the poioer potential implicit in trade and aid relationships. Rather the trade and aid programs should be managed so as to preserve an environment in which pressures can be brought to bear to serve the national interestater, and perhaps more critical, date. This emphasis on power considerations implies both (a) that the assistance program cannot be based primarily on humanitarian or idealistic goals, and (b) that economic lies with other nations should not be severed simply because of our disapproval of other social systems, including those based on communism. Though typically public opinion vastly overstates the strategic leverage that can be gained through economic weapons, this leverage is stiU not negligible. One can argue that in the past the United States-has failed to take advantage of the power potential implicit in aid and trade through its failure to develop concepts and mechanisms of deterrence in ways akin to what has beenhe military field. Much of the difficulty may be ascribedailure to develop sanctions, which discourage actions unfavorable to our interest's, as well as incentives, which encourage cooperation. Mo system ofdeterrence can exclusively stress the carrot and ignore the stick.

More is being demanded of the aid program than it can reasonably achieve. Assuming that the primary emphasis of the aid program is to encourage social and economic development rather than to elicit direct support for American foreign policy

687

James B. Schlfsincoi

t it arguedhould o'tempt to develop nable eociat and political condition* by tltingthrninQ thr "lenittmitcy" of the developing tocktl aeder in thr ryet ol the re.ipretiiethan attempting to aptirl the trapping! ol African dcniecaey.

Tcchnolvgient change, the easy availability of tMbttittttn. and tht lengthy period for ndjit'totentrolonged ttrunnl' knit all redteed the impact of Ihr "tnpply effect" which itat at one time the man irfBpon of economic uarfarr. If thr teonoinie letapons of ttiategy art to be at alt eHectice under today's conditions, tht "infturuee effect" >nmf rig* coeretpowlintllv ii importance. Thit implic* thai ur thouM beetition ta threaten to do dafitoc to other reontmies through thr curtail-ment of octets to Wciteinn order to keep thii threat an. ever-present oar, ur Mult, honeirer, continue to trod' in tdame tcith other countries, including Communist Ones.in dealing trith the undcrdeirtoptd nations tht potential egtctivenet* of tteeh theeo.fi mav prote to be considerable.

James R. Scm-FstsctB

finalwould be unwisese potential nam of this sort for niching purposes. The balance or pay-WJ has been lieublesome and is properly an object of concern in Washinpton. but sorelyirst-order consideration in our relations with Ihe undv'detvlopcd nations. SuEgestions have been broiled aboul thaishould make use of the aid program lo fore* recipient! to buy from us in ways Uiat go beyond tied aid. Under the best of cireumstances, our bargaining power is limited, and shooting away llralegic ammunition for so paltry an economic coat would seem looor sense of proportion-Aid

Within an over-all fi*mewoik designed to discourage hostile or predatory attitude* toward the Wesi, Ihe aid program mar see* to foster the maximum rale of economic and social progress. In live bade policy of AID. Ill* Kennedy Administration has espliciily adopted ibis goal. As has been indicated there aro costs to this decision. Outsiders aie not likely lo be much liked even under Ihe best of clreumslancos, which hardly apply to the underdeveloped countries, and Iheir intervention In uhatever direction will In the long run excite antagonismn real or fancied wrongs Nevertheless, the basie decision has been made. Ut os examine in what waymay proceed so that the good effects clearly outweigh the ill effects.

There are two initial postulates: fl) our bargaining power will be limited,merican notions of social reform and of equity are neither necessarily applicable in the underdeveloped lands, nor need we assumeose whose cooperation we must win will find them appealing. These postulates areJointly they imply lhai we cannot press forward on all fronts toociety inood American democrat will reel at home, bul must instead concentrate our energies on those social changes which will spur economic growth even it lha immediate results ate more consistent with Ihe cultural genias of the peoplvs Involved rather than our own lastcs. We oupht not expect Ihem lo make the same choices as wc would, or. if ihey make the same choices, to achiet*en-year periodhat ii look US ciifhly years lo nihieve. Finally, in reaching )uiipn*nt9 on social processes in other lands, we cannot apply whai are ourin reality,of purity.

As outsiders, we will be unable lo perceive the social function of behavior which is'superficially corrupt, and will lend to lump

mi( Aid and Tradc

it together wiih that which laalVh tn^rf to oar own hluory. retroactive*.have rem*eet* ia what one* "ere rrraided at the dartpotaWe procedure* of lie Tamman, Hall ia thatind ofeturliyelcome lor the newly arrived im-migrant. IV* tie atcuitomed lo Ihr daily dangling of new port officei. good rommillc* auignmenta. and bridge* over erechi in Ihc outback before wavering Congiessmcn, and warm approval la given, for it*m of political rcaliun. to whateverU doing tho dangling by (hoic who agreeItaowardrocedure* abroad w* art Inclined toimple muckraking altitude. We look askance at Ih* higgling of Ihe politicalahat would do credit bothoearie* aad eld-Kyle politicali we hope toa fair meature of iBCcau. weat* toMr critical faeahle* and lean toet.ee* BBappetuiae iocl.iT de< km which are fractional and Ihow which are simple barrier* to

The statement of objective* by AID isvery ambitio.ilThe purpow of the aiiUlancc prugrnm include itimulallon of self-help, encourafement of progressivend achieve-men! of government* bawd on consent, which recognise tho dignity and worth of individual* who are expectedarticipate in determining the nation*otntemontintioni I* In large part iMm dieasing. but the criteria by which self-help la mo.In* toward iceio! and political progrni are moreore etultabC* distribution ofore equitable tat lyMem with. upaaded wet-farencreased pahtkal participation andll liberties, and soon. Several point* may be made reganftng th* objecttrat. there are too many; tecemd. they are to mat aiUal la-oomjneat; and third, they ignore the real lescarces availabl*.

There U. in the flmt place, th* fane-perceived tilth Ut-eer. economic program, on th*nd. and the erenuined goal* of equitable diHribulloo of income, immediate improvement la livingnd security on the other. Thi* umtoi lying conflict spill* overenuon between lapld cowmlc pro-giess and tha introduction nf democraticn thi* Issue there appear* lo haveevolution in informed opinion in Ihe United Slate* during the pan fiveuring the law fifties, it had beewne almost an axiom that authoritarian, if not totalitarian. goveruwaU had innate advantage*ing economies toward rapid growth. The prevaibag vie* waa

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

Resources Division Operational

Activities with Possible Flap Potential

Memorandum,

7 May

same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans toassets and access agents.

These Americans arc used for spotting andpurposes only and do not perform any

D- Question: Do we use alias documents on Americans in course of operations?

Answer: Yes, we do use alias documents when recruiting American support assets. The great majority of these recruitments are done in alias. AH recruitments of foreign targets are done in alias.

c. Question: What disciplinary controls do we have over alias documents?

Answer: Weurrent list in FR Division Headquarters of the alias documents issued to each Base.

CONi ,EHTIAL

SECEET

Vifrbtt

with

He indicated that tne introductthis memo' could

OGC

Div )ry and In ^

JJWi fiapynnbir-TRri

ui'

SECRET ' CONFIDENTIAL !il"n

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

Resources Divisior^Operational

Activities with Possible Flap Potential

activities

thr risk of stating the obvious, carried on by<FR Division H

almost all of the operational [run the risk

unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted thisondition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which ^FR DivisiofTjias participated and/or is participating'that containgreater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. ave listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

airly considerable

amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent byT

personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount oi money that has been expended in support of these efforts

fed M$

tzi

c. Alias Documentation: Clearly, i'R Divisiongreat majority of iis operational work by having itsutilize alias documents. All recruitments arealias. Thus, the alias documentation is aeffective

Our case officers have utilized fully backstopped alias credit cards for renting automobiles, motel rooms, hotel rooms for operational meetings, etc. These credit cards are back-stopped by accounts in alias which are promptly paid at the appropriate time. ec no problem in the continued use of alias documentation andeel it is absolutely essential to continue using alias documentation wherever and whenever possible.

SEC jiVE T

of Organization and Functions

Location of Field Units

Targets

Methodology

Budget

Coordination

Support Assets

Intelligence'Reporting

QQb 'JO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou Case

1. -By memorandum datednformed you ofof an interview of Mr.reported that

employee of the Office of Security, had

statedTaVCUSSlon period at Advanced Intelligence Seminarn1 that the Office of Security had been involved in the "BallouThe residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique guh collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided1 by Montgomery County Police and Federal law enforcement officers. When theressed in civilian clothes, forced their way into the house, Ballou picked up an antique pistoL The officers opened fire and seriously wounded Ballou. He was hospitalized for several months and was left partially paralyzed. elieve he is now suing over the incident. )

2. We interviewedother employees who

attended the Seminar, and the Director of Security to determinewas said at the Seminar and the extent of any Agencythe Ballou case. Wc find that participants in tbe Seminarto discuss the details of their work and associatedan assignment he had been on with.

Secret Service at8 National Conventions and his liaison activities with the Montgomery County Police.

gomery County Pqlicc, sometime in1 after the

been rep. rted in the newspapers. According

police inspector had thanked him for some amplifying equipment ine Agency had given to the Montgomery County Police and remarked that

this equipment had probablyoliceman's life. The inspector commented that tbe account of the Ballou incident appearing in the press was not the whole story. With the aid of the equipment the Agency had provided, the police hadelephone call from Ballouriend in which Ballou outlined plans tohe police thenaid to forestall Ballou's plan, and it was during this raid that Ballou was shot.

that he has no other knowledge of theexcept lor WOat he has read in the newspapers, and that hehad any other conversations about tbe case with any membersMontgomery County Police. We learned nothing from ourwould indicate any other Agency involvement in the Ballou case.

following are related excerpts from the "Familyof the Director of Security on

During the period8everal items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestinetransmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department; Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department; Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department; New York City Police Department; and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.

Onnd at the specific request of the United States Secret Service, this Office provided two audio courttermeasures technicians to the United States Secret Service in connection with the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois. This was not an official detail although both men were provided with temporary credentials identifying them as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.

"William V. Broe Inspector General

noun on:

xecScc/ClA

(DATE)

UNCLASSIFIED COHf

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

"suBIfCT:

firOMi

General

mA* -

Wm. E. Colby

Director

fniirinniTlili l".^ fl UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of CentralMr. William E. Colby

1. Onay the name of

referred to this office as having attempted to contact the Director concerning "activities outside the Agency." ttempted to contact

onnday, but he was on leave. Onay he stated he wanted toortion of his information and asked if he could come to my offico onay.

in1 ana is currently to the Soviet/EE Section. He hai pame into the AgencyOT

ile.

strong personnel

Ivised that inttended the Advanced Intelligence Seminar. On the first evening ofthe seminar the studentsgetting acquainted" session where each onerief description of his duties. One of the students.

ofthe Office of Security, however, carried on alter the session was over and expanded on the briefing he had given. He claimed that CIA was cooperating with the Montgomery County Police, stating that the Office of Security gave electronic and other support to that organization.

4. He further indicated that the Office of Security hadin the "Ballouhe Ball ou case

as follows: The residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided1 by theCounty Police and some Federal law enforcement officers. After the officers, dressed in civilian clothes, had forced their way into the house Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers immediately opened fire and wounded Ballou seriously. Heong time in the hospital and is partly paralyzed at the present time.

INTCr" wa ONLY

His case was given much publicity in the Washington Post at the time. There was additional publicity in the last several months when Ballouawsuit against the raiding officers.

6. Itold him this was just the type

of information we wanted to receive so that it can be investigated and appropriate action taken if the information is borne out.

7. This office will follow up on this allegation and advise the Director concerning our findings.

Inspector General

mam unc only

Noted

ay at

WVB

called the Tiroctor on re "activities outside the

"3TTJT

old him Director was out of the office. but we would return his call. Mr.

going back, said to

Mr. Colby

jcalled back that day and said he wasubini lecture and would call us He never did call back, turn over to Mr. Bros.

EYES oaii

na only

' etb

uwassifup miu. tfcm.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

General y_ J

Wm. E. Colby

Director

, of

^ JUnJL ^

n UNCtASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of CentralMr. William E.

Mr. Colby advised me

had called the Office of the Director in line with the Director memorandum to all employeesequesting all employees to report activities which might be construed to bethe legislative charter of the Agency.

is employedlerk inOUleo the A

Cable secretariat. He joinect the Agency in7 and worked in the Office of Securityears before transferring to the Cable Secretariat

in the Office of Security he was assigned to desk, SD3. The primary function of this desk was to

roject

pescribed the project as follows. The

a unit at the JFK Inter-

hisT LING UAL Office of Security national Airport that photographed mail going to Soviet Bloc countries. This work was done by Agency staff employees. The mail was placed in bags by the regular Post Office employees and stacked. After their departure for the night, the Agency employees would open the mail and photograph it. Both incoming and outgoing mail, including postcards, were photographed. atch list was maintained and priority was given to the names listed, but generally all mail was processed.

wouldeletype

The results of the operation were sent to Washingtonthey were handled by

advising him of the registry number and the number of items. He would check to see if the number of items received was correct and route the material to the appropriate offices. Generallyf

the material was separated into bundles bound with rubber bands. This portion was sent to TSD for technical processing. The remain-ing material was sent to the CI Staff,

primarilyited States. When!

Aboutonth the CI Staff would add names to orfrom the list.send the changes in the list to

the field office. The watchl was made

icir tne uniceecur

who were in the Uni tyhe project was still activt

was in no way emotional or belligerent. He presented the facts quickly and clearly and said he had no other information. He stated he would have come forward with thesooner but he had only recently had time to read the Director's memorandum. The writer thanked him for his interest.

Inspector General

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou Case

1. By memorandum datednformed you ofof an interview ofreported that

Mr.an employee ol the Oiiice of Security, had

statediscussion period at Advanced Intelligence Seminarn1 that the Office of Security had been involved in the "BallouThe residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided1 by Montgomery County Police and Federal law enforcement officers. When the officers, dressed in civilian clothes, forced their way into tbe house, Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers opened fire and seriously wounded Ballou. He was hospitalized for several months and was left partially paralyzed. elieve he is now suing over the incident.)

We interviewed Mr.

other employees who

the Seminar, and the Directo! of Security to determinewas said at the Seminar and the extent of any Agencythe Ballou case. We find that participants jn the Seminarto discuss the details of their work and associatedan assignment he had been on with.

SecrerSeTVrCe at8 National Conventions and his liaison activities with the Montgomery County Police.

that in discussing the latter subject he

a conversation he had withthe Mont-

gomery County Police, sometime inI aitcr the Ballou incident

had been reported in the newspapers. According

Jhad thanked him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had givenlie Montgomery Countyno rMMrked thai

this equipment had probablyoliceman's life. The inspector commented that the account of tbe Ballou incident appearing in the press was not the whole story. With the aid of the equipment the Agency had provided, the police hadelephone call from Ballouriend in which Ballou outlined plans tohe police thenaid to forestall Ballou's plan, and it was daring this raid that Ballou was shot.

said that he has no other knowledge of theexcept for what he has read in the newspapers, and that hehad any other conversations about the case with any membersMontgomery County Police. We learned nothing from ourwould indicate any other Agency involvement in the Ballou case.

following are related excerpts from the "Familyof the Director of Security on

During the period8everal items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department; Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department; Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department; New York City Police Department; and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.

Onnd at the specific request of the United States Secret Service, this Office provided two audio counter-measures technicians to the United States Secret Service in connection with the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois. This was not an official detail although both men were provided with temporary credentials identifying them as being af&liatcd with the United States Secret Service.

'* Bros:

"William V. Broe Inspector General

Distribution:

ddressee

2 -

RETURN TOyFiW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with

e of Security

1. On3 I labour, what he

had said at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6and thonature of the relations he had had with the MontgomeryHe said that he and others had been encouraged towork and the problems related thereto with otherand told that what they said would bethis context he had discussed the Office of Security'slocal Police Forces including the Police Force In He said he montioned the "Ballou Case" as anhow the Montgomery County Police had used equipmentthe Agency in their work, but denied that he had said orthe Agency was "involved" in the Ballou case. He said thatalso related to the other Seminar members the fact thathad provided assistance to the Secret Service inthe protection of the President and Vice President and thatothers had boon detailed to work with the Secret Serviceactivities at8 Democratic NationalChicago and the Republican National Convention in Miami. was on the Chicago detail, if he was

detailed to protect tne Vice President. He said that he was detailed to Tom Kelly, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service and worked in effectember of the Secret Service under Mr. Kelly.

2. Ito whether his relations with

the Montgomery County Police was training oriented, equipment oriented, or if he had engaged in any operations or activities with the police. He said his relations with the Police had been entirely equipment oriented and had been limited to the Chief of Police and one or two senior Inspectors. The extent of assistance givenof the Agency providing the Police with surplus technical

equipment which was of no further use to the Agency, and briefing them as to its use. He said he would not define these briefings as training, but admitted that it might be so construed.

that his only knowledge of the "Ballou

except what he had read in the papers, came from one

telephone conversation he had with Inspectorthe

Montgomery County Police sometime after accounts of thehad appeared in the press. He said the Inspectorthank him for some amplifying equipment the Agency hadPolice and mentioned lhat it had probably saved the life of He said that the Inspector explained to him thatof the incident appearing in the press was not thethat with the aid of the equipment the Agency hadPolice had been able toelephone call froma friend in which Ballou had outlined plans toopPolice had thenaid to forestall Ballou's plan andduring this raid that Ballou was shot.

y_waj

s involve-

that he had had no other conversations with the Montgomery County Police on that subject. He said he had mentioned it at the Seminar as an example of the sensitivity involved in the Agency's dealings with domestic Police Forces. He said he recalled that there wasit of discussion and argument by the Seminar members about the propriety of the Agencylocal police forces and working with the Secret Service inut that he did not recall any extensive discussion about the Ballou Case and that at no time had he said that theirectly involved.

said he remembered that

lent in domestic activities and that sometime later,orto Colonel White about his

"seemed particularly concerned about the Agencyvrn ment in domestic activitiesi sometime later, around

concern and Colonel White in turn talked to the Director of Security. Since that date, he said, he has not had any further direct contact with the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of the Director of Security.

rrsTrop Inspector

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with

Office of Security

equipment which wai of no further use to the Agency, and briefing them as to Its use. He said he would not define these briefings as training, but admitted that it might be so construed.

that bis only knowledge of the "Ballou

except what ho bad read In the papers, came fromconversation he hsd with Inspectortho

Montgomery County Police sometime after accounts ol thehad appeared In tha press. He said the Inspectorthank, him for soma amplifying equipment the Agency hadPollco and mentioned that It had probably saved the life of He said that tho Inspector explained to him thatof the Incident appearing in the press was not thethat with the aid of the equipment the Agency badPolice bad been able toelephone call froma friend In wbich Ballou had outlined plans to "kill aPolice had thenaid to forestall Ballou's plan andduring this raid that Ballou was

that ho had had no other conversations with thoPolice on that subject. He said he had mentioned ItSeminar as an example of tho ncnsltlvtty involved indealings with domestic Pollco Forces. He saidthat there wasit of discussion andthe Seminar members about tho propriety of tho Agencylocal police forces and working with the Secret Service inbut that he did not recall any extensive discussion aboutCase and that at no time bad ho said that the Agencyinvolved.ho remembered

"deemed particularly concerned about the Agency'oin domestic activities and that sometime lator,orto Colonel White about his

concern and Colonel Whlto in turn talked to the Director of Security. olr.ee that date, he said, ho has not had any further direct contact with the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of tho Director of Security.

F. P. Bishop Inspector

2 -

FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with

FMSAC

about the O

tsaid he

s liaison with the Police Forces in

fie r- of Secii rity

the Metropolitan Area and that the Ballou case wasalso recalledmentioned that the Agency

had provided assistance to the Secret Service in connectionwork against radical groups atonvention in Chicago. He said that he could notexactlyaid, but he did recallwas considerable discussion and debate among theabout the propriety of the Agency engaging in

2. Later in January orime when Iwas Chairman of the Management Advisory Group

[MAOf, he said he discussed these matters, and questioned the extent to which the Agency should become involved in domestic intelligence activities, with Colonel White and later with Mr. Colby. The MAG also raised the general problemouple of their papers, but without citing specific detailed examples. He said he understood that Colonel White had taken the matter up with the Director of Security and that some changes had been madeesult.

- File w

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Involvement in Outside Activities on Basis of Information Provided byj

alked to Mr.

who

and

lassmate of]

at the Mr.

Intelligence Seminareld

had talked about the given to and received

Office of Security's liaison with, and assiSTaace from, the Police Departments in the-Washington Metropolitan area. He said he could not recall specifically what was said, but to the best of his memory Mr. George's or Mont

said that each student was asked to describe and talk about his work in the Agency and he recalled that Mr

[described training given to either the Prince County Police concerning surveillance methods and electronic techniques. He'said that he did not recall any discussion of the "Ballou case" and that he had no knowledge of that case other than what he had read in the newspapers.

r. f.

ort oft'o by

ut Vr,

nsr "o. 6 '.ifr.tet thdft:ie CTTico oC cirity hid rel tions IoceI police forces In"cshtnetonforted to the !X2tailr:.ono datodt tlint ho. hid noeoVae StUoupad bad not pnvlouilfoffMMGTnt In or cc.wctiontha era*).

ofttVi tt;o*d.o

-r.

"hrt f. etslVon t ctooroc:r.

Good briefer, -utinouxp-reive- ct tires trlfc to nuch.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of CentralMr. William E. Colby

'aa

1. Onay tho name of referred to this office as having attempted to contact the Director concerning "activities outside the Agency."ttempted to contact

onnday, but he was on leave. Onay he stated ho wanted toortion of his information and asked If he could come to my office onay.

into the AgencyOT

to the Soviet/EE Section. Heery strong personnel file

In7 and Is currently

ery stronn personnel

that in1 he attended tho

Advanced Intelligence Seminar. On the first evening of the seminar the studentsgetting acquainted" session where each one gaverief description of his duties. One of tho students]

the Office of Security, however, carried on miiorsession was over and expanded on the briefing he.had given. He claimed that CIA was cooperating with the Montgomery County Police, stating that the Office of Security gavo electronic and other support to that organization.

4. He further indicated that the Office of Security had been

Involved In the

described the Ballou case

"Ballouesidence

as follows: Tho residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided1 by theCounty Police and some Federal law enforcement officers. After the officers, dressed In civilian clothes, had forced their way Into the house Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers immediately opened fire and wounded Ballou seriously. Hoong time in the hospital and Is partly paralyzed at the present time.

HI* cutgiven much publicity in tha Washingtonat the time. There wa* additional publicity In tha last several months when Ballouawsuit against the raiding officers.

Itold him this was Just the type

of Information we wanted to receive so that It can be investigated and appropriate action taken if the Information Is borne out.

7. This office will follow up on this allegation and advise the Director concerning our findings.

William V. Broe Inspector General

MEMORANDUM FOR: five.

fco

101

DAT El

rilcy Place, N. W. Washington, D.92 "

Mr. Lloyd Shearer

Editor-at-Large

Parade Magazine

. Hamilton Drive

Beverly Hills,

Dear Mr. Shearer:

Thank you for your letter of Februarynd its kind word* about me. As you can imagine, your challenge set mc to work to meet it. an say, under oath if need be, th.it CIA has never carriedolitical assassination, nor has il induced, employed or suggested one which occurred. Whether this fully meets yourannot Cay (it takes two tout itong way from the original statement in Mr. Scott's column that CIA "uses politics] assassinationm too sensitive,ould hopecould set the record ctraight for your readers.

Sincerely,

parade:

LLOYD SHEAPCR*!

Parade Pubticatiou. lac. HO N. /lonitU* Drive

ffmrtj JWb.ow

.? Brlley

Dear Mr. Colbyi

Thank you for your kind ond informative letter of Januaryoncerning Operation Phoenix.

I don't wont to setunning word-battle with you on the subject of political assassination in Indo-China or the role of CIA and other of our agencies in Operation Phoenix.

I sun Justou would care to say flatly that the CIA hns never used political assassination in Indo-Chlna or elsewhere and has never Induced, employed, or suggested to others that such tactics or devices be

If you will moke that flat statement underill not only apologize,ill tango with Dick Helms in Carfinckel's largest show window at li*th andof course, Mrs. Helms gives her permission.

hank you for your interest end commend you for the really outstanding service you hove rendered the

country. You arc Indeed one of Helms1 finest.

tiOGG2

alta Haautaa

sheajier

ciilrr.al-um

pvhlirtthu. hr. hon./hmllf* Dm. biurts Wfb.CWft mill

Dear Ceneral Colby:

your article. "Should Lesbians

Allowed To Play Professionalound 1t

u.for arranalne awith me and Dick Helms or Her Majesty's Tel Aviv Rifles. Even at Willing

ne sad notel Will you tell An<rus we cannot use his new car bumper sticker:became it il

tr, to reoalV5

o say under oath that the CIA has never been party to political assassination. I of

d deai- fI happened to encounter Olep-artender, Inhio

crecy. witnessed by Victor L. Karcriettl. Under the terms of

tit Sf JyouPeclai Papal

the Senateapply t0 hcflrlnrs before

SoreJ'rnCommittee or theo'; Forelcm Relations. If this is so. pleaseletand we will take it from

X be lnon shortly ctaylne- at the nlTt tluroutSilver Sprint. Perhaps we can

former Green Beret members who want to discuss with you

the subject of CIA lmpostcrs In South Vietnam, who lied to '

them and me, too.

Let ne hear fit,*best,

"(]

rilcy Placo, N. w. Washington, D.92

Mr. Lloyd Shearer '

Editor-at-Large

Parade Magazine,

. Hamilton Drivo

Beverly Hills,

Dear Mr. Shearert

Thank you for your letter of Februarynd its kind words about me. As you can imagine, your challenge set me to work to meet it. an say, under oath if need be, that CIA has never carriedolitical assassination, nor has it induced, employed or suggested one which occurred. Whether this fully meets yourannot aay (It takes two tout itong way from the original statement in Mr. Scott's column that CIA "uses political assassinationm too sensitive,ould hopo you could set the record straight for your readers.

Sincerely,

Colby,

W. E. Colby

LLOYD SHEARER

February2

.? Brl'ley PI.

Dear Mr. Colby1

Thank you for your kind ond Informative letter of Januaryoncerning Operation Fhoenlx.

I don't Kant to getunning word-battle with you on the subject of political assassination In Indo-Chlna or the role of CIA and other of our agencies in Operation Phoenix.

I am Just wonderlns af you would care to say flatly that the CIA has never used political assassination in Indo-China or elsewhere and has never induced, employed, or suggested to others that such tactics or devices be employed.

If you will make that flat statement underill not onlyill tango with Dick Helms in Garflnckel's largest show window at Ikthprovidlng, of course, Mrs. Helms gives her permission.

hank you for your interest and commend you for the really outstanding service you have rendered'the country. You are Indeed one of Helms' finest-

Mr. Lloyd Shearer

Editor at large

aga^ino

hird Avenue)

New York, Now

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your lonue of January 9th, ono of Walter Scott'i Personality Paradetaled thatses politicalinr.tioneapon" and that Operation Pboonlx "run by tho CIAew high for U. S. political asoasotnalionc Inave held responsible positions In CIA for many years and was also (during UcUched service from CIA)for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Senate and Mouse Committees) that:

does net and has not used political assassination as

Phoenix was run not by tha CIA but by thoof Vietnam, with tho support of the CORDS element ofssistance Command in coordination withncluding CIA,

Phoenix lo not and wasrogram of It countered tha Viet Cong apparatus attempting toGovernment of Vietnam by targctting Its leaders. Whereverthese were apprehended or Invited to defect, but awere killed In firelights during military operations orcapture. Thereast difference in kind, not merelybetween those combat casualties (even Including thewhich occurred) and tin victims of the Viet Cong'sof terrorism to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred.

Io order to clarify this Importanto the millions of concerned Americans who readhould appreciate your publishing thia.lcttor.

JmJ W. E. Colby W. E. Colby

Orif - xDir r. Thuermer

illiam Sullivan of Stafe (via2 Janl olonel Fatnh-in. 'nsn/iS*

Lloyd Shearer

Editor at Large

Parade Magazine

hird Avenue

New York, New

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassinationeapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam. " ave held responsible positions In CIA for many years and was also (during detached service from CIA)for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave In public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that)

does not and has not used political assassination as

Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by theof Vietnam,with the support of the CORDS clement ofssistance Commandoordination withncluding CIA.

Phoenix is not and wasrogram of It countered the Viet Cong apparatus attempting toGovernment of Vietnam by targctting its leaders. Whereverthese were apprehended or invited to defect,ubstantial

. number were killed in firelights during military operations orcapture. Thereast difference in kind, not merely In degree, between these combat casualties (even Including the few abuses which occurred) and the victims of the Viet Cong's systematic campaign of terrorism to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who readhould appreciate your publishing this letter.

( quCMfii. votumc. ii

ACTOR IRNIil SUECKINf Willi HIS fOUXIH WlfE

Q. How many timet haiat Corgnioe been married, and istfrJL. Springfield, Matt.

A. Boignme has been married four limes. His last' wife. Donna, has charged him wtthivorce.

lope and does he iHff fool Ch'Cjro. Itf.

i in (liham. England, onrs ml (of tiring il up.

un ii one wiih whom you canho wirftouise U. lery.

Q. li (here any age nty ol the US. Covcrnmcnl svhisb ha* beer) authoriierf lo focanxfe political assassination in itsWilson. Ausifn, Tet A. Ihe. agency which useshe Central Inictligcnce Agency. Many of its men in Vietnam havecivilian Communisis in an clfori lo destroy Ihc Vicleong infrastructure. Operation Phoeni* run by the CIAew high. political assassinations In Vietnam, laif.ely in response to enemy terrorist ladies which also include issassina-lion, kidnapping, terrorism ol all son*.

Q. Docs Richard Ninon have his own private gotf course al feytmma Reynoklt, O'anfto. fU.

m wear lifts in hit sbocsl And tlh Taylor, iufc theVe, Mi.

liftsake him taller. Yes, hois In lite family. Of ihe two |er and more responsible, llcripts they do, whichf recent flops.

A. Noi at Key Biscayne. Heii-ho'e pilch-and-pult course on his San Ciemento, Calif.estate.

Q. How fon| docs it take radioactivem Oiineic nuclear icsfieach AfChneboio. Bars'osv, Ca/il. A. ApproKimaiety three days depending on ihe wind.

ittldeM. DA KIEL O. WNllY (rfttor. JIM CO* KIN AMHEIl CUfllN senior editor. DAVID FA1FY

iiwciitc ed.io-s. 1INDA CUISTON, HIRBCRT KUMCR8ERC, MARTIN AiAtCUHIS.. MHKUHN ROIANI

I ll.lll.nli. MARY IIODOROWSU. SUIAS'M CtJRirY, DORK SCHOHMAN

DIMIUIA lulvort, VtRCINIA tori cartoonW.WiCX IARIAR

HUIMINIIlAl,INM

liii

twite

Mr. Lloyd Shearer

Editor at Large

Parade Magazine

hird Avenue

New York, New

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassinationeapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam, " ave held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (during detached service from CIA)for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely, qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

does not and has not used political assassination as

Phoenix-was run not by the CIA but by theol Vietnam with the support of the CORDS element ofssistance Command in coordination withncluding CIA.

Phoenix is not and wasrogram of It countered the Victun ratus. attempting to overthrow

the Government of Vietnamitswere killed in firelights during military operations resisting capture. Thereast difference in kind, not merely degree, between these combat casualties (even including thewhich occurred) and the victims of the Vict Cong's systematic

campaign of terrorism to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred.

n order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who roadhould appreciate your publishing this letter.

Mr. Lloyd Shearer

Editor at Large

Parade Magazine

hird Avenue

New York, New

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassinationeapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam. " ave held respoosible positions in CIA for many years and was also (duringservice from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

does not and has not used political assassinationweapon.

Phoenix was run not by the CIA but byof Vietnam with the support of the CORDSthe U. S. Military Assistance Command in coordinationU. S. agencies including CIA.

Phoenix is not and wasrogrambutcounter^the Vietlcadingrt-heo overthrow the Governmentby apprehending or defecting itsomewere killed in firefights during military operations orcapture. Thereast difference in kind, not

idegree, between these combat casualties (even including

buses /and the victims of the Viet '

Cong's systematic campaign of

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of'con- Americans whoIyour publishing this

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

TOP AND BOTTOM

j SiTllHT

SENDER WILL CHECK CLA.

UNCLASSIFIED ] ONFlDI-.VriA.,'

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

AND ADDRESS

i IAI-S

White

filPlY

FfPIT

kOUfOH

Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments.

Jan 72

Mr, Lloyd

Editor at Largo

Parade Magazine

hird Avenue

New York, New

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality. spor.aos 5cited thattaaweapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam. " ave held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (duringservice from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave in publicsession under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

docs not and has not used political assassinationweapon.

Phoenix was run not by the CIA but byof Vietnam with the support of the CORDSthe U. S. Military Assistance Command.

Phoenix isrogram ofof the Viet Cong apparatus were killed in themilitary operations or resisting police arrest. There isdifference in kind, not merely degree, between theseoccasional and fewbuses) and the Vietcampaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions ofAmericans who might be misled by Mr. Scott'should appreciate your publishing this letter.

Sincerely,

WILL CHECK CLA3

Tor AND BOTTOM

NFWFATJAL

routing slip .

AND ADDRESS

George

II OH

P.EPIT

Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments. If possible, wc should appreciate receiving your response this

HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

nwmiO/Executivc

0 Jan 72

CONFIDENTIAL

In your issue of January 9th, tne of Walter Scott's Personality ftarade responses stated that CIA "uVes political assassination as a X. eapon" and that Operation Phoenix 'Vun by theXCIAew igh for U. S. political assassinations^ inave held responsible positions in CIA for many Wears and Was also (duringservice from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Senate and

a. CIA does not aod hased politicalweapon.

b. Operation Phoenix was run iot by the CIA but

Government ol Vietnam with the support of the CORDS el

ofthe U. S. Military Assistanceerx^tL*,

cifJt.W*

Opcration Phoenixnjjtia priogram of

! inU

do^ypt military operationsv'There is

von

V vast difference in kind, not mcrelyMcgree, between thesc/fi. ^ including occasional and fewbuses)mpaign of terrorism referred to by Mr^Sc/tt.

Sincerely,

In order to clarify this important question tj^be'rrUlHons ofAmericans who might be misledcott'ahould appreciate your publishing this letter.

tft^ pfyr.n .Op , tirnttJJ

<sr^;- TV* of vv.

JiVmIp Ni%#feJjy j

i r

r or

rt iN

| for*

.-NDEt! WILL CHECK

TOP ANO BOTTOM

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

AND AODRESB

UFLt

KEPI*

Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments. If possible, we should appreciate your response this afternoon.

rOLO HERE TO RETURN TO SENCCR

AMD

Direct or

"1 UNCLASSIFIED

Jan 72

SK.CHKT

m: '0"1

cost's

Mr. Lloyd Shearer Editor at Large Paradehird Avenue New York, New

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassinationeapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations inave held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (duringservice from CIA] responsible for U.upport to Operationmfuniqucly/qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

does not and has not used political assassinationweapon.

Phoenix was run not by the CIA but byof Vietnam with the support ofthe CORDSU. S. Military Assistance Command.

Phoenix isrogram ofof the Vict Cong apparatus were killed in themilitary operations or resisting police arrest. There.isdifference in kind, not merely degree, betweenoccasionaland fewabuses) and the Victcampaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions ofAmericans who might be misled by Mr. Scott'should appreciate your publishing this letter.

j <aa-K- *}

r . c

Mr. Lloyd Shearer

Editor at Large

Parade Magazine

hird Avenue

New York. New

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of Januaryone of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassinationeapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam." ave held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (duringservice from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Scnato and House Committees) that:

docs not and has not used political assassinationweapon.

Phoewas run not by the CIA but byof Vietnam with the support of tho CORDS element

. of the U. S. Military Assistance Command^

Cm^ .

Phoenix isrogram ofof the Vict Congre killed in themilitary operations or resisting police arrest. There isdifference in kind, not merely degree, between theseoccasionalnd fewbuses) and the Victcampaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to theAmericans who might be misled by Mr. Scott'syour publishing this letter.

r : r

KHQEH WtH. CHCCKTOP /WO IIOTTOM

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

UNCLASSIFIED | | CONFIDENTIAL | | SECBtT

Anrfu/Thuarmer OfiVS1

- - i i

tEPlf

pew

. Ld r iii b 1 1 . 1 i,

cU n

Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comrru.iU. If possible, we should appreciate receiving your response this

roioieiu'in ro scndch

I ONO

Director

Jan 72

237

Pn>ian

The noted phrases should. In pay opinionj

be oute the kind that lead to the italticized "Editor's llote"the end of the letter which rehuta toe whole ^fpoint^ being nnde hy the letter writer.

"ndsisting poarrestwill get you, with thr press, nothing butnlckingnd as wo're really not goingin too much inliort letter anyway, -jhy not skip the occassional abuses bit.

Then's nry thots.

AHT

Lloyd Shearer

Editor at Large

Parade Magazine

hird Avenue.

New York, New

Dear Mr. Shcaren

In your issue of January 9th. one of Waltersonajity_ Paradc responses stated tltat CIA "uses political assassinationeapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIAew high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam. " ave hold responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (duringservice from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operationm uniquely qualified to testifyave in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

ft. CIA docs not and has not used politir.il assassinationeapon.

Phoenix was run not by the CIA but byof Vietnam with the support of the CORDSthe U. S. Military Assistance Command.

Phoenix isrogram ofof the Vict Cong apparatus were killed in themilitaryhere isdifference in kind, not merely degree, between these (Tvcn,

fend the Viet Cong's conscious campaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to the mUlions ofAmericans who might be misled by Mr. Scott'should appreciate your publishing this letter.

cm xr

-ir

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Documents Homepage > CIA Documents > Documents released in period: 8/23/1973-2/21/1973

CIA Released Documents

"FAMILY JEWELS"

Created: 5/16/1973

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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